a

GAO

Report to the Ranking Minority Member,

Subcommittee on Financial Management,

the Budget, and International Security,

Committee on Governmental Affairs,

U.S. Senate

Federal and State

Action Needed to

Improve Security of

Sealed Radioactive

Sources

The number of sealed sources in the United States is unknown because NRC

and states track numbers of licensees instead of individual sealed sources.

Users of certain devices containing sealed sources are not required to apply

to NRC for a license. Accounting for these devices has been difficult. In

addition, since 1998, more than 1,300 incidents have taken place in the

United States where sealed sources have been lost, stolen, or abandoned.

The majority of these lost devices were recovered.

Security for sealed sources varied among the facilities GAO visited in 10

states. Also, a potential security weakness exists in NRC’s licensing process

to obtain sealed sources. Approved applicants may buy sealed sources as

soon as a new license is issued by mail. Because the process assumes that

the applicant is acting in good faith and it can take NRC as long as 12 months

before conducting an inspection, it is possible that sealed sources can be

obtained for malicious intent. In addition, NRC currently evaluates the

effectiveness of state regulatory programs, but these evaluations do not

assess the security of sealed sources.

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, NRC and states have

notified licensees of the need for heightened awareness to security, but have

not required any specific actions to improve security. NRC has been

developing additional security measures since the attacks, and issued the

first security order to large facilities that irradiate such items as medical

supplies and food on June 5, 2003. Additional orders to licensees that

possess high risk sealed sources are expected to follow. NRC and states

disagree over the appropriate role of states in efforts to improve security.

NRC intends to develop and implement all additional security measures on

licensees with sealed sources, including those licensed by states. However,

over 80 percent of states responding to our survey feel they should be given

responsibility to inspect and enforce security measures.

Sealed radioactive sources,

radioactive material encapsulated

in stainless steel or other metal, are

used worldwide in medicine,

industry, and research. These

sealed sources could be a threat to

national security because terrorists

could use them to make “dirty

bombs.” GAO was asked to

determine (1) the number of sealed

sources in the United States, (2)

the number of sealed sources lost,

stolen, or abandoned, (3) the

effectiveness of federal and state

controls over sealed sources, and

(4) the Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (NRC) and state

efforts since September 11, 2001, to

strengthen security of sealed

sources.

GAO recommends that NRC (1)

collaborate with states to

determine availability of highest

risk sealed sources, (2) determine

if owners of certain devices should

apply for licenses, (3) modify

NRC’s licensing process so sealed

sources cannot be purchased until

NRC verifies their intended use, (4)

ensure that NRC’s evaluation of

federal and state programs assess

security of sealed sources, and (5)

determine how states can

participate in implementing

additional security measures. NRC

stated that some of our

recommendations would require

statutory changes. We clarified our

report language to address this

concern. Agreement states and an

organization of radiation experts

agreed with our recommendations.

To view the full report, including the scope

and methodology, click on the link above.

For more information, contact Gene Aloise at

(202) 512-6870 or aloisee@gao.gov.

Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee

on Financial Management, the Budget,

and International Security, Committee on

Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate

NUCLEAR SECURITY

Contents

Results in Brief 4

Background 7

NRC and the Agreement States Lack Complete Information on

Numbers of Sealed Sources 9

Over 1,300 Devices Containing Sealed Sources Have Been Reported

Lost, Stolen, or Abandoned Since 1998 17

Weaknesses Exist in Federal and State Controls Over the Security of

Sealed Sources 20

NRC Efforts to Improve Security over Sealed Sources Have Been

Limited and Disagreement Exists over the Appropriate Role of the

States 27

Conclusions 32

Recommendations for Executive Action 33

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 34

Appendixes

Irradiators 45

Teletherapy 46

Industrial Radiography 47

Brachytheraphy 48

Well Logging Device 50

Fixed Industrial Gauge 52

Portable Gauge 53

GAO Contact 119

Acknowledgments 119

States as of December 31, 2002 13

Table 2: Type and Size of Sealed Sources Used in Medical and

Industrial Practices 55

States and on Federal Facilities in Agreement States as of

December 31, 2002 11

Figure 2: Agreement State Regulated Specific Licenses as of

December 31, 2002 12

Figure 3: Results of Integrated Materials Performance Evaluation

Program Reviews 25

Figure 4: Product Conveyor System in a Panoramic Irradiator 46

Figure 5: Stereotactic Radiosurgery Device (Gamma Knife) 47

Figure 6: Industrial Radiography Camera and Storage Case 48

Figure 7: High Dose Rate Remote After Loader Used for

Brachytherapy 50

Figure 8: Storage Container for Well Logging Sealed Source 52

Figure 9: Fixed Industrial Gauge 53

Figure 10: Portable Moisture/Density Gauge 54

CFR Code of Federal Regulations

CRCPD Conference of Radiation Control Program Directors

DOE Department of Energy

DOT Department of Transportation

GAO General Accounting Office

NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission

OAS Organization of Agreement States

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the

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permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or

other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to

reproduce this material separately.

A

The Honorable Daniel K. Akaka

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Financial Management,

the Budget, and International Security

Committee on Governmental Affairs

United States Senate

Dear Senator Akaka:

Since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks there has been concern that

certain radioactive material, such as cobalt-60, strontium-90, iodine-131,

cesium-137, iridium-192, and americium-241, could be used in the

construction of a radiological dispersion device—commonly referred to as

a “dirty bomb.” Such radioactive materials are used in devices that treat

cancer, sterilize food and medical instruments, and detect flaws in

pipelines and other types of metal welds. Much of the radioactive material

used in these devices is encapsulated, or sealed, in metal such as stainless

produced by using explosives in combination with radioactive material

upon detonation. Most experts agree that the dispersed radioactive

material would have few short-term health effects on exposed individuals

and that the explosives, not the radioactive material, would likely cause the

greatest amount of immediate injuries, fatalities, and property damage.

However, a dirty bomb—depending on the type, form, amount, and

concentration of radioactive material used—could cause radiation

exposure in individuals in close proximity to the material for an extended

time and potentially increase the long-term risks of cancer for those

contaminated. In addition, the evacuation and cleanup of contaminated

areas after such an explosion could lead to panic and serious economic

costs on the affected population.

Under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission

(NRC) regulates domestic medical, industrial, and research uses of sealed

sources through a combination of regulatory requirements, licensing,

1Some loose material, such as iodine-131, used in thyroid cancer treatments, and

technetium-99m, commonly used in medical imaging procedures is not in sealed source

form. However, for simplicity this report uses the term “sealed source” to refer to all

radioactive materials used for medical, industrial, and research purposes.

Letter

inspection, and enforcement. Section 274 of the act authorizes NRC to give

primary regulatory authority to states (called “agreement” states) under

and enforcement authority to 32 agreement states that administer the use

the use of sealed sources in the remaining states. NRC periodically

evaluates each agreement state’s regulatory program for compatibility with

NRC regulations and its effectiveness in protecting public health and safety.

Two types of licenses are associated with the use of radioactive materials—

general licenses and specific licenses. A generally licensed device usually

contains a sealed source within a shielded device, such as gas

chromatograph units, fixed gauges, luminous exit signs, or reference and

check sources. Such devices are designed with inherent radiation safety

features so that persons with little or no radiation training or experience

can use it, and as such do not require NRC or agreement state approval to

purchase and are widely commercially available. Specific licenses cover

uses, such as cameras used for industrial radiography, medical devices

used to treat cancer, and facilities that irradiate food or medical products

for sterilization. These uses generally require larger amounts of radioactive

material than can be obtained with a general license. Organizations or

individuals wanting to obtain a specific license must submit an application

and gain the approval of either NRC or an agreement state. In addition to

NRC and agreement states, other federal agencies, such as the Department

of Transportation, the Food and Drug Administration, and the

Environmental Protection Agency, regulate the safe transportation,

medical use, and cleanup of radioactive material. The Department of

2The purpose of section 274 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (42 U.S.C. § 2021)

is to recognize the interest of the states in the peaceful uses of atomic energy and to

establish programs for cooperation between the states and NRC to control the radiation

hazards associated with the use of radioactive materials. While it details procedures for

NRC to relinquish its regulatory authority to the states for medical, industrial, and research

uses of radioactive materials, NRC retains sole regulatory authority over, among other

things, nuclear power plants and the export and import of radioactive materials. In addition,

NRC retains regulatory authority over federal facilities (such as Department of Defense

bases or Veterans Administration hospitals)—see 10 C.F.R. § 30.6(b)(2).

