

Date of Issue:
14 August 1992

REPORT NO: 013

[REDACTED]

3. SUBJECT:
OP BILLIARDS

Date of Information:
August 1992

4. SOURCE:

A former SVR Line X officer who served in London between 1972 and 1979 and in Paris from 1985 to 1992 who defected to the UK in 1992.

[REDACTED]

OP BILLIARDS

Recruitment

Vo [redacted] was invited to a trade union meeting in Kingston sponsored by Andy WILSON a few years after he arrived in UK. PARELLIC was present. Neither WILSON nor anyone else played any part in talent spotting PARELLIC. [redacted] invited PARELLIC to meet him alone. They discussed unemployment, trade union matters and social questions. They started meeting regularly once a month in restaurants. [redacted] treated these as covert meetings. He told PARELLIC not to speak about these meetings to others, but did not instruct him in covert measures in order not to frighten him off. PARELLIC told [redacted] about his life. He was disappointed about his lack of future in his employment. [redacted] encouraged PARELLIC to think that his life could be more adventurous. He also encouraged him to join a tennis club and gave him a racquet. For the first year [redacted] never broached the matter of his main interest; PARELLIC'S work in industrial technology. [redacted] felt it was too early to do so. [redacted] told PARELLIC that he was using the content of their discussions in his reports from the Embassy.

Vo 2. After a year [redacted] suggested that PARELLIC should get a better job and cut himself off from his CPGB activities. This took time as he was at first unwilling to break with his friends. Together they drew up a short list of companies, one of which was EMI. PARELLIC applied and EMI showed interest. The salary was lower than his current job, but [redacted] agreed to compensate him for this. [redacted] paid PARELLIC a significant sum (£1,000?) for joining EMI.

Vo 3. [redacted] also encouraged PARELLIC to get professional qualifications and improve his prospects. [redacted] and Moscow Centre did not expect PARELLIC to be successful because of his YCL background. PARELLIC'S landlord told him that the police had visited the house asking questions about his contacts. PARELLIC suspected that this was connected with security vetting.

Vo 4. PARELLIC was then assigned to the fuse project with Thorn/EMI. [redacted] made no demands on PARELLIC for information at first. Later [redacted] asked PARELLIC for information on the fuse. He intimated that he would be prepared to pay. At this time PARELLIC was having difficult relations with a girlfriend who was financially demanding. [redacted] used this as a lever but as their personal relations were so good it was not difficult for him to do so.

Vo 5. At first PARELLIC gave [redacted] a brief description of the fuse. [redacted] paid PARELLIC a small amount of money for this and asked him to find out about the security arrangements at EMI. He asked for information about the security staff, checks at the

SECRET

gate and document security. He also asked whether it was possible to take a camera into the site. The impression received was that THORN EMI had a very lax security regime. Nevertheless [redacted] did not ask PARELLIC to take any documents out. At this stage Moscow Centre also asked for more checks on PARELLIC since it was unusual to gain such information from a former member of the CPGB.

6. [redacted] asked PARELLIC to memorise passages and diagrams from documents and reproduce them at home. He was then to photograph his notes, destroy them and give the film to [redacted]. The information was sent to Moscow Centre who replied to [redacted] that the fuse was old fashioned and of little interest. [redacted] could not recall which documents PARELLIC reproduced.

7. There were continuing suspicions about PARELLIC's reliability by Moscow Centre. On one occasion during a meeting [redacted] and PARELLIC were walking together in the grounds of Hampton Court when they came across Andy WILSON. WILSON expressed no surprise to see [redacted] and PARELLIC together. [redacted] had instructed PARELLIC to distance himself from the CPGB and the union in Kingston so he was concerned over this chance meeting. He asked PARELLIC whether there had been any reaction to this meeting, but PARELLIC said that he had heard of none.

