Mike Smith

This will be a very important week for Mr. Smith. If you can do anything to demand his case gets a just hearing please help. Good luck to him.

MIKE SMTIH: "I think any engineer who reads this in association with the files 1 and 2 from the Count 4 evidence will realise that Meirion Lewis is exaggerating his evidence to convince the jury to convict me. "

12-07-2006 SECRET MI5 debriefing reports. Reports made by Stella Rimington when she was the Head of Counter-intelligence (i.e. the "Desk") taken from interviews with Viktor Oshchenko shortly after he defected to the UK in 1992.

I have been following the case of Mike Smith and have obtained some new documents on his trial that implicate an American who was working for the KGB and English Intelligence, and shed more light as to the bias of the prosecution in what appears to be the fabrication of the case against him. The following documents sent to me by Mr. X for publication make interesting reading for anyone interested in the world of spies and I encourage anyone who is able to, to publish them and share them in order to help Mr. Smith whose life has wrongfully been destroyed as a result of the case made against him. The first file has SECRET stamped all over it with several pages marked TOP SECRET as well. It is lightly redacted with several annotations as to the redactions by Mr. X..

08-12-2006 HOLES IN PROSECUTION of MIKE SMITH More Secret Evidence in Mike Smith Case

Hi John,
        Here is the document that has an important place in Mr.Smith's legal case. It shows how the judge decided which evidence would be admissible at the trial, and it reveals how the end result of a trial can be determined by the decisions at these pre-trial hearings. The main point that emerges is how the judge firmly comes down on the side of the prosecution, and he allows in a lot of highly prejudicial evidence - evidence which at best could only be described as speculative. It is apparent from the way these legal arguments developed that both the judge and the prosecution were following the directions of MI5, because the evidence which was ruled admissible followed the story that MI5 had focused on.
        The effect of the judge's rulings was to ensure that there was a strong bias in the trial towards the prosecution case, and this caused the defence team problems because most of the evidence was circumstantial. This imbalance in the trial towards the prosecution also placed pressure on the jury to convict, which is what they did.
        Reading through the arguments the prosecution presented to the judge, it can be seen that there was little or no evidence to support the link to Viktor Oshchenko, which was the crux of the prosecution case. All the defence objections were dismissed by judge Blofeld, who allowed the prosecution to run a case based on assertions for which no evidence existed. Even the MI5 witness Stella Rimington made it clear at the trial: there was no evidence of a link between Oshchenko and Smith.
        The judge can be seen to play down the significance of Smith's holiday in Portugal in 1977, as though this was a side issue. However, this was done to disguise the fact that Portugal was indeed to become the main argument made to connect Smith to KGB tradecraft. It was an innocent tourist map from this holiday that enabled the prosecution to call evidence from a US citizen, referred to as Mr E. Mr E was recruited by Oshchenko in December 1978, while he worked as a salesman in a Hi-Fi shop in Tottenham Court Road, London. Mr E was run by two KGB controllers: Viktor Oshchenko and Yuriy Gennadyevich Pokrovskiy (who was later expelled from Britain).
        Mr E was born in Yorkshire (England) and he was groomed by Oshchenko due to his background in the US Navy and his electronics expertise, he left as a Petty Officer (electronics technician (radar) III class). The KGB were also interested in Mr E's relatives: his father was a retired US Army 0-6, his mother an English nurse, and his father-in-law worked with one of the US House of Representatives subcommittees. The prosecution went to great lengths to conceal the identity of Mr E, and to present him as some kind of friend of the US and British Security Services, but in actual fact it was clear from the evidence that Mr E had accepted significant amounts of money from the KGB, equivalent to the monthly mortgage payments on his home, and he allowed himself to be groomed as an agent for about 15 months or more.
        While working for the KGB, Mr E attempted to procure some sensitive integrated circuits, which were proscribed to the Russians under COCOM. He also undertook KGB training methods and sought to improve his professional position, so he might gain access to information useful to the Russians. One of Mr E's training mission's was a trip to Lisbon (Portugal) on the weekend of 21/22 July 1979, to deliver a package to a KGB contact.
        A major part of the prosecution argument was that Mr E had behaved in the same way as Smith, but on careful study of the history of the 2 people, this is far from being an honest argument by the prosecution.