3At the time of our report, Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida,

Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,

Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina,

North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas,

Utah, and Washington were agreement states. NRC expects Wisconsin will become an

agreement state in the summer of 2003.

Energy (DOE) regulates the use of radioactive material at its facilities and

at the national laboratories.

This report—the third that we have prepared at your request to examine

efforts to control sealed radioactive sources—examines efforts in the

United States to regulate the use of sealed sources domestically and to

determine (1) the known number of sealed sources in the United States; (2)

how many of these sealed sources have been lost, stolen, or abandoned; (3)

the effectiveness of federal and state controls over sealed sources; and (4)

NRC’s and agreement states’ efforts considered or implemented following

September 11, 2001, to strengthen security of sealed sources. To address

these objectives, we distributed a survey to radiation control agencies in

the 32 agreement states, the 18 non-agreement states, the District of

Columbia, and Puerto Rico to determine numbers and types of radioactive

materials licenses in their jurisdictions and to solicit their views on the

regulation of sealed sources. At the time of this report, all of the agreement

states except Arizona, 11 non-agreement states, and Puerto Rico had

responded to our survey. We did not receive responses from the following

non-agreement states—Alaska, Connecticut, Minnesota, Missouri,

Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Vermont, Wyoming, and the District of

regional offices; interviewed officials at NRC headquarters in Rockville,

Maryland; and analyzed NRC license and incident databases. In addition,

we observed NRC evaluations of the effectiveness of state regulatory

programs in Rhode Island and Florida and a similar evaluation of NRC’s

Region III radioactive materials regulatory program in Lisle, Illinois. We

visited 10 states to meet with officials of state radiation control agencies

(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 15, 2003) examined DOE’s efforts to recover and dispose of

unwanted “greater-than-Class-C” sources—sources that typically contain greater

concentrations of isotopes such as plutonium-238, plutonium-239, and americium-241, that

cannot be disposed of at existing low-level radioactive waste facilities. Our report, U.S.

(Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2003) examined international efforts conducted by the United

States, the Russian Federation, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and others to

control sealed sources.

5Although we did not receive surveys from these states, we obtained data on incidents

involving sealed sources and numbers and types of licensees from NRC.

and selected licensees representing a variety of types and uses of sealed

sources. Appendix I presents our scope and methodology in more detail.

unknown. NRC estimates that there are approximately 2 million sealed

sources in the United States. This estimate is based on the number of

specific and general licensees from NRC’s databases and agreement states

combined with data from an NRC survey conducted in the early 1990s. NRC

and agreement states do not track the actual numbers of sealed sources,

but only track the number of specific licensees and have limited data on

general licensees. NRC, in cooperation with DOE, has begun examining

options for developing a national sealed source tracking system, but this

effort is limited in scope; importantly, it has had only limited involvement

of the agreement states. Our analysis of NRC’s specific license database

and responses to our survey of agreement states indicate that about 20,000

entities (companies, hospitals, organizations, and in some cases,

individuals) have obtained specific licenses to possess and use radioactive

material, including sealed sources. Agreement states regulate 80 percent of

these entities, while NRC regulates the remaining 20 percent.

NRC has had difficulty accounting for generally licensed devices. Owners

of these devices are not required to apply to NRC or agreement states for

licenses. Mishandling and improper disposal of generally licensed devices

has, in some cases, lead to expensive investigation and clean up. NRC

began tracking generally licensed devices in April 2001, but has

experienced problems locating device owners. To assist in this effort, NRC

has contracted with a private investigation firm to help locate owners. In

order to improve accountability over generally licensed devices, we are

recommending that NRC determine the need to require owners of these

devices to apply for specific licenses and whether the additional costs

presented by applying for and approving specific licenses are

commensurate with the risks these devices present.

Since 1998, there have been more than 1,300 reported incidents of lost,

stolen, or abandoned devices containing sealed sources, an average of

about 250 per year. The majority of these devices were subsequently

recovered. Both NRC and DOE recognize the importance of determining

how many sealed sources are present in the United States, and which

sealed sources pose the greatest risk if they were to be used in a dirty

bomb. NRC and DOE are working together to categorize sealed sources by

their level of risk. However, NRC’s and DOE’s efforts are limited in scope

because they do not include an analysis of sealed sources in the agreement

states, which regulate 80 percent of the nation’s radioactive materials

licensees. This is because there is no single source of data on agreement

state licensees; instead each state has its own database of the licensees it

regulates. These databases are not linked to one another and NRC does not

have access to them. Therefore, we are recommending that NRC as part of

its continuing efforts to categorize the sealed sources that pose the greatest

risk, consult with the agreement states to determine the types, amount, and

availability of the highest risk sealed sources.

Weaknesses exist in federal and state controls over the security of sealed

sources. Our visits to radiation control programs and licensees in 10 states

found that security for devices containing sealed sources varied among

facilities we visited. For example, a medical device manufacturer that we

visited had extensive security measures, including electronic access

control to areas containing sealed sources, perimeter fencing, and

background checks on employees. On the other hand, a medical use

licensee that we visited kept its sealed sources in an unlocked, unguarded

space with the door propped open. In addition, we found a potential

security weakness in NRC’s licensing process to obtain sealed sources. The

process assumes an applicant is acting in good faith and allows applicants

to acquire sealed sources as soon as a new license is issued by mail. It can

then take NRC as long as 12 months to conduct its first inspection, leaving

the possibility that materials will be obtained and used maliciously in the

meantime. Certain agreement states have implemented measures to

address this weakness, such as delivering licenses in person or conducting

inspections before the delivery of sealed sources. In addition, NRC

currently evaluates the effectiveness of state regulatory programs, but

these evaluations do not assess the security of sealed sources. To address

security weaknesses, we are recommending that NRC modify its licensing

process to ensure that radioactive sources cannot be purchased before

NRC verifies that the material will be used as intended. We are also

recommending that NRC modify its evaluations of agreement state and

NRC programs to include criteria and performance measures of program

effectiveness in ensuring the security of sealed sources.

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, NRC, along with the

agreement states, has notified licensees of the need for heightened

awareness to security and the need to take certain actions, but has not

issued, until recently, legally binding orders to improve the security of

sealed sources. NRC has been developing specific additional security

measures since the attacks, and issued orders on June 5, 2003, to

strengthen security at large irradiator facilities. Although irradiator

facilities contain large amounts of radioactive material, they are specially

designed to include thick concrete and steel walls, security interlocks, and

other protective equipment to protect against radiation exposure and

secure the sealed sources. In light of such built-in security, agreement state

officials and others have questioned NRC’s decision to select irradiators as

the first recipient of additional security measures. Of agreement states

responding to our survey, 93 percent identified sealed sources used in

industrial radiography as of greater concern. Reasons for this may include

that these devices are widely available and portable.

NRC and some agreement states disagree on the appropriate role of the

states in the regulation of sealed source security. The Atomic Energy Act of

1954 gives NRC the authority to issue rules, regulations, or orders to

promote the common defense and security and to protect the health and

minimize danger to life or property. Based on this authority, NRC intends to

order licensees with sealed sources, including those licensed by agreement

states, to implement additional security measures. NRC has already done

so for large irradiator facilities. However, 82 percent of agreement states

responding to our survey indicate that they want to have responsibility for

inspection and enforcement of security measures for sealed sources. In

addition, 74 percent of agreement states responding to our survey indicated

that their state program could effectively respond to a radiological incident

with its current resources. NRC officials argue that the agreement states

lack the staff and funding to carry out the additional responsibility of

securing sealed sources. However, according to NRC officials we

contacted, NRC clearly faces similar staffing and funding problems. NRC

has initiated a materials security working group, which includes the states,

as a mechanism for discussing and identifying potential resolutions to

these issues. We are recommending that NRC determine how agreement

and non-agreement states can participate in the development and

implementation of additional security measures over sealed sources.