Vienna Oral Lie Detector Test

8. Moscow Centre were concerned about the political repercussions of the case and whether PARELLIC was under British Control. The case was reported to ANDROPOV, then head of the KGB. It was decided to mount a sophisticated security check on PARELLIC which was the first of its kind. The check involved ten people in Austria. [redacted] suggested to PARELLIC that he travel to Austria in August with his girlfriend on the pretext of taking a holiday. [redacted] paid for the journey. [redacted] took no other part in the operation. The test took place in a rented house. One room was set aside for the test and one for the operators. A team patrolled the streets around the house in cars and on foot. The unit responsible for the operation was not from the FCD. One of the participants was Boris snu from the British desk in Directorate T and formerly en poste in London before [redacted]. PARELLIC passed the test, but some doubts still remained because of the unusual nature of the case, in particular PARELLIC's Communist background and the ease with which he penetrated EMI. Moscow Centre instructed [redacted] to tell PARELLIC to take copies of classified documents to Vienna. [redacted] objected to this unnecessary risk but was overruled. [redacted] believed that PARELLIC had copied the documents in EMI but could not be sure. He did not see the copied documents. The Centre was satisfied with the documents which were shown to ANDROPOV. [redacted] was not sure in which year the Vienna trip took place, but believed that PARELLIC was still working at EMI at the time.

SECRET

PARELLIC's Status

9. [REDACTED] did not have time to undertake the bureaucratic process of formalising PARELLIC as an agent. PARELLIC therefore remained a confidential contact while he was run by [REDACTED]

PARELLIC's Camera

10. [REDACTED] gave PARELLIC the money to buy a camera. This was a normal SLR model, either a Konica or a Canon. [REDACTED] instructed PARELLIC not to take the camera into EMI.

PARELLIC's Loss of Access

11. PARELLIC's loss of access to the fuse came as a great disappointment and puzzle. At about this time [REDACTED] noticed surveillance just before a meeting that he was unable to abort. [REDACTED] grabbed PARELLIC and took him to a nearby station where they took a train. PARELLIC said he had not noticed anything unusual, but [REDACTED] suspected that PARELLIC had come to attention.

Information Passed to [REDACTED] and Evaluation of PARELLIC

12. PARELLIC gave [REDACTED] about three films each with twenty four exposures or less of his notes from classified documents. [REDACTED] did not give PARELLIC any guidance on what to copy. Moscow Centre was not impressed with the information, which it said was of an older type of fuse. In [REDACTED]'s view the Centre wanted PARELLIC to bring the documents to Vienna in order that he make a visible commitment to them rather than because of the value of the documents. The case was judged at the time as a promising one for the future rather than a currently productive case.

13. After PARELLIC was transferred to EMI Medical he continued to pass information to [REDACTED]. He obtained twelve volumes of documents on a medical scanner. In this case he took original documents from the works as they were unclassified and it was easy to obtain official copies.

Handover to LAZIN

14. [REDACTED] introduced PARELLIC to LAZIN at a meeting. The handover was without incident.

15. While LAZIN ran the case a DLB in a telephone box was lost. The DLB contained a map with a route for PARELLIC to follow to a meeting. However the DLB was disturbed and pieces of paper thought to be the map were seen on the ground. It was concluded that children had found the DLB and destroyed the map. [REDACTED] heard about this while he was back in Moscow.

16. [REDACTED] did not think that PARELLIC provided anything of value while he was run by LAZIN. [REDACTED] heard some details of the case while he was in Moscow where he initially worked on the

British desk but he could not be sure that he had heard all the significant details.

17. After LAZIN was expelled contact was lost with PARELLIC. A A CHERNYAYEV (Line X, en poste 1979-83) made a reconnaissance to re-establish contact. He may have made a telephone call to PARELLIC. O P KRASAKOV Line X, en poste 1984-85 re-established contact by which time PARELLIC was working for GEC. PARELLIC then started to provide information of interest to Directorate T.