Mike Smith wrote with the following offering on his case. Please read it carefully along with the other files on his case. Only through pressure from the public can he be assured of the fair trail and the re-opening of his case that he is seeking. Like many hundreds of others who have been unfairly tried and punished on the flimsiest of grounds by governments eager to persecute anyone for political gain, in particular with regard to Russia, his case deserves, in my opinion, to be heard and his vindication finally brought about.

SNIPPET Those who remember my case will be aware that in 1992/93 I was portrayed as a major KGB spy, featuring on the front pages of several national newspapers. My name later appeared in the Mitrokhin Archive, as did Melita Norwood - the �Granny Spy� - but unlike her I have been largely ignored by those commentating on the history of espionage in the UK.
In this article, I would like to familiarise JAR2 readers with some key elements of my case, and to raise questions about the official Prosecution account. I maintain that I did not receive a fair trial, and this is why I am still engaged in legal action to have my case re-opened.

This document is the "case Summary", which was the Prosecution's assessment of the case, and the main evidence and arguments on which they presented their case in court. The document may appear impressive, but much of the evidence was very weak. For example:

(1) The phone call was a trick and the police manipulated much of what happened during their interviews in order to make it seem like there was a previous history of such activities. No evidence was produced to support that argument.

(2) All the arguments about "tradecraft", and KGB methods, could easily have been evidence of more tricks by MI5, because they knew all about these things, and were in a good position to perform an entrapment operation. The mysterious Harry Williams and the source of the money were never traced.

(3) The jury gave the verdict "not guilty" to all the charges related to the handwritten notes (marked JS/16 to JS/20), and so all the experts and evidence produced by the prosecution failed to impress the jury.

(4) The Case Summary refers to the one "restricted" classified document found in the car. At no time did the prosecution identify what project this document was used on, or its significance, until well into the trial when a MoD expert claimed it came from Britain's ALARM missile project. This point has never been confirmed by the MoD.

(5) A major part of the prosecution case relied on the evidence about Oporto and the tourist map that had been found. This map was only a tourist map, and the markings on it had no connection with any espionage activity, but it suited the Prosecution to claim it "might or might not be evidence of KGB tradecraft". There is no mention in the Case Summary of the US citizen Mr E, who would be brought into the case late, and who played a major part in convincing the jury that the issues concerning Portugal were indicative of the involvement of the KGB.

There are other errors and distortions in the Case Summary, which will be explained on the blog http://www.parellic.blogspot.com

SNIPPET Those who remember my case will be aware that in 1992/93 I was portrayed as a major KGB spy, featuring on the front pages of several national newspapers. My name later appeared in the Mitrokhin Archive, as did Melita Norwood - the �Granny Spy� - but unlike her I have been largely ignored by those commentating on the history of espionage in the UK.

In this article, I would like to familiarise JAR2 readers with some key elements of my case, and to raise questions about the official Prosecution account. I maintain that I did not receive a fair trial, and this is why I am still engaged in legal action to have my case re-opened.

Mike Smith wrote to me and asked me to put copies of his final court documents on the site. These two documents are the court transcripts from his final two days in court. If anyone here in .ru land has any information that can shed light on his involvement in the matter in question please contact me, anonymously if you wish. I hope this helps you out Mike.

Dear John,
Cryptome has just published one of the most important documents from my trial in 1993, which is the summing up given by the judge before the jury went out to consider their verdicts: r-v-smith-su.htm If you would like to put it on JAR2 the files are attached.
Cheers
Mike

Michael John Smith was jailed for 25 years on Thursday 18th November 1993. The trial lasted nine weeks and was mostly held in camera due to the sensitive nature of evidential material. Smith faced four charges under the Official Secrets Act. The judge, Mr. Justice Blofeld, told Smith that he had betrayed his country for greed. Smith was acquitted of making five handwritten notes of sensitive projects for a purpose prejudicial to the interests of the State. Within these notes were details of the so-called 'Star Wars' program.

Smith made a successful appeal against his 25-year sentence in June 1995 and as a result was shortened to 20 years.

On Friday 25th February 2000 conditions of strict security surrounded a High Court application by Smith for the right to contact the press. The judge, Mr. Justice Jackson, ruled that Smith should not reveal any material filed by him or the MoD for use in the proceedings. Once again the full hearing is expected to be heard in camera.

If Michael John Smith serves his full sentence he will be 65 when he is released.