We presented a draft of this report to NRC, the Conference of Radiation

Control Program Directors (CRCPD), and the Organization of Agreement

States (OAS) for comment. NRC stated that the draft report did not fully

present either the current status of NRC’s efforts to improve the security of

high-risk radioactive sources or the large effort that NRC has devoted to

this issue over the past 18 months. NRC believed that several of our

recommendations would require statutory changes at both federal and

state levels. We clarified our recommendations regarding the participation

of the states in the development and implementation of additional security

measures. CRCPD and OAS officials generally agreed with our conclusions

and recommendations.

diagnose and treat illnesses (particularly cancer), irradiate food and

medical products for sterilization purposes, detect flaws and other failures

in pipeline and other types of metal welds, and determine the moisture

occurring radioactive materials, such as radium-226, were available to be

used in sealed sources. Since then, sealed sources containing radioactive

material produced artificially in nuclear reactors and particle accelerators

have become widely available, including cobalt-60, strontium-90,

technetium-99m, cesium-137, and iridium-192. Under the Atomic Energy

Act of 1954, the states retain sole regulatory authority over most naturally

occurring radioactive material as well as radioactive material produced in

particle accelerators. Federal jurisdiction extends only to those materials

used as a source of material for nuclear fuel or created as a result of

irradiation in nuclear reactors.

Radioactive material can be found in various forms. For example, cobalt-60

is a metal, while the cesium-137 in some sealed sources is in a powder form

closely resembling talc. Radioactive materials never stop emitting

radiation, but their intensity decays over time at various rates. The term

“half-life” is used to indicate the period during which the radioactivity

decreases by half as a result of decay. Radioactive materials are measured

by their level of activity. The greater the activity level—measured in units

risk to the public if the radioactive materials are lost or stolen.

6See appendix II for a discussion of medical and industrial devices that use radioactive

sources.

7The curie is the unit of measurement most commonly used in the United States. The

corresponding international standard unit, the Bequerel (Bq) is the activity equal to one

radioactive disintegration per second. One bequerel=2.7 x 10-11 curies.

Two types of licenses are associated with the use of radioactive materials—

general licenses and specific licenses. A generally licensed device usually

consists of a sealed source within a shielded device, such as gas

chromatograph units, fixed gauges, luminous exit signs, or reference and

check sources. These devices are designed with inherent radiation safety

features so that persons with little or no radiation training or experience

can use it. General licensees are automatically licensed without having to

apply to NRC or an agreement state for a license and are subject to a

Furthermore, manufacturers are required to report quarterly to NRC the

names of customers who purchase generally licensed devices. Examples of

requirements general licensees are subject to under NRC’s regulations

include:

• general licensees shall not abandon the devices;

• complying with instructions and precautions listed on device labels;

• performing tests to ensure radioactivity is not leaking from the device at

least every 6 months, and, if leakage is detected, suspend operation of

the device and have it repaired or disposed of by the manufacturer or

another entity authorized to perform such work; and

• reporting to NRC or an agreement state the transfer of a device to

another licensee or the disposal of the device.

A company seeking radioactive material for uses that do not qualify for a

general license must apply to NRC or, if it conducts business in an

agreement state, to the appropriate state for a specific license. Its

application must demonstrate how the use of the materials will meet the

must provide information on the type, form, and intended quantity of

material, the facilities in which the material will be used, the qualifications

of users of the materials, and radiation protection programs the applicant

has in place to protect their workers and the public from receiving

excessive doses of radiation.

8NRC’s regulations are at 10 C.F.R. § 31.5.

9NRC’s regulations are at 10 C.F.R. Parts 19-21, 30-39, 40, 61, 70, and 71.

NRC and the

Agreement States Lack

Complete Information

on Numbers of Sealed

Sources

The number of sealed sources in use today in the United States is unknown

primarily because no state or federal agency tracks individual sealed

sources. Instead, NRC and the agreement states track numbers of specific

licensees. NRC and DOE have begun to examine options for developing a

national tracking system, but to date, this effort has had limited

involvement by the agreement states. NRC had difficulty locating owners of

certain generally licensed devices it began tracking in April 2001 and has

hired a private investigation firm to help locate them. Twenty-five of the 31

agreement states that responded to our survey indicated that they track

some or all general licensees or generally licensed devices, and 17 were

able to provide data on the number of generally licensed devices in their

jurisdictions, totaling approximately 17,000 devices.

NRC and Agreement States

Track Licensees Rather

Than Individual Sealed

Sources

NRC estimates that there are approximately 2 million licensed sealed

sources in the United States. However, there is no single source of

information in the United States to verify authorized users, locations,

quantities, and movements of sealed sources. Separate systems are in place

at NRC and in each agreement state to track the identities of specific

licensees and the maximum quantity of radioactive material that they are

authorized to possess. These systems do not, however, record the number

of sealed sources actually possessed by specific licensees nor do the

systems track movements (such as purchase, transfer, or disposal) of

sealed sources by specific licensees. Licensees are required to maintain

records for the acquisition and disposition of each sealed source it receives

and inspections by NRC and/or an agreement state includes confirming

inventory records.

The Secretary of Energy and the Chairman of NRC established a working

group in June 2002 to address, among other things, the options for

establishing a national source tracking system and the potential for the use

of technological methods for tagging and monitoring sealed sources in use,

storage, and transit. This working group reported in May 2003 that a

national source tracking system should provide a “cradle to grave” account

of the origins of each high-risk source, and record how, by whom, and

where a source has been transported, used, and eventually disposed of or

exported. According to the report, such a system would help NRC and DOE

to:

• monitor the location and use of sealed sources,

• detect and act on discrepancies,

• conduct inspections and investigations,

• communicate sealed source information to other government agencies,

• respond in the event of an emergency,

• verify legitimate ownership and use of sealed sources, and

• further analyze hazards attributable to the possession and use of sealed

sources.

The working group did not determine how data on sealed source licensees

in the agreement states would be integrated into a national level system.

While there are no complete data on the number of sealed sources in the

United States, data are available on the number of specific licensees

authorized to use sealed sources. Analysis of NRC’s specific license

database and responses to our survey of the agreement states indicates that

there are about 20,000 specific licensees in the United States (see figs. 1

and 2). The majority (nearly 80 percent) are regulated by the 32 agreement

states, the remaining 20 percent of specific licensees are regulated by NRC.

Notes: NRC regulates specific licensees on federal facilities in agreement states.

NRC also regulates 5 specific licensees in Guam, 120 specific licensees in Puerto Rico, and 7 specific

licensees in the U.S. Virgin Islands.

Our analysis of NRC’s license tracking system and responses to our survey

of agreement states indicates that sealed sources for medical uses

comprise the largest portion of specific licenses issued (see table 1).

Sources: NRC license tracking system and GAO survey of agreement states.

Notes: NA=not available.

Does not include licenses issued for naturally occurring or accelerator-produced radioactive materials

in NRC regulated states. Twenty-nine of the 31 agreement states responding to our survey do not

distinguish between materials regulated under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and naturally occurring

or accelerator-produced radioactive materials in their licensing actions.

Data for Arizona and Louisiana includes only the total number of licensees.

Fixed and portable gauges used in industry to measure density, moisture

content, thickness, and so forth, are the next most prevalent use of sealed

sources, with nearly 7,100 specific licenses issued nationwide. Over 570

specific licenses have been issued for industrial radiographers. In addition,

there are 70 large irradiators (containing high levels, between 10,000 and 15

million curies, of cobalt-60) across the United States used for the

sterilization of food and medical products, and 284 smaller irradiators

(containing less than 10,000 curies of, in most cases, cesium-137 and

cobalt-60) used in hospitals and other facilities for sterilization of smaller

products, such as units of blood. The remaining specific licenses in the

United States are issued for a variety of purposes, including, among other

things, manufacturing and distribution of smoke detectors (containing

small amounts of americium-241), academic research, and disposal of

radioactive waste.

NRC Has Had Difficulty

Finding Owners of

Generally Licensed Devices

While data exist on the numbers and locations of specific licenses in the

United States, complete data are not available on the numbers of general

licenses. In most cases general licensees are not required to apply to NRC

or an agreement state for a license to possess and use a device. Therefore,

in the past, data on general licensees have come from manufacturers of

generally licensed devices that are required to report quarterly to NRC or

the agreement states the names of customers purchasing generally licensed

devices. According to NRC, approximately 40,000 general licensees possess

an estimated 600,000 generally licensed devices in the United States.