Current Situation

18. [redacted] thought that PARELLIC may still be in contact but there is a problem with the case, either PARELLIC is reluctant to continue or the case officer is unhappy. In support of this [redacted] said that when he was on leave in Moscow in June or July 1991 he was asked to visit the British desk in Directorate T to provide advice on the case, but [redacted] did not have the time to do so. In September 1991 [redacted] received a letter in Paris from Moscow asking him if he could organise a meeting with PARELLIC in France. [redacted] did not reply to the letter. He has heard nothing further about the case since.

A Warning to PARELLIC?

19. [redacted] thought that there would be no attempt to contact PARELLIC now that he had defected. The Centre would suspect a trap. Otherwise, the signal for danger would typically be a piece of paper (with no message) of a particular colour under the windscreen wiper of PARELLIC's car. There would be no procedure for PARELLIC to contact his case officer. It would be against all normal practice for the agent to be able to take this initiative.

Names Used by [redacted]

20. PARELLIC knows [redacted]'s surname. [redacted] gave him his card once. Andy WILSON could also have told PARELLIC [redacted]'s full name. [redacted] was known by the codename 'OZEROV' within the Service. This was used in UK, in the Centre and in France.

PARELLIC's Reaction to his Loss of Security Clearance

21. PARELLIC's actions to find out why he had lost his security clearance were agreed with [redacted]. There were a number of reasons for this course of action. It was better to know why he had lost his clearance. They also felt that he should press his rights in order to check whether there was a proper case against him. Psychologically it was better to be self assertive in the matter. The aim was for PARELLIC to regain his clearance.

SECRET

Motivation of PARELLIC

22. Ideological

Money

Opened new horizons/gave PARELLIC feeling of self importance.

Disappointment with leadership and corruption in the CPGB.

Talent Spotting by PARELLIC?

23. PARELLIC did not talent spot or help recruit anyone else. [redacted] asked him to talent spot other staff but he seemed reluctant or unable to do this. [redacted] did not press him as he did not think this was the most appropriate use of PARELLIC at this stage.

Meetings

24. [redacted] used to meet PARELLIC in parks and restaurants in the Kingston area. Initially [redacted] met PARELLIC near his home. Later [redacted] used the telephone box technique to provide counter surveillance on PARELLIC before the meeting. [redacted] would intercept PARELLIC on his walk before when he was satisfied that PARELLIC was not under surveillance. Meetings took place once a month, usually during the evening at the weekend. The next meeting was arranged at each meeting.

25. The signal for an emergency meeting was a piece of paper of a particular colour under the windscreen wiper of PARELLIC's car. On seeing this signal PARELLIC would go to a telephone box at a particular time when he would receive a call from [redacted]. [redacted] never had occasion to use an emergency signal with PARELLIC.

DLB

26. [redacted] only used DLBs in telephone boxes to give PARELLIC a route to a meeting.

Codeword

27. The codeword for PARELLIC was 'BORG'. [redacted] chose this because of his own interest in tennis.

Payment

28. The payment of £1,000(?) was in recognition of PARELLIC's success in getting employment with EMI and as an inducement to co-operate. This was a large amount of money but was sanctioned because the case was considered to have a great potential.

29. [REDACTED] did not give PARELLIC a regular payment at first. After the test in Vienna PARELLIC was put on a salary. [REDACTED] instructed PARELLIC not to put the money in his bank and to use it wisely for private purposes.

Training

30. [REDACTED] gave PARELLIC tradecraft training. [REDACTED] stressed that he should be cautious and be friendly with colleagues. [REDACTED] showed him ways of checking that his contacts were not in touch with the Security Service. He gave him training in anti-surveillance.

Equipment

31. Apart from the money to buy a camera, [REDACTED] gave PARELLIC no equipment. It was possible that PARELLIC was given equipment later on.

Secret Writing/Live Letter Boxes

32. [REDACTED] did not instruct PARELLIC in secret writing. He did show him how to make cryptic diary notes giving details of their next meeting. [REDACTED] did not give him any LLB addresses abroad.