In 1995, both MI5 and the MoD were criticized over the handling of Michael John Smith. From a security viewpoint delays, errors and incorrect judgement characterized it.

I have looked at the Cryptome site in the past and it looks like it covers the topics that relate to the issues in my case. I will contact them as you suggest.

Meanwhile you may be interested in the "official" version of my case. I attach 2 documents: the judgment read out at my appeal in June 1995, and the UK Security Commission's report into my case published about a month later in July 1995. These are Word copies I made from the original documents

On 2/26/06, JARII <jar2@list.ru> wrote:

No problem but I think your case deserves more attention, I will try to do more. Have you tried cryptome? www.cryptome.org

Cheers friend,

John

Many thanks for putting the information from my blog onto your website, and also for giving a link to my blog.

I have put a link to your site on my blog and mentioned that you have put the information on JAR2.com. See here:

It is possible I have passed on information I did not understand, but this could not be part of charges 1 and 2, because those documents were never seen by anyone on the prosecution side. It was the prosecution argument that I had given these documents to a Russian SVR officer, and so how would the prosecution have known what they were? That is according to their case, although it is possible that the man I was dealing with was an MI5 officer, and then you could be correct - the prosecution denied that any MI5 officer was involved (for example in an entrapment operation).

It is my belief that the evidence in my trial - based on the exhibits the police found at my home - was of no real importance, and that they used experts to exaggerate in order to get my conviction. I say this because I cannot find any evidence to show that the exhibits were sensitive material, and my expert Dr Eamonn Maher found lots of information in the public domain to show most of the prosecution case was wrong.

What I believe happened was that the prosecution intended to charge me with leaking information about Britain's free fall nuclear bomb, which I worked on between 1976-78. Most of my interviews after my arrest were about the 1970s, and they said I had given Oshchenko details of the nuclear weapon in the 1970s. However, when it came to charging me with actual crimes, there was no mention of the nuclear bomb issue, and this was because the police and MI5 agreed that they did not have the evidence to bring that case to trial - MI5 even discussed this with Oleg Gordievsky, and that was why he gave evidence about tradecraft at my trial. Also, it is odd that Oshchenko never gave evidence at my trial either, which makes the prosecution's arguments look very puzzling.

My view is that my arrest was more to do with Mitrokhin giving details to the British early in 1992, because his period of work covered the 1970s when Oshchenko was in London. "Archive leaks" were mentioned to me in my interviews with the police in August 1992. But then Mitrokhin had retired by 1985 and so his "evidence" could not have been relevant to the charges at my trial (1990-92). The issue that has not been put in the public domain was that I was friendly with a trade unionist called Andy Wilson (AUEW Engineering Section) and Andy was friendly with officials at the Soviet Embassy in London - he went regularly to functions there, and he would have met Oshchenko and maybe discussed me with him.

On your questions, I did try using Liberty in the UK, but it has been difficult finding anyone who is willing to help me or who has the contacts to uncover more information. I did not try Amnesty International. I am not in prison now, I was released in November 2002 on parole. Finding the Russian Viktor Oshchenko may help if he will explain what he was doing in Paris before his defection. I believe he was a double agent before he defected, possibly for several years, and this would show that he was not the person he was portrayed as at my trial. Clearly Oshchenko has something to hide, otherwise we would have heard more information from him over the past 13 years.

I am grateful that you can mention something about my case on your website. I think this will help to create more noise about my case, and put pressure on the UK's Criminal Cases Review Commission, who are investigating whether a miscarriage of justice has taken place at my trial.

Many thanks for replying so quickly. At the moment I am not sure exactly what you can do to help, but the first thing I would ask is if you could please mention my blog on your website. In return I will say you can republish any of the information on my blog, and I hope there is something there that may interest you.

What I am looking for is technical help to undermine the evidence given at my trial regarding a document exhibit, which it was claimed came from the British ALARM missile project. You will see I have already raised this issue on my blog, and the fact the UK's Ministry of Defence are trying to avoid confirming this detail tells me that lies were told about the document in court. I already have a lot of technical data, I uncovered from public domain sources, to show the evidence of the main MoD witness Dr Meirion Francis Lewis was false, but clearly it is difficult discussing these matters in public because that part of my trial was held in secret sessions.