Although general licensees are required to follow NRC’s regulations, they

traditionally have little contact with NRC. Mishandling and improper

disposition of generally licensed devices has, on occasion, resulted in

limited radiation exposure to the public and, in some cases, entailed

expensive investigation, cleanup, and disposal activities. For example, two

incidents occurred in New Jersey in 1997 involving luminous exit signs

containing tritium. In May 1997, a 14-year old removed three tritium exit

signs from a demolition site near his home and opened one sign exposing

himself to radioactive material and contaminating his home. In October

1997, a patient at a state-run psychiatric hospital broke a tritium exit sign.

While no injuries resulted, the state spent more than $200,000 cleaning up

the hospital and disposing of the more than sixty barrels of radioactive

waste—primarily contaminated carpeting, furniture, bedding, and other

debris—from the incident.

NRC amended its regulations effective February of 2001, to, among other

things, better enable NRC to verify and track the location, use, and

disposition of generally licensed devices. NRC focused its efforts to

improve accountability over generally licensed devices on a small subset of

devices that were determined to be of higher risk. The amended regulations

include a requirement for general licensees to register with NRC devices

would be charged $450 to cover the costs of the registration program.

Beginning in April 2001, NRC mailed registration forms to about 2,800 of its

responded. Twenty-eight percent of the registration forms were returned as

undeliverable and the remaining 11 percent were not returned by the

general licensee, a response rate significantly lower than NRC expected.

According to NRC, a significant amount of the submitted information is

incomplete or inaccurate, requiring additional follow up that was not

anticipated. To help increase the response rate, phone calls are being made

in advance to locate general licensees before registration forms are sent to

ensure the responsible individuals at the correct addresses receive them. In

addition, NRC has contracted with a private investigation firm to help find

general licensees whose addresses in the database are incorrect.

Twenty-five of the 31 agreement states that responded to our survey said

that they require registration of some or all generally licensed devices.

Seventeen of these states were able to provide us with data on the number

of generally licensed devices they regulate. These 17 states estimate that

approximately 17,000 generally licensed devices are used in their

jurisdictions.

1010 C.F.R. § 31.5(c)(13). Registration is required for levels equal to or greater than 10

millicuries of cesium-137, 0.1 millicuries of strontium-90, 1 millicurie of cobalt-60, or 1

millicurie of any transuranic element (elements with atomic numbers higher than uranium).

11This registration effort did not include the agreement states because the agreement states

are not required to adopt compatible regulations requiring registration of generally licensed

devices until February 2004. Once all agreement states have adopted rules compatible to

NRC’s regulations, NRC says that it is considering coordinating with them to implement a

national level database that will incorporate data from agreement states and NRC regulated

states.

Over 1,300 Devices

Containing Sealed

Sources Have Been

Reported Lost, Stolen,

or Abandoned Since

1998

Since 1998, there have been more than 1,300 incidents where devices

containing sealed sources have been reported lost, stolen, or abandoned in

the United States, an average of about 250 per year. The majority of these

lost devices were subsequently recovered. Both NRC and DOE recognize

the importance of not only determining how many sealed sources are

present in the United States, but also which sealed sources pose the

greatest risk if used in a dirty bomb. NRC and DOE are working together to

categorize sealed sources by their level of risk. However, NRC’s and DOE’s

efforts have not, to date, addressed sealed sources in the agreement states.

Majority of Lost and Stolen

Sealed Sources

Subsequently Recovered

and Represented Little Risk

to the Public

Analysis of NRC’s Nuclear Materials Events Database indicates that,

between 1998 and 2002, there were over 1,300 incidents of lost, stolen, and

abandoned sealed sources. These losses averaged about 250 per year. Many

of these incidents involved stolen portable gauges that are used to measure

the moisture content and density of soils, concrete, or asphalt on

construction sites. By themselves, these gauges contain low amounts of

radioactive material and pose relatively little risk to the public. Portable

gauges are most often stolen from construction sites or from vehicles such

as pickup trucks. According to NRC and agreement state officials,

individuals stealing gauges are usually unaware that they contain

radioactive material, and they often abandon or return them once

discovering their contents. Nevertheless, responding to these incidents

takes time and resources. Well logging sources also account for a relatively

large number of lost and abandoned sources. One major oil services

company accounts for over 30 of the 132 total well logging sources

abandoned since 1998. These sources contain several curies of americium-

241 and cesium-137. These losses usually consisted of a sealed source

becoming lodged down a well and subsequently abandoned. The well is

filled with concrete and a marker is attached warning of the presence of

radioactive materials. In addition, sealed sources are occasionally

abandoned when companies owning them go bankrupt.

According to NRC, most sealed sources that are lost, stolen, or abandoned

are subsequently recovered. In the past 5 years, few incidents have

occurred involving what NRC considers high-risk sealed sources. For

example, in March 1999, an industrial radiography camera containing over

88 curies of iridium-192 (a quantity NRC considers to be of concern) was

stolen from a trailer at the radiographer’s home in Florida. The Florida

radiation control program, local law enforcement, and the Federal Bureau

of Investigation conducted an investigation, but never recovered the sealed

source. According to NRC, the iridium-192 in the sealed source has now

decayed to the point where it is no longer a high risk to the public.

Another example of lost or stolen sealed sources took place in a North

Carolina hospital in March 1998. During a quarterly inventory of a hospital’s

sealed sources, it was discovered that 19 sealed sources were missing,

containing an aggregate of over 600 millicuries of cesium-137—a highly

dispersible radioactive material. These sources included 18 cesium-137

sealed sources—which had been locked in a safe at the time of the

disappearance—and a new cesium-137 sealed source still stored in its

shipping container. The North Carolina radiation control program, NRC,

DOE, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation conducted an extensive joint

investigation. The investigation included air and ground searches using

radiation detection equipment. However, the sealed sources were not

recovered and a conclusion about the cause of the incident was not

reached.

NRC’s and DOE’s Efforts to

Categorize Sealed Sources

of Greatest Concern Does

Not Include Sealed Sources

in Agreement States

The working group established by the Secretary of Energy and the

Chairman of NRC in June 2002 was also tasked with determining which

radioactive materials pose the greatest risk if used in a dirty bomb. Their

analysis was to provide a relative ranking of the degree of risk posed by

specific materials as a basis on which initial judgments can be made

regarding specific protective measures to be developed for these materials.

Using experts from DOE’s Sandia National Laboratory, the task force

developed a methodology to systematically evaluate radioactive materials

for a dirty bomb. Researchers at Sandia considered the potential

dispersability of radioactive materials, the number of locations possessing

the material, the quantity of material possessed at each facility, and the

protective measures already applied to the material. The combination of

these factors yielded a “hazard index,” which serves as an expression of

relative concern. Specific radioactive materials were rated high, medium,

low, or very low, depending upon the degree of health risk posed for their

May 2003). The specific radioactive materials identified as highest priority for increased

protection in the near term have not been listed in the report. This information is “For

Official Use Only.”

the use of radioactive materials in a dirty bomb and did not explicitly

address the psychological and economic consequences. According to an

NRC official, no specific data exists regarding how the public would react

to a dirty bomb, which complicates efforts to analyze its psychological

consequences.

The working group’s analysis included materials under an NRC license and

DOE’s control in the United States, excluding nuclear weapons materials,

radioactive materials in nuclear power plants, spent fuel, and other

radioactive waste. DOE’s and NRC’s report, however, did not consider

sealed sources held by the approximately 15,000 specific licensees in the

agreement states. Although the agreement states and NRC have similar

types of licensees, agreement states often have greater numbers of

licensees with certain types of sealed sources than NRC-regulated states.

For example, our survey of agreement states indicates that Texas has more

exclusively regulate the use of naturally occurring and accelerator

produced radioactive materials. Agreement state officials told us that any

consideration of the risks presented by sealed sources needs to include all

materials regulated by NRC and the agreement states because the

psychological and economic consequences of a dirty bomb are likely to be

similar whether the radioactive material is naturally or artificially

produced. NRC plans to work with the states to implement follow-up

actions based on the recommendations in the DOE/NRC report.

Vulnerability studies have been initiated to identify security vulnerabilities

and appropriate security enhancements. Scenarios involving the

aggregation of sources in a single location will be considered. In addition,

methods for improved tracking of the locations of sources will be

developed.

13Well logging is a process that uses sealed sources and/or unsealed radioactive materials to

determine whether a well, drilled deep into the ground, contains minerals, such as coal, oil,

and natural gas.