Trips Abroad

33. As well as Vienna, [REDACTED] knew that PARELLIC went to the USA in 1976/77. This was before he entered EMI. [REDACTED] asked him to write a letter to his American girlfriend and ask for an invitation to visit. [REDACTED] paid for the trip, hoping that PARELLIC may make contacts for a future job there. Nothing came of this and all PARELLIC was able to give [REDACTED] afterwards was simple information concerning USA customs procedures. [REDACTED] also remembered that PARELLIC had visited Portugal. He was tasked to clear a DLB from an area prohibited to Russians. This was a loyalty test. This was before the security test in Austria. PARELLIC travelled under his own name.

PARELLIC's Wife

34. PARELLIC married soon after [REDACTED]'s departure from UK. [REDACTED] thinks that this was the same girl with whom PARELLIC had been having earlier problems. [REDACTED] is not certain that PARELLIC's wife was aware of PARELLIC's relationship with the Soviets but he thinks it likely. He considers PARELLIC's Wife (Pam) as having the stronger character and PARELLIC is therefore subordinate to her.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Date of Issue:

25 August 1992

[REDACTED] REPORT NO: 034

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

3. SUBJECT:

Date of Information:

PARELLIC - Operation BILLIARDS -
Further (Interim) Reporting

August 1992

4. SOURCE:

A former SVR Line X officer who served
in London between 1972 and 1979 and in
Paris from 1985 to 1992 who defected
to the UK in 1992.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PARELLIC - Operation BILLIARDS - Further (Interim) Reporting

[redacted] was given copies of the "Williams" letter (appendix 1a and b to the brief); PARELLIC's scribbled notes, possibly referring to contacting arrangements (appendices 2 to 5); and PARELLIC's prepared notes/reports found in the boot of his car (appendix 6 a to e); PARELLIC's maps of Downtown Chicago (1976) and Oporto (1977); and a map of the locations mentioned in the notes above. He studied them on his own for about an hour without comment or interruption from the debriefer, who then asked him for his interpretation and opinion of the papers. [redacted] was told by the debriefer that his unprompted comments were required and to this end the debriefer would, so far as possible, refrain from any comment or questioning of his own.

The "Williams" Letter

2. [redacted] said that this letter could have been sent to PARELLIC to call him to a meeting after interruption of contact. He noted that the handwriting was not that of a Britisher neither in the formulation of the characters nor in style. There were also some spelling mistakes. There was no address of sender on the letter nor on the envelope. The name "Williams" was not known to him. Source presumed from this letter that PARELLIC must have been given in advance some fixed contact arrangements so that he would know exactly what to do on receipt of such a letter.

3. Source was then asked whether he thought it risky to send such a letter to an agent's home address. He replied that it did, indeed, incur some degree of risk but it was a very practical way of re-establishing contact and it is a normal and accepted SVR Line X method of doing this. Other methods would include telephoning the agent or attempting to intercept him en route on his way to work. On reflection, Source was confident that this letter was an attempt to renew contact after a long interruption.

The Scribbled Notes

4. The Source stated that these represent pieces, written by PARELLIC himself, of a plan of contact arrangements with his Case Officer, using abbreviations in some instances. Source was then asked questions about each Appendix to the brief (nos 2 to 6e) and was then shown, at his request, the relevant "best guess" translations.

a) Appendix 2

- (i) Source did not, himself use tennis locations for intelligence meetings with PARELLIC. He used these only initially during the long period of

cultivation. He could see the possibility of such places now being used as they would offer a form of natural cover. He could not remember whether he had used Parliament Hill for a meeting - it is a possibility; but most of his meetings with PARELLIC took place in the Wembley and Kensington areas.