The other information I am seeking is about the ex SVR officer Viktor Oshchenko. He apparently has disappeared, and I have only found one reference in a newspaper article that has quoted him saying anything since 1992. Oshchenko was, I believe, an MI6 double agent for some time before he defected to the UK, but at my trial this was denied by the prosecution and an MI5 officer also testified under oath that Oshchenko had not been a double agent before July 1992.

Well, I will not say more now in case I may be boring you. Please let me know if you think you can be of any help to me, or alternatively if I can be useful to you.

I do not know if it interests you, or if I understand the type of subject your website covers, but I have recently started a blog about my case. This is intended to cover details of the background to my trial and conviction for spying, and some of the evidence that was involved in my case. You can see my blog here:

I recently received information regarding the case below and am requesting any parties with information related to the case to contact me. Thank you in advance, anonymity guaranteed.

Spy indictment: Official Secrets Act

It may not be known to the readers of my blog what was actually involved in my case and trial, and exactly what I had been accused of doing that led to my conviction for espionage. The Indictment was worded as follows:

The Crown Court at Central Criminal Court
The Queen -v- Michael John Smith

Michael John Smith is charged as follows:

COUNT 1
Statement of Offence
Communicating material to another for a purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State, contrary to Section 1(1)(c) of the Official Secrets Act 1911.

Particulars of Offence
Michael John Smith on a day between the 1st day of January 1990 and the 1st day of January 1991, for a purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State, communicated to another a sketch, plan, model, article, or note, or other document or information which was calculated to be or might have been or was intended to be directly or indirectly useful to an enemy.

COUNT 2
Statement of Offence
Communicating material to another for a purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State, contrary to Section 1(1)(c) of the Official Secrets Act 1911.

Particulars of Offence
Michael John Smith on a day between the 1st day of January 1991 and the 1st day of May 1992, for a purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State, communicated to another a sketch, plan, model, article, or note, or other document or information which was calculated to be or might have been or was intended to be directly or indirectly useful to an enemy.

COUNT 3
Statement of Offence
Making a sketch or note for a purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State, contrary to Section 1(1)(b) of the Official Secrets Act 1911.

Particulars of Offence
Michael John Smith between the 30th day of April 1992 and the 8th day of August 1992, for a purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State made sketches or notes which were calculated to be or might be or were intended to be directly or indirectly useful to an enemy.

COUNT 4
Statement of Offence
Obtaining or collecting material for a purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State, contrary to Section 1(1)(c) of the Official Secrets Act 1911.

Particulars of Offence
Michael John Smith between the 30th day of April 1992 and the 8th day of August 1992, for a purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State obtained or collected sketches, plans, models, articles, or notes, or other documents or information which were calculated to be or might have been or were intended to be directly or indirectly useful to an enemy.

There was no evidence at all about what scientific material was involved in Counts 1 and 2. I volunteered information that it related only to obsolete and unclassified commercial documentation, concerning silicon-on-sapphire and gallium arsenide technology. HRC (Hirst Research Centre) abandoned these technologies at Wembley in the late 1980s, and it would not be useful to an enemy. However, the Prosecution claimed, without any evidence, that the material must have been militarily sensitive - it is difficult to see how they arrived at such a conclusion.

Count 3 related to my handwritten notes:
JS/16 Rugate Filter Project (pp. 176-178)
JS/17 Micro-Machining Project (pp. 179-181)
JS/18 Quasi-Optical Car Radar Project (pp. 182-185)
JS/19 Micron-Valve Project (p. 186)
JS/20 Olfactory Research Project (p. 187)

I could go into great detail about the type of material found in Count 3, and the long prosecution and defence arguments about whether the �Russians� would have found it useful or not, or whether it was prejudicial to the UK. In the end these projects were potentially capable of dual commercial or military use (as is almost anything if you think about it), but there was insufficient evidence that I had either intended to hand this information to a Russian, or it was of real technical value to an enemy. After deliberation the jury used their common sense, and they rejected the prosecution claims.

Although all the scientific exhibits were in the same bag in the boot of my car, I was found not guilty of Count 3, but guilty of Count 4.