Weaknesses Exist in

Federal and State

Controls Over the

Security of Sealed

Sources

Weaknesses exist in federal and state controls over the security of sealed

facilities we visited in 10 states. In addition, NRC’s licensing process to

obtain sealed sources presents a potential security weakness, namely that

approved applicants may purchase sealed sources as soon as a new license

is issued by mail. Because the process assumes that the applicant is acting

in good faith, it is possible that sealed sources can be obtained for

malicious intent. It can take as long as 12 months before NRC conducts its

first inspection of the sealed source holder, potentially allowing sealed

sources to be obtained and used maliciously without NRC’s knowledge.

Security at Facilities Using

Sealed Sources Varies

During visits to licensees, regulated by both NRC and agreement states, we

found a varied level of security provided to sealed sources. A medical

device manufacturer we visited in an agreement state had extensive

security measures in place to protect sealed sources. For example, a heavy

iron fence surrounds the building and guards are on duty to monitor the

facility 24 hours per day, 7 days per week. For shielding and security, the

concrete walls and ceiling containing the radioactive materials are more

than 6 feet thick. All areas housing materials have electronic locks

requiring a 4-digit code and card access. Visitors must be pre-arranged and

escorted at all times. Background and drug checks are conducted on all

personnel before hiring. Once hired, they are provided with varying degrees

of building access, depending upon their duties. Eighteen staff members

are fully trained in emergency response for hazardous materials and every

employee is required to complete a 3-hour training course on radioactive

materials and refresher training sessions are held frequently. Following the

events of September 11, 2001, the company examined risks for the facility

and established an in-house task force to develop scenarios of potential

terrorist attacks. To test the company’s security and employees’

preparedness, the company’s chief executive officer had a helicopter land,

unannounced, on the roof of one of the company’s buildings. Following this

drill, emergency plans were developed that were integrated with the

national Homeland Security Advisory System. For example, whenever the

national threat level is raised to orange, the facility’s front gates are closed

of an accident with sealed sources and, should such an accident occur, to mitigate its

consequences.

and locked at all times. If the threat level were ever increased to red, no

visitors would be allowed. Furthermore, the company has entered an

agreement with the local police to hire armed off-duty police to provide

additional security for the facility should the national threat level be raised

to red.

Extensive security measures were also present at a facility we visited in an

Sealed sources, shipped to the manufacturer for installation in moisture

density gauges, are immediately placed in a shielded basement storage

room that is kept locked at all times. Only three staff members have keys to

access the room. Entrances to the manufacturing facility are kept locked at

all times, with an alarm system activated after closing time. Visitors must

be escorted during visits. Finally, the company has initiated a computerized

“cradle to grave” tracking system where all sealed sources installed in

moisture density gauges are tracked from manufacture, use, and eventual

disposal.

In the course of visits to a medical licensee, we observed poor security

practices with sealed sources. For example, during a visit to a hospital in an

agreement state, we were told that sealed sources, including strontium-90,

cesium-137, and iridium-192, were securely stored in a room equipped with

an electronic lock with limited access. Later, during a tour of the hospital,

we found the room unlocked, unattended, and the door propped open. The

hospital official explained that this practice was very unusual; he locked

the room door after inspection and continued the tour. Shortly thereafter,

we passed the room for a second time. Again, the room was unlocked,

unattended, and the door propped open. The storage room was in close

proximity to the hospital’s laundry and maintenance facility, which is

accessible to any hospital employee. In addition, an entry to the hospital

from the outside was also nearby, and this entrance was not guarded nor

equipped with radiation detection equipment to notify security if any sealed

sources were being removed or stolen.

We also saw potential vulnerabilities at industrial radiography licensees we

visited in agreement states. Industrial radiographers use high radioactivity

iridium-192 sources to produce an image on photographic film to inspect

15Moisture density gauges are commonly used to measure density of asphalt and concrete

surfaces and soil moisture content during road construction. See appendix II for a complete

descriptions of radioactive devices.

metal parts and welds for defects. These devices are very portable because

they are often used at remote locations. The devices are also subject to

limited security at the locations we visited—primarily a series of padlocks

on storage cases for the device. Personnel are not required to have

background checks and training was historically only on-the-job. Most

agreement states now require classroom training and testing to enhance

radiographers’ knowledge and skills. One industrial radiographer we

visited added extra security measures consisting of a motion detector

alarm system—monitored by the local police—and an extra lock to the gate

of the storage room at its facility. However, this additional security would

not prevent the theft of the sealed source when the device is being used in

the field or at a customer’s facility. This industrial radiographer had taken

additional steps to train his workers to be aware of security threats and

required—even before it was required by NRC and agreement state

regulations—for two people to be present whenever the sealed source was

being used.

Current Licensing Process

Leaves Sealed Sources

Vulnerable

To qualify for a specific license to use sealed sources, an applicant must

demonstrate that their use of sealed sources will meet safety requirements

set forth in NRC regulations or in comparable agreement state regulations

(if the license applicant is located in an agreement state). NRC requires

license applications to include information on, among other things, types of

sealed sources that will be used, details of the applicant’s radiation

protection program for workers dealing with sealed sources, and

qualifications of users of sealed sources. NRC reviews this information for

adherence to procedures and criteria documented in NRC licensing

NRC licensing procedures do not require inspection of licensee facilities

before the issuance of a license. Instead, NRC performs initial inspections

out by an agreement state official, a licensee can purchase sealed sources

as soon as a license has been acquired by mail. As a result, licensees may

purchase sealed sources legally without first verifying that they will use the

16NRC publishes guidance for specific license applicants that outlines procedures for

17Chapter 2800 of NRC’s Inspection Manual contains guidance for inspections of specific

licensees with sealed sources.

material as intended. Several agreement states have developed methods to

verify the legitimacy of potential licensees. For example, one program we

visited conducts prelicensing inspections. Another state program handdelivers

licenses at the end of the application process. An agreement state

official explained that pre-licensing inspections and hand delivery enabled

regulators to establish authenticity of the prospective licensee and whether

information provided in the application is indeed valid.

NRC and Agreement States

Generally Ensure Safe Use

and Handling of Sealed

Sources

NRC conducts periodic evaluations of NRC regional materials programs

and agreement state radiation control programs to ensure that public

health and safety is adequately protected. Accidents and injuries resulting

from the use of sealed sources are relatively few. For example, analysis of

NRC’s Nuclear Materials Events Database and responses to our survey of

the agreement states indicates that in fiscal year 2002, only 25 of the

approximately 20,000 licensees in the United States reported radiation

exposures in excess of regulatory limits. In addition, according to NRC,

there were only 32 reported accidents in fiscal year 2002 involving medical

use of sealed sources out of tens of thousands of medical procedures

conducted.

To evaluate the performance of its and agreement states’ programs, NRC

developed the Integrated Materials Performance Evaluation Program,

which uses several performance indicators in assessment of program

effectiveness, including timeliness and quality of licensee inspection,

program staffing and training, licensing activity, and response to incidents

and allegations. Officials from NRC and agreement states participate in

these periodic evaluations. During these evaluations, NRC and agreement

state officials review program documentation and interview officials with

the state or regional program to assess the program’s performance. When

the results of each performance indicator have been determined, a final

evaluated as:

• adequate to protect the public health and safety,

• adequate but needs improvement, and

18The final determination of program adequacy is made by a management review board at

NRC, which consists of NRC executives and a nonvoting representative of the agreement

states.

• inadequate to protect public health and safety.

Figure 3 outlines the results of the most recent reviews of agreement state

and four NRC regional programs.

NRC’s most recent reviews of the 32 agreement states and NRC regional

programs, dating back to 1998, found that all programs are adequately

protecting public health and safety. Of the last 35 program reviews, 31

programs were found adequate to protect public health and safety—the

highest evaluation. Four programs were found “adequate but needs

placed on heightened oversight must follow a plan to improve performance

or it will be placed on probation for failing to correct programmatic

deficiencies. Furthermore, NRC reserves the right to suspend a state’s

agreement if the state does not comply with one or more of the

requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.

The Integrated Materials Performance Evaluation Program is intended to

ensure that the NRC and the agreement states adequately protect the health

and safety of the public in accordance with NRC standards. For example, in

February 2003, the Rhode Island program was found “adequate but needs

improvement.” As a result of its evaluation, the Rhode Island program was

placed on heightened oversight and was instructed to follow a detailed plan

to improve performance, which includes NRC monitoring of progress

through bimonthly teleconferences. In addition, the Rhode Island program

must periodically submit a progress report to NRC. The review team found

that a deficiency in staffing and training had led to Rhode Island’s

performance problems. Therefore, as part of the plan to improve

performance, Rhode Island was instructed to address staffing and training

concerns. In November 2003, a follow-up review will be conducted to

establish whether the program has improved enough to remove it from

heightened oversight status.