- (ii) The "Danger" and "Come Next Day" signals might well be used in conjunction with eg a card on a display or message board in a club or in a changing room. Such a signal could be put in a place regularly visited by PARELLIC and which could be visited by his Case Officer from the Residency. Such a site could be used for placing a signal to call or cancel a meeting or as a warning of danger.
- (iii) It was suggested to [REDACTED] that the Horsenden Hill entry could represent a meeting and fall back arrangements if contact was broken. He agreed with this interpretation.

b) Appendix 3

- (i) "Jan Apr every 4 months" looks like a constant contact arrangement in case of contact interruption, according to Source. Starting in January or April, for example, every 4 months, PARELLIC was to visit a fixed signal site or meeting place, in order to meet, for example, a new Case Officer unknown to him, in the event of his previous Case Officer having returned to the FSU without a handover or been declared png. The "Green? Line/Tone Go" and "Answer Michael" probably refers to a sign and form of words to act as a recognition signal. This kind of arrangement would be made if the pattern of regular meetings was broken. For example, if the Case Officer had come under surveillance for two or three successive, regular, fall back and possibly emergency meetings in succession, or if the agent was ill or otherwise unable to get to the regular meetings, then reliance would be placed on the constant fall-back arrangement every fourth month, mentioned above. PARELLIC would be expected to appear at these meetings, on the first Saturday of every fourth month (Source's interpretation) until such time as a successful meeting occurred.
- (ii) Source did not know how to interpret 4/15,22. If these were dates, neither the 13th nor the 22nd could be the first Saturday in any month.

- (iii) Source thought that the word "Standard", could represent a lamp standard or pillar at which, perhaps, PARELLIC should pause on an Anti-Surveillance route.
- (iv) The IQA Journal meant nothing to Source.
- (v) The bottom half of the note at Appendix 3 represented more contact arrangements showing a change in the pattern. The note probably indicates a new recognition phrase to do with "plants of common interest" and signal (ie PARELLIC should carry a copy of the "Guardian" newspaper), and new schedule constant meetings to take place in 'Homebase', with the Reserve and Fall-back meetings in 'Bejam'. These constant meetings appear to be organised for noon, still on the first Saturday of each month, possibly starting the route in Gloucester Road.

c) Appendix 4

- (i) Source does not recall having used South Harrow (station) himself, as a meeting place with PARELLIC, but he noted that the area is not far from Wembley - one of the areas he used for this purpose.

(ii) Sudbury Town Triangle

At this point Source noticed that Sudbury Town is in a triangle of roads. If this triangle contains parkland and telephone boxes (referred to in his discussion with [REDACTED]), it could be a contact area he had used with PARELLIC.

- (iii) "When finished" etc could be a note for the next meeting more in the form of a question for PARELLIC to ask his Case Officer rather than a Case Officer's instruction.

d) Appendix 5

- (i) Karl GEHRING could have been talent-spotted by PARELLIC. Source asked PARELLIC to talent spot when he was the Case Officer, but PARELLIC was not particularly willing to undertake this work and never came up with any suggestions. "Get Karl's address" and "get old project notes" could refer to tasks set by the case officer.

- (ii) By this time, Source took it for granted that these notes and signs were to do with meetings and signals.

- (iii) In answer to a comment about the proximity of the junction of Abbotsbury and Melbury Roads to the Soviet Embassy, Source replied that such a site would be chosen typically as an emergency signal site. One way of using it would be for the agent to place the signal [eg if he wished to deliver (orally or physically) some urgent and important intelligence; or if he was in danger]. Another would be for the Case Officer to use it to invite an important agent to the nearest possible secure point to the Embassy for a meeting if, for any reason, the Case Officer was unable to travel further afield, or for a new Case Officer to request a meeting for the first time, after the departure or expulsion of the previous case officer without a handover. The former use is the more likely and would be quite normal in a country such as the UK or USA where the operating conditions for the conduct of clandestine intelligence activity are very difficult because of heavy surveillance. In such circumstances, the signal site typically would be at a point which the Case officer passes on foot, or in his car, every day on his way to work, so that surveillance teams would not notice the signal being read. Alternatively, this type of emergency signal site could be given to an agent as a form of assurance of psychological prop and rarely used.
- (iv) Source thought that "Long Break" could conceivably refer to an extended lunch hour meeting.