Count 4 related to GEC components and printed documents:
JS/14 Old surface acoustic wave, silicon-on-sapphire and gallium arsenide components (p. 1)

JS/15 Surface acoustic wave documents (pp. 2-175), including a RESTRICTED �ALARM� document (pp. 51-59)

JS/21-38 Bulk acoustic wave documents (pp. 188-269J), including an UNCLASSIFIED Rapier document (pp. 190-196)

SR/4 Infra-Red Imager documents (pp. 269/1-269/9)

SR/4 Silicon-on-sapphire documents (pp. 269/10-269/69)

SR/4 Gallium arsenide documents (pp. 269/70-269/87)

The components of JS/14 were old and obsolete examples (some labeled as non-working rejects) that had been lying around in my office. Since they would probably have been thrown away in any case, when the company moved site a few months later, I took them as souvenirs of my time at the company. The prosecution made the case that these components would have been useful to the Russians (for reverse engineering). However, as my expert Dr Eamonn Maher quite correctly pointed out, far more advanced and current examples of these devices were on open sale commercially - so why would a Russian be interested in obsolete material?

The documents in JS/15 was a collection of information from an approval exercise to qualify Hirst Research Centre to commercially produce similar surface acoustic wave devices, and to earn the company a certificate to meet a British Standard for this manufacturing capability (BS9450 Capability Approval Exercises in 1984). There was nothing apparently of significant military interest in this collection of documents, or so the defence was led to believe by the lack of any evidence from the prosecution, until the moment Dr Meirion Francis Lewis stepped into the witness box on 7 October 1993 and delivered his radically different view using undisclosed evidence. The issue revolved around whether one 9 page document related to the ALARM missile project. Readers of this blog will be aware that more than 12 years later the Ministry of Defence has yet to officially confirm the document was used on ALARM (Mr Andrew Mackinlay, my MP, asked a question in the House of Commons recently, but failed to get an answer). As I have stated previously, the conclusions of the Security Commission�s report were that 'at the time the document was created it was not specifically linked to a particular weapons system� (HMSO Cm 2930, Annex A.5, July 1995). Apart from the link to ALARM there were many errors and inconsistencies in Dr Lewis�s testimony about that document, and this is also awaiting resolution.

Documents in JS/21-38 related to a small bulk acoustic wave delay line, and some of that information referred to a component from a piece of test equipment used to test the Rapier system - a sort of �go/no-go� test. However, this documentation was also part of a BS9450 Capability Approval application in 1984. The documents gave details of the frequency band used by Rapier, but did not reveal the actual spot frequencies of any installation, as each Rapier system has a different operating frequency. The sensitivity of this information can be judged from the fact that it was openly published in Janes Land Based Air Defence Review, which printed how a version of Rapier, called Possum, uses the frequency band 3.1 to 3.3 GHz and that Rapier works in the �F-Band� frequency range. Many other technical points were published about Rapier in this Janes book, which can be purchased or read in a public library by any Russian who cares to look for it.

The 5 page UNCLASSIFIED Rapier document, dated 11 January 1984, was a procurement specification for a BAW (bulk acoustic wave) delay line. BAW delay line technology is well known, and at the trial it was stated that the component was to become obsolete. It is interesting that delay line specifications were openly published by GEC Marconi in a �Techbrief�, a glossy hand-out for customers, which states that typical delay lines can be manufactured with a 3.1 to 3.4 GHz frequency band. Any potential customer could request this leaflet, or buy a similar component.

It is also significant that the main �expert� called to give evidence about the technical aspects of Rapier, ex-Squadron Leader Colin Bagley, was not himself particularly well-qualified to give that evidence. My own expert Dr Eamonn Maher made a comment that the prosecution expert whose qualifications least impressed him was Colin Bagley. It is a strange and inexplicable fact that, despite ALARM and Rapier being the two specific weapons referred to at my trial, there were no witnesses called who were authoritatively expert on the design and performance of those weapons. Perhaps the prosecution was afraid of asking experts who might actually know the true significance of the documents used as exhibits at my trial?

If we are to believe the hawk-like vision of experts like Dr D.I. Weatherley, ex-Squadron Leader Colin Bagley and Dr M.F. Lewis, then Rapier and ALARM can be jammed by using some pretty basic information from Janes Land Based Air Defence Review (in the case of Rapier), and the specification of one commercially available component (in the case of ALARM). It seems incredible, if true, that Rapier and ALARM are so easy to jam, and that the UK has wasted hundreds of millions of pounds on such vulnerable systems. From my technical viewpoint I believe more than a little exaggeration was going on here, but unfortunately I am prevented from telling you more due to the gagging orders governing the �in camera� nonsense used at my trial.