The review program also encourages states and NRC regions to learn good

practices from one another. For example, an NRC official recommended

that Florida be cited for a good practice for its in-house training efforts for

the program’s staff, including the creation of a new “training coordinator”

position. As a result of participation by an Ohio official during Florida’s last

evaluation, Ohio’s program decided to hire a training coordinator.

Furthermore, because review results are available to the public and a good

practices report is periodically distributed to all agreement states and NRC

regions, all programs have access to the good practices of other programs.

19States under “heightened oversight” as of May 31, 2003, are Rhode Island, Nevada, and

New Hampshire. Tennessee was removed from “heightened oversight” based on an October

2001 follow-up review.

The report not only shares the good practices, but also the reasons for poor

performance. Agreement state and NRC regional programs can take action

to improve performance by examining the strengths and weaknesses of

other programs.

NRC Efforts to

Improve Security over

Sealed Sources Have

Been Limited and

Disagreement Exists

over the Appropriate

Role of the States

Efforts undertaken by NRC and agreement states to strengthen the security

of sealed sources for medical, industrial, and research use have only, to

date, required large irradiator facilities to take specific actions. Additional

orders to licensees that possess high-risk sealed sources are expected to

follow. NRC and agreement states disagree over the appropriate role of the

states in efforts to improve security. NRC intends to develop and

implement all additional security measures on licensees with sealed

sources, including those licensed by agreement states. However, 82 percent

of agreement states responding to our survey feel they should be

responsible for inspecting and enforcing security measures for sealed

sources in their states under their authority to ensure public health and

safety.

NRC’s Security Efforts Have

Not Focused on Sealed

Sources

Since the events of September 11, 2001, NRC efforts have focused on

issuing advisories and orders for nuclear reactor and nuclear fuel licensees

and implementing changes within NRC to streamline its security

responsibilities. Specifically, NRC has issued over 30 advisories and 20

security orders requiring action to nuclear power plants, decommissioning

November and December 2001, NRC’s Office of Investigations visited 80

nuclear facilities, law enforcement agencies, and first responders

nationwide to interview officials and review records to identify potential

terrorist risks. NRC forwarded potential leads to the Federal Bureau of

Investigation. In addition, NRC has revised the “design basis threat” for

nuclear power plants—the largest reasonable threat against which a

regulated private guard force should be expected to defend under existing

law—and issued a corresponding order in April 2003 requiring power

information obtained from the intelligence community or law enforcement agencies on

changes to the threat environment, and guidance for licensees to take specific actions

requirements for licensees to implement interim compensatory security measures beyond

that currently required by NRC regulations and as conditions of licenses.

plants to implement additional actions to protect against sabotage by

terrorists and other adversaries. NRC also made a series of internal

administrative changes, such as consolidating the agency’s security

responsibilities in establishing an Office of Nuclear Security and Incident

working directly with the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal

Bureau of Investigation on security issues. The Office of Nuclear Security

and Incident Response also works with the Department of Homeland

Security and other agencies concerned with terrorism to assess and

respond to potential threats. In an effort to more effectively communicate

and respond to threats, NRC developed a Threat Advisory and Protective

System, and increased staffing at its 24-hour Emergency Operations Center.

NRC also conducted a review of information available to the general public

on the NRC Web site for potential security risks.

Efforts to strengthen the security of sealed sources for medical, industrial,

and research use—by both NRC and agreement states—have been limited.

Since September 11, 2001, NRC has issued a total of six advisories urging

licensees to ensure security of sources and advising them to be more aware

double-check shipping documents and inform local police authorities of

their possession of sealed sources. On June 5, 2003, NRC issued its first

security order for large irradiator facilities—70 facilities nationwide that

expose products, such as medical supplies, to radiation for sterilization—

that requires licensees to take action to strengthen security. The decision to

select irradiators first has been questioned by agreement state officials and

licensees, as they feel other uses of sealed sources pose a higher risk. For

example, 93 percent of agreement states responding to our survey

identified industrial radiographers as of greater concern. Reasons for this

may include that the sealed sources in these devices are portable, have high

21The Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response was established in April 2002 and

consists of two divisions – the Division of Nuclear Security and the Division of Incident

Response Operations. It is responsible for the agency’s security, safeguards, and incident

response efforts and to serve as a point of contact and counterpart to the Department of

Homeland Security and other federal agencies. In this role, the Office of Nuclear Security

and Incident Response participates in a number of interagency working groups and

committees that address issues relating to terrorism, information sharing, and planning.

22NRC established this system in response to Homeland Security Presidential Directive 3.

23There were a total of seven advisories, one of which was a correction to a prior advisory.

radioactivity, and are widely available (over 570 licensees in the United

States). Although irradiator facilities contain larger amounts of radioactive

material than industrial radiographers, they are specially designed to

include thick concrete and steel walls, security interlocks, and other

protective equipment to protect against radiation exposure. In addition, the

irradiator facilities we visited had taken the initiative to implement

supplementary security measures, such as installing motion detectors,

more extensive security alarms and monitoring, and employee

identification badges. Other uses identified by agreement states officials in

our survey as requiring stricter regulation include portable gauges and welllogging

devices—over 4,600 and over 200 licensees nationwide,

respectively.

Transportation was also identified as needing additional security. Although

most agreement states surveyed indicated that the Department of

Transportation’s (DOT) regulations are adequate to ensure safe

transportation of sealed sources, 81 percent of them identified weaknesses

in current regulations and 77 percent indicated that communications and

coordination needs to be improved between their state program and DOT.

Some DOT officials we spoke with disagreed that sealed sources were

particularly vulnerable during transportation. However, one DOT official

noted that large quantities of iridium-192 are regularly shipped to the

United States from Europe and South America using regular commercial

freight services. Such sources are shipped in stainless steel transport kegs

that require no special tools or equipment to open. Once loaded with up to

10,000 curies of iridium-192, the transport keg weighs only 150 to 200

pounds. While this official believed that, overall, security is sufficient

during transport, he told us that at certain phases such shipments could be

vulnerable to terrorist diversion.

NRC and the agreement states have formed a materials security working

group to develop and issue new security orders by the end of the year for

approximately 2,100 licensees—located throughout the United States—

that have been determined to be of the greatest risk based upon NRC’s and

DOE’s work to categorize sealed sources. When these orders are issued,

affected licensees will have a certain specified time period to comply with

the order and implement required security measures. At the end of this

period, licensees will be subject to inspections to ensure compliance and

face enforcement actions if actions have not been taken.

Agreement states’ efforts to strengthen the security of sealed sources have

focused primarily on facilitating NRC actions, such as forwarding NRC

advisories, increasing attention on security when conducting inspections

and license reviews, and coordinating with local law enforcement and first

responders to develop emergency response procedures. Eighty-six percent

of agreement state officials responding to our survey indicated that they

are adequately addressing post-September 11, 2001, heightened security

concerns involving malicious use of radioactive material.

NRC and the Agreement

States Disagree over

Development and

Enforcement of Additional

Security Requirements

The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 authorizes NRC to issue rules, regulations,

or orders to promote the common defense and security, while granting

Following the events of September 11, 2001, NRC determined that securityrelated

efforts for all medical, industrial, and research licensees—including

those licensed by agreement states—should be the responsibility of NRC

under its common defense and security authority. However, 82 percent of

agreement states responding to our survey noted that they want to have

responsibility for inspection and enforcement of security measures for

sealed sources under their authority to ensure public health and safety.

Agreement states already enforce NRC’s existing security regulations under

this authority. In addition, 74 percent of agreement states responding to our

survey indicated they could effectively respond to a radiological incident

with their current resources.

Individual commissioners at NRC have expressed concern with budget

shortfalls many states are currently experiencing. These commissioners

said that states experiencing budgetary difficulties may not be able to

assume additional responsibilities and that it may impact their program’s

performance. When asked whether their state had sufficient resources to

support new efforts, 60 percent of agreement states responding to our

from organizations representing agreement states and non-agreement

states have met with NRC and advised NRC that, although many states are

24NRC’s regulations require licensees to secure licensed materials that are stored in

controlled or unrestricted areas from unauthorized removal or access and to control and

maintain constant surveillance of licensed material that is not in storage and is in a

controlled or unrestricted area. 10 C.F.R. §§ 20.1801, 20.1802.