5. The Scientific Papers

a) Appendix 6a

Any intelligence, such as this paper, on, or touching on, the subject of SDI (Strategic Defence Initiative) is of top priority to the KGB/SVR Directorate T.

b) Appendices 6b to 6e

Source did not think that the Directorate T Requirements List mentioned any of these subjects specifically, but they would certainly be of interest to the Directorate and would be classified as "Initiative" reports ie reports on subjects thought by the agent and/or Case Officer as of possible interest and submitted to directorate T in precis form for comment.

c) General Remarks on Appendix 6

Source noted that all these papers were prepared in

capital letters in the same manner as when he was the Case Officer. The normal procedure would be for PARELLIC to photograph or photocopy them for his Case Officer and then destroy his original notes. From this he surmised that these papers had been prepared for PARELLIC's Case Officer but not yet handed over.

6. The Money

a) The £1000 Initial Payment

It was put to Source that he had changed his mind on the size of the initial payment made to PARELLIC from £10,000 to £1,000. Source agreed and said he had thought about the matter and reached the conclusion, for the following reasons, that the sum had been £1,000:

(i) The sum had intentionally been a substantial one in order to try to ensure PARELLIC's co-operation. At the time £1,000 would have represented about 25% of PARELLIC's annual salary and this sum would have been about the right size. £10,000, on the other hand, would have been excessive and it is unlikely that Centre would have approved the payment of such a large sum at such an early (and unproven) stage in PARELLIC's intelligence career.

(ii) Source also deemed it possible he had thought of the figure £10,000, because he was so used to thinking in terms of French Francs. This number of Francs would, of course, roughly equate to £1,000.

b) The £2,000 Paid in £50 Notes

Commenting on the £2,000 paid in notes, some of which had come from the USA, Source stated that this cash could well have been obtained from a branch of an American Bank in the UK, if PARELLIC or the security officer in the London Residency had gone there to exchange dollars for pounds sterling. Sometimes agents were paid in American dollars (in France and many other countries such an arrangement is the norm), but Source thought it fairly unlikely, on balance, that an agent in the UK would have been paid in currency other than Sterling. Nevertheless, these Sterling notes could have been obtained by the Residency in exchange for dollars.

The Trip to the USA (1976)

7. Source was shown the marked map of Downtown Chicago and asked for his comments. He replied that this trip had no intelligence significance in terms of meetings, signals and

tradedcraft etc nor was the local Residency informed of the trip. PARELLIC was sent on the trip, paid for by the KGB, to establish contacts and friends and to reconnoitre the possibilities of obtaining a job out there. It had been the KGB's intention to transfer PARELLIC from the UK to the USA to work against "The Main Target". In the event, these plans failed. Source thought that the ringed buildings and numbers might, therefore, represent universities, research establishments or contact addresses. They would not have been telephone kiosks, or meeting places or DLBs.

The Trip to Portugal (1977)

8. Source was shown the marked map of Oporto and asked for his comments. In this case, the trip was for more obvious intelligence reasons -

- a) To find out if PARELLIC was reliable and "clean" (ie not a double agent);
- b) To test his commitment as an agent.

The Local Residency was informed in advance of the trip and asked, via Centre, to make impersonal contact with PARELLIC, (via DLB if Source could remember correctly, but it could have been by telephone) to give him detailed instructions to follow a certain route, and fill or empty a DLB. Source did not think that he gave PARELLIC the map. He thought it probably had been provided locally. The Local Residency was to provide officers to keep PARELLIC under surveillance throughout this route. Source thought that the "crosses" might represent telephone kiosks or potential DLB sites. Whilst Source had given general instructions to PARELLIC in London, Source had not been privy to the actual details of the test route. When told that the crosses were telephone kiosks, Source thought this entirely consistent with the aims of the exercise.

Desk Comment: The rest of the brief, particularly the "Harry" story, will be put to Source on 27 August 1992.