The SR/4 Infra-Red Imager documents involved an overview of the assembly of the T.I.C.M. (Thermal Imager Common Module) using SPRITE Infra-Red detector devices. So much information is already published about Infra-Red Detectors (10,000 papers), that my own expert (Dr Eamonn Maher) said the Russians would be far more interested in the information already available in the public domain, than the simple and limited information in the few pages in my possession. Dr Maher should know what he was talking about, because he was a specialist in this area himself, but the Crown insisted on going into every tiny detail, as they did in everything else. The prosecution tried to make insignificant details look highly damaging to the Nation, even though Britain allows the U.S. and Japan (a former enemy) to manufacture these detectors under licence. Most of the information only concerned the detector�s assembly into its cooling jacket and could not be sensitive.

The remaining parts of SR/4, concerning silicon-on-sapphire and gallium arsenide documents, was shown by Dr Eamonn Maher to be of commercial interest and already available in the public domain.

So, in my opinion, the prosecution case boiled down to one 10 year-old RESTRICTED document (claimed to be from the ALARM project), and one 8 year-old UNCLASSIFIED document for a component used on a piece of Rapier test gear. To a person educated in electronic engineering, such as myself, it was quite shocking to hear allegedly well-qualified �experts� making claims that material already in the public domain was �sensitive�. There were some extraordinary things said in court.

At the end of my trial the sentences passed were as follows:

Charge 1: Passing information 1st January 1990 to 1st January 1991 - 8 years
Charge 2: Passing information 1st January 1991 to 1st May 1992 - 8 years
Charge 3: Making Notes and sketches 30th April 1992 to 8th August 1992 - Not Guilty
Charge 4: Obtaining material 30th April 1992 to 8th August 1992 - 9 years

Rather than, as is usually the case, making the sentences run concurrently, the judge made them consecutive. It was clear that it was only possible to find me guilty of counts 1 and 2 because of the material involved in Count 4, but that material was mostly in the public domain or of low scientific value.

There was no evidence of what material I passed on charges 1 and 2 and so it is impossible to prove that it was useful to an enemy and prejudicial to the interests of the State. However, the learned judge sentenced me on the basis that he was �bound to assume� that, having regard to the payments received for the documentation passed over, that the material passed over was sensitive. At my appeal these sentences were both reduced to 5½ years each.

The sentences can be seen to be excessive when it is considered that I only had security clearance to CONFIDENTIAL level, although there is no evidence I had access to anything above RESTRICTED status. The sentences are more appropriate to the Cold War period for a high level member of the armed forces or government services who had disclosed SECRET or TOP SECRET material to a hostile and active enemy. At the time of my trial, due to the recent political changes, Russia was no longer considered a potential enemy (according to Margaret Thatcher).

Sir Derek Spencer QC, Mr J Nutting QC and Mr John Kelsey-Fry appeared on behalf of the Crown

THE LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: On 18 November 1993, at the Central Criminal Court, on an indictment containing four counts the applicant was convicted of three offences of espionage and was sentenced to a total of 25 years imprisonment. On each of counts 1 and 2, for the offence of communicating material to another for a purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State, contrary to Section 1 (1)(c) of the Official Secrets Act 1911, the applicant was sentenced to consecutive terms of eight years imprisonment. On count 4, for the offence of obtaining or collecting material for a purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State, contrary to Section 1 (1)(c) of the Act, he was sentenced to nine years imprisonment, consecutive to the sentences passed on counts 1 and 2. On count 3 of the indictment, which charged the applicant with making a sketch or note for a purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State, contrary to Section 1 (1)(b) of the Act, the applicant was acquitted.

The applicant now applies directly to the full court for an appropriate extension of time and, if that extension is granted, for leave to appeal against both conviction and sentence. We have considered the relevant circumstances and are satisfied that we should grant the necessary extension of time and accordingly we do so. We therefore now turn to consider, first, the merits of the application for leave to appeal against conviction.

The essence of the Crown's case was that whilst he was employed by GEC as an Audit Manager in the Quality Assurance Department at Hirst Research Centre ("HRC"), an establishment involved in Government defence contracts, the applicant was an agent of the Russian Intelligence Services. It was alleged that between September 1990 and his departure from HRC in July 1992, the applicant communicated to his KGB controllers and their successors technical material and information from HRC which was relevant to this country's actual and potential defence capability.