25Approximately 20 percent of agreement state officials responding to our survey indicated

that they are having difficulty retaining sufficient and/or qualified personnel to effectively

regulate sealed sources. Nevertheless, NRC has determined that all agreement state

programs are adequately protecting public health and safety.

facing budget cuts, funding of the radioactive materials programs in these

states have largely been stable and the programs have been able and will

likely be able to adequately fulfill their responsibilities.

According to our discussions with NRC officials, NRC is also facing budget

and staffing constraints, largely as a result of its dependence upon fees

from the licensees it regulates—only 20 percent of the total sealed sources

licensees nationwide—for funding of its sealed source licensing and

inspection activities. As more states become agreement states, NRC has

address the potential effect this reduction in funding may have on its

licensing and inspection programs, NRC and the agreement states have

entered into a partnership—called the National Materials Program—to

better share the responsibility for protecting public health and safety. Since

the agreement states regulate about 80 percent of the nation’s sealed

source licensees, the National Materials Program allows them to

participate more actively in the development of regulations and guidance,

particularly in areas where they possess expertise. For example, Texas, an

agreement state, regulates more well logging specific licensees than exist

in all NRC-regulated states. Thus, according to NRC officials, Texas could

take the lead in developing any new public health and safety regulations for

well loggers. Both NRC and the agreement states are currently conducting

pilot projects to determine how the National Materials Program can and

will work. In addition, states remain solely responsible for regulating

certain radioactive materials, such as naturally occurring radioactive

material like radium and material produced in particle accelerators,

increasing the importance of federal and state cooperation in developing

and implementing additional safety and/or security measures. NRC and the

agreement states are continuing to work cooperatively to develop

information on how responsibilities can be shared under the National

Materials Program.

NRC officials said that NRC lacks sufficient staff to conduct inspections of

all licensees expected to receive security orders—large irradiator facilities

and approximately 2,100 licensees that NRC has identified as presenting

the greatest risk. To mitigate this staffing shortage, NRC intends to enter

26NRC is required by the Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act, 2001 (P.L. 106-

377) to recover 94 percent of its budget through fee recovery. As the number of NRC

licensees decreases with an increasing number of agreement states, fees paid by NRC’s

licensees have increased in order to support NRC’s regulatory program.

into contracts with agreement states or independent contractors to assist

in carrying out these inspections. According to agreement state officials we

spoke with, however, agreement states may be reluctant to participate in

these efforts if they have had no role in developing the additional security

requirements or are not provided additional funding. NRC would remain

responsible for taking appropriate enforcement action for any security

violation found during these inspections. According to NRC, although final

details regarding funding have yet to be determined, NRC anticipates

increasing its licensees’ fees and using funds NRC has received from

emergency supplemental appropriations to cover costs associated with

additional security.

radioactive sealed sources regulation. Where NRC and the agreement

states previously concentrated on ensuring the safe and effective use of

sealed sources, they must now increasingly consider how to prevent

terrorists from obtaining and using the material. Efforts to improve

controls over sealed sources face significant challenges, especially how to

balance the need to secure these materials while not discouraging their

beneficial use in academic, medical, and industrial applications. The first

step to improve security is to conduct a threat assessment that would

identify sealed sources most likely to be used in a terrorist attack and the

consequences of such an attack. Defining the types of sealed sources that

are of the greatest concern will allow federal and state efforts to be

appropriately prioritized. NRC’s and DOE’s current efforts to categorize

sealed sources by the greatest amount of risk and their efforts to establish a

national-level tracking system for the highest risk sealed sources are

commendable. However, these efforts could be strengthened by involving

the agreement states, which regulate 80 percent of the nation’s radioactive

materials licensees, in determining risk. In addition, these efforts could be

further strengthened by determining the economic consequences of a dirty

bomb and how to effectively mitigate any resulting psychological

consequences. In addition, NRC’s current regulations leave sealed sources

at risk of malicious use. Modifying its regulations to eliminate general

licensing of devices containing sealed sources could improve

accountability, potentially reducing the number of sources that are lost,

stolen, or abandoned. Furthermore, modifying NRC’s licensing and/or

inspection process to verify—before a licensee purchases radioactive

material—that it will be used as intended may increase the security of

sealed sources.

The President’s National Strategy for Homeland Security recognizes the

critical importance of integrating federal, state, local, and private sector

efforts to prepare and respond to terrorist attacks, including those using

sealed sources. The initial responsibility, however, falls upon state and

local governments and their organizations—such as police, fire

departments, emergency medical personnel, and public health agencies—

which will almost invariably be the first responders to any terrorist event

involving sealed sources. Because of state and local governments’ role in

responding to incidents—in addition to the fact that the federal

government lacks authority over naturally occurring and accelerator

produced radioactive material—it is critical to involve state and local

governments in the development and implementation of additional security

over sealed sources. State radiological protection agencies can provide

valuable expertise on the licensees that they have been regulating, in many

cases, for decades. Developing criteria and performance measures to gauge

NRC’s and agreement states’ effectiveness at implementing additional

security as part of NRC’s performance evaluation process would help

ensure the consistent application of additional security measures across

the United States. NRC and the agreement states have a proven record of

cooperation in regulating the safe use of radioactive materials, including

sealed sources. As increasing demands are placed on budgets at all levels

of government, effectively leveraging the knowledge and resources of

federal, state, and local agencies will be crucial to ensuring that sealed

sources continue to be used safely and remain secure against terrorist use.

Recommendations for

Executive Action

To determine the sealed sources of greatest concern, we recommend that

the Chairman of NRC collaborate with the agreement states to identify the

types, amount, and availability of the highest risk sealed sources and the

associated health and economic consequences of their malicious use. In

addition, we recommend that NRC and the agreement states determine

how to effectively mitigate the psychological effects of their use in a

terrorist attack.

In addition, accountability over generally licensed devices needs to be

improved and gaps in the current licensing process need to be addressed.

Because new efforts will involve additional licensing and inspection of

potentially thousands of licensees and devices, we recommend that the

Chairman of NRC:

• determine, in consultation with the agreement states, the costs and

benefits of requiring owners of devices that are now generally licensed

to apply for specific licenses and whether the costs are commensurate

with the risks these devices present and

• modify NRC’s process of issuing specific licenses to ensure that sealed

sources cannot be purchased before NRC’s verification—through

inspection or other means—that the materials will be used as intended.

Finally, to ensure that the federal and state governments’ efforts to provide

additional security to sealed sources are adequately integrated and

evaluated for their effectiveness, we recommend that the Chairman of

NRC:

• determine how officials in agreement and non-agreement states can

participate in the development and implementation of additional

security measures and

• include criteria and performance measures of the NRC’s and the

agreement states’ implementation of additional security measures in

NRC’s periodic evaluations of its and agreement states’ effectiveness.

Agency Comments and

Our Evaluation

We provided NRC, CRCPD, and OAS with draft copies of this report for

their review and comment. NRC’s written comments are presented as

appendix VI. NRC, CRCPD, and OAS also provided technical comments,

which we incorporated into the report as appropriate.

NRC stated that the draft report does not fully present either the current

status of NRC’s efforts to improve the security of high-risk radioactive

sources or the large effort that it has devoted to this issue since September

11, 2001. According to NRC, the draft report does not fully reflect its

existing statutory framework and does not recognize that several of our

recommendations would require statutory changes at both federal and

state levels. Furthermore, NRC commented that our draft report should

have focused on high-risk radioactive sources that are of greatest concern

for malevolent use by a terrorist rather than radioactive sources of all

types.

Regarding NRC’s comments that our draft report does not fully discuss its

activities to increase the security of the highest-risk sealed sources, we

note that our draft report detailed all advisories issued by NRC to sealed

source licensees urging them to ensure security of sealed sources following

September 11, 2001, as well as NRC’s efforts with DOE to define the

radioactive isotopes of concern. We have added information on the

organization and goals of NRC’s new materials security working group.