SECRET

Date of Issue:

1 September 1992

NO: 046

3. SUBJECT:

Date of Information:

[REDACTED]'s Contemporaries in London - August 1992
Viktor LAZIN

4. SOURCE:

A former SVR Line X officer who served in London between 1972 and 1979 and in Paris from 1985 to 1992 who defected to the UK in 1992.

[REDACTED] REPORT 046

[REDACTED]'s Contemporaries in London - Viktor Nikolayevich LAZIN

When Source left the UK in 1979, LAZIN took over as Head of Line X. He ran the agent "BORG": [REDACTED]

2. Source thought that LAZIN, like most of his colleagues at the time, was "full of noise" and not much intelligence action. They were more keen on shopping for Western goods and lining their own pockets.

Date of Issue:
1 September 1992

REPORT NO: 049

[REDACTED]

3. SUBJECT:

PARELLIC - Operation BILLIARDS -
Further Reporting

Date of Information:
August 1992

4. SOURCE:

A former SVR Line X officer who served
in London between 1972 and 1979 and in
Paris from 1985 to 1992 who defected
to the UK in 1992.

[REDACTED]

REPORT 049

PARELLIC - Operation BILLIARDS - Further Reporting

Further to [REDACTED] Report 034, Source was given details of the "Harry" story, and of the £12,000 payment over the last two years and was asked for his comments.

2. Source expressed surprise at the £12,000 payment since February 1990, in view of the altered circumstances within the KGB/SVR over that period. The essence of the situation at Centre is that, over the last two years there has been no organised demand for intelligence from Government Departments or Industry, particularly following the demise of the VPK, and mounds of documentary intelligence has been piling up waiting for a customer. Neither is there any proper Direction from Centre, nor money to pay agents. In Paris, the instructions from Centre, over the last year, were to try to hold on to the agents they had, but to carry on so far as possible without paying them. Against this background, the payment of £12,000 over the last two years seemed substantial and indicative that PARELLIC must have produced worthwhile information, or perhaps been the only major case left to run.

3. Referring to the "Harry" story, Source considered that "Harry" might well be the alias used by PARELLIC's Case Officer. When Source was running the case he used the alias "Simon", when telephoning the agent. Each successive Case Officer, he thought, would choose his own alias - therefore the alias used could change several times over the course of an agent's career.

4. When given the description of "Harry" up to but short of the flecked grey suite, Source smiled and said "BOZHANOV". Alternatively, "Harry" could be an Englishman, if the Case Officer had decided to run PARELLIC via a Head Agent. In today's climate, when officers are seeking unorthodox ways of running agents, this method would be considered as a possibility.

5. A Head Agent role might be given, for instance, to a proven, trustworthy agent who had lost access in his original field of operation. Source doubted however, that the UK Station had a sufficient number of agents to spare one as a Head Agent. In the 1970s Line X in the UK had about 5 agents at any one time. The advantages of using a Head Agent of non-FSU nationality would include the dissociation of the agent from the Embassy/RTD and unlimited and unfettered travel by the Head Agent abroad (eg Helsinki) for Third Country meetings.

6. On this evidence, Source thought it was not possible to decide that any part of the "Harry" story was untrue.

REPORT 063

BILLIARDS - KGB Consideration of PARELLIC's CPGB Associations in his Recruitment

PARELLIC was a member of the Young Communist League (YCL) when [redacted] first met him. This was regarded by Centre and [redacted] both as an advantage and disadvantage: an advantage in that PARELLIC was politically sympathetic, reliable, loyal and well motivated; a disadvantage in that he was unlikely ever to obtain access to classified information.

Desk Comment:

It is, of course, well known from RIS MO that information does not have to be classified to be of considerable use to the RIS. This was clearly an overriding consideration in PARELLIC's case.

2. These considerations, however, no longer apply. Because, in the SVR's experience, most members of foreign Communist Parties (CPs) blame the current and recent FSU leadership for the demise of Communism, it is dangerous for SVR Intelligence officers to attempt to have any kind of operational relationship with such people.