Counts 1 and 2 of the indictment were specimen counts and were concerned with the period 1 January 1990 to April 1992. There was no specific documentary evidence available in relation to either count. Count 4 concerned the period 30 April 1992 to 8 August 1992 and related to specific bundles of documents which were found in the boot of the applicant's motor car on the day of his arrest.

The applicant denied that he was involved in any form of spying for the Russians. It was his case that he was engaged in industrial espionage and had been handing over information to one "Harry" who he believed was acting on behalf of a commercial competitor of GEC. A key issue in the case was therefore whether the applicant knew that he was dealing with the Soviet and/or Russian intelligence services when, as he admitted, he handed over the information in question.

It was the Crown's case that the applicant had been recruited as a Soviet spy in the early 1970's at a time when he was an acting member of the Young Communist League. It was alleged that he had been recruited by a KGB officer in London called Viktor Oshchenko who recruited agents with access to scientific and technological information; that after recruitment the applicant was "put on ice" until he was "reactivated" by a letter which he received in September 1990. At trial this letter was referred to as the "Williams" letter. The Crown claimed that, having been reactivated in September 1990, the applicant thereafter engaged in the espionage which gave rise to the specific counts in the indictment and for which he was paid substantial sums of money.

On 25 July 1992 Viktor Oshchenko defected and came to England on 31 July 1992. It was said that such a defection would inevitably cause any appointment with a contact known to Oshchenko to be aborted because of the threat the defection posed to KGB agents in the field.

On 6 August 1992 the applicant went by car to Harrow on the Hill. The documents which were the subject matter of count 4 were in the boot of his car. It appeared that the applicant was expecting to meet somebody but no-one appeared. On Saturday 8 August 1992 an officer in the British security services, identified as Mr B, telephoned the applicant at home. The whole of the resulting conversation was tape-recorded. Mr B adopted an eastern European accent and introduced himself as George. He then went on to say "I am a colleague of your old friend Viktor. Do you remember him?" To that question the applicant answered "yes". Mr B then said it was very urgent for him to talk to the applicant. He suggested that the applicant go to a nearby public telephone box where he would ring the applicant. About 18 minutes later the applicant was seen to leave his house and go to the specified phone box. He was kept under observation and photographed by Special Branch officers. A call was made to the kiosk in question but the applicant arrived too late to receive it. For a time the applicant stayed in the area of, and close to, the telephone kiosk before setting off to return home. On his return journey he was intercepted and arrested by Special Branch officers.

Date	Interview No.	Tape No.	Times	Page Nos.

8th August 1992	1	1	15:05 � 15:31	1 � 31
	2	2 3	17:50 � 18:17 18:19 � 18:41	32 � 58 59 - 83
	3	4	19:13 � 19:34	84 - 113

9th August 1992	4	5 6 7	14:08 � 14:38 14:40 � 15:07 15:10 � 15:36	114 � 141 142 � 167 168 - 191
	5	8 9 10 11 12	16:15 � 16:43 16:45 � 17:13 17:14 � 17:42 17:44 � 18:12 18:19 � 18:47	192 � 215 216 � 237 238 � 266 267 � 294 295 � 319
	6	13	21:12 � 21:21	320 - 332

10th August 1992	7	14 15	16:57 � 17:24 17:26 � 17:55	333 � 359 360 - 386
	8	16 17	20:19 � 20:47 20:48 � 21:16	387 � 415 416 - 441
	9	18	21:52 � 22:08	442 - 456

11th August 1992	10	19	10:20 � 10:23	457 - 461
	11	20 21	10:26 � 10:54 10:55 � 11:24	462 � 486 487 - 511
	12	22 23	12:21 � 12:50 12:52 � 12:58	512 � 533 534 - 539
	13	24 25	14:54 � 15:21 15:22 � 15:47	540 � 564 565 - 588
	14	26 27 28 29	17:27 � 17:55 17:56 � 17:58 18:00 � 18:29 18:30 � 18:33	589 � 612 613 � 615 616 � 641 642 - 644
	15	30 31 32	20:23 � 20:51 20:52 � 21:20 21:22 � 21:50	645 � 666 667 � 693 694 - 720
	16	33	22:20 � 22:48	721 - 745

Times