Furthermore, our report discusses that NRC’s security order to large

irradiators was issued on June 5, 2003. This order was issued four days

after our meeting with NRC officials to discuss our preliminary findings,

conclusions, and recommendations. At the meeting, NRC officials told us

that it could take until the end of 2003 for the order to be issued. It is

important to note that this is the first and only security order related to

sealed sources issued since the September 11, 2001, attacks and that it

applies only to 70 large irradiator facilities in the United States. As

discussed in our draft report, 93 percent of agreement states responding to

our survey identified industrial radiographers, of which there are over 500

nationwide, as of greater concern than large irradiator facilities.

Regarding NRC’s comment that our draft report does not recognize that

several of our recommendations would require statutory changes at both

federal and state levels, we have clarified our report to recommend that

NRC determine how officials in agreement and non-agreement states can

participate in the development and implementation of additional security

measures. We agree with NRC that its statutory framework reserves to

NRC the authority to promote the common defense and security and our

report discusses the distinction between federal and state authority.

However, we continue to believe, as do state officials we spoke with, that

involving the agreement and non-agreement states in the development and

implementation of additional security measures would be beneficial. As

our draft report stated, state and local governments will almost invariably

be the first responders to any terrorist event involving sealed sources.

States can also provide valuable expertise on licensees that they have been

regulating for decades and which NRC has had no prior contact with. In its

comments, NRC states that the possibility of state budget shortfalls played

absolutely no role in its decision to develop and implement additional

security measures under its common defense and security authority.

However, numerous NRC officials told us during our review that budget

difficulties could impact the performance of state radiation protection

programs and NRC’s former Chairman discussed the issue at a January

2003 meeting. NRC acknowledges in its comments that cooperation with

agreement states is vital to the success of its efforts. We are encouraged

that NRC stated in its comments that it will examine changes to its

statutory framework in its new materials security working group and

intends to work with the states to the maximum extent possible under

existing statutes.

Regarding NRC’s comment that the draft report should have focused only

on high-risk sources rather than radioactive sources of all types, we note

that the objectives of our review included determining the known number

of all sealed sources in the United States and the number of sources lost,

stolen, or abandoned. Our draft report noted that defining the types of

sealed sources that are of the greatest concern would allow federal and

state efforts to be appropriately prioritized. As we did when responding to

a similar comment NRC made in our May 2003 report, we agree that the

highest-risk sources present the greatest concern as desirable material for

used as a terrorist weapon. No one can say with certainty what the

psychological, social, or economic costs of a dirty bomb—regardless of the

radioactive material used to construct it—would be. We are concerned that

NRC’s and DOE’s identification of the highest-risk sealed sources focuses

solely on the health risks of their use and does not address the

psychological, social, or economic costs of a dirty bomb. It is also

important to note that NRC is still working with the International Atomic

Energy Agency to reconcile differences between their definitions of highrisk

sealed sources. Furthermore, many of the radioactive isotopes

identified by NRC and DOE as high-risk are used only at DOE facilities or

by very few NRC licensees in the United States. NRC and DOE did not

consider radioactive materials licensees in the agreement states, which

constitute 80 percent of the nation’s licensees. Without addressing the total

consequences of a dirty bomb and considering the availability of sealed

sources nationwide, we believe NRC’s and DOE’s determination of risk is

incomplete.

In general, both CRCPD and OAS agreed with the recommendations in the

report. However, both organizations noted that our use of the term “sealed

source” to refer to all radioactive materials used in medical, industrial, and

research purposes may exclude many radioactive isotopes that could be

used in a dirty bomb that are loose and not in sealed form, especially those

used in medical and research facilities. We used the term “sealed source”

for simplicity to distinguish medical, industrial, and research radioactive

isotopes from material used in nuclear weapons and as fuel in nuclear

reactors. We did not intend to exclude unsealed radioactive material from

(Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2003).

our discussion of radioactive materials of concern and have clarified our

use of the term.

CRCPD stated that the report does not address four critical areas of

potential risk. First, CRCPD believes that a major area of risk is at bankrupt

facilities where sealed sources can be left unattended and/or unsecured for

long periods of time, leaving the sources easy targets for theft. We

acknowledge this risk and have revised our discussion of lost, stolen, and

abandoned sources appropriately. Second, CRCPD noted that radioactive

materials licensed for “storage only” tend to be neglected by the licensee

and the regulatory agency. While we agree that this is a potential weakness

in sealed source security, individual state practices on “storage only”

licenses differ. We did not specifically examine these practices during our

review. Third, CRCPD stated that the report does not adequately address

the radioactive material under the control of DOE and naturally occurring

and accelerator produced radioactive material. While DOE does control a

large amount of radioactive material, discussion of the security provided to

it was outside of the scope of our review. We believe our report adequately

discusses the challenges of regulating naturally occurring and accelerator

produced materials. Finally, CRCPD states that the report does not

consider transportation hubs through which very large quantities of

radioactive material pass each day. While we do not specifically discuss

transportation hubs, our draft report noted that weaknesses have been

identified in the transportation of sealed sources and, at certain phases of

transport, these shipments could be vulnerable to terrorist diversion.

OAS agreed with our recommendation that NRC should include criteria and

performance measures of the agreement states’ implementation of

additional security measures in NRC’s periodic evaluations of agreement

states’ effectiveness. OAS stated that such evaluation is not possible given

the current intention of NRC to issue and implement security orders under

its common defense and security authority. However, we believe that the

recommendation in our draft report that NRC determine how states can

participate in the development and implementation of additional security

measures addresses this concern.

OAS also noted that our draft report stated that licensees are tracked

instead of individual sealed sources and that the draft report lends support

to the formation of a national tracking system for sealed sources. OAS

commented that our discussion does not accurately describe the current

system. Licensees are required to maintain records for the acquisition and

disposition of each source it receives and maintain an accurate inventory of

sources in their possession. While we agree with this comment and have

revised our discussion of license tracking, our draft report was accurate in

that there is no single source of information in the United States to verify

authorized users, locations, quantities, and movements of sealed sources.

OAS goes on to state that there are serious concerns with the practicality

and accuracy of a national tracking system and that the development of

such a system should be further evaluated with input from the states and

private industry. We agree with OAS’s comments, but believe that our

recommendation to collaborate with the agreement states in order to

determine the types, amount, and availability of the highest risk sealed

sources and the health, psychological, and economic consequences of their

use in a terrorist attack addresses OAS’s concerns.

Finally, OAS commented that the states have long requested that the

federal government seriously consider placing the use and regulation of all

radioactive materials in a single federal agency. According to OAS, the

current approach results in a disjointed regulatory structure and different

standards for the same public health issue. While we agree that consistency

and avoiding duplication is important, addressing the overall regulation of

radioactive material in the United States was outside the scope of our

review on security of sealed sources.

We conducted our work from August 2002 through June 2003 in accordance

with generally accepted government auditing standards. Appendix I

presents our scope and methodology in detail.

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of

this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of it until 30 days from

the date of this letter. We will then send copies to the Chairman and

Commissioners of NRC; the Secretary of Homeland Security; the Secretary

of Energy; the Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration; the

Director, Office of Management and Budget; the Chairman of the

Organization of Agreement States; the Chairman and Executive Director of

the Conference of Radiation Control Program Directors; the directors of

the radiation control programs in the 32 agreement states; interested

congressional committees; and other interested parties. We will also make

copies available to others who request them. In addition, the report will be

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, I can be reached at

(202) 512-3841. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix VII.

Sincerely yours,

Robert A. Robinson

Managing Director, Natural

Resources and Environment

Appendix I

At the request of the Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on

Financial Management, the Budget, and International Security, Committee

on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, we examined the following

questions:

1. What is the known number of sealed sources in the United States?

2. How many of these sealed sources have been lost, stolen, or

abandoned?

3. How effective are federal and state controls over sealed sources?

4. What efforts have been initiated or considered since September 11,

2001, to better safeguard radiological sources?

To answer these questions, we distributed surveys to 32 agreement states,

18 non-agreement states, Puerto Rico, the District of Columbia, and to

NRC’s 4 regional offices. We focused the survey on information about each

state’s radiation control program, specific and general licensing activities,

enforcement actions, effectiveness of controls over sealed sources,

program evaluation processes, transportation of sealed sources, and the

impact of September 11, 2001, on regulatory programs. We acquired a list of

the appropriate agreement and non-agreement state officials from NRC’s

Office of State and Tribal Programs Web site and from the Conference of

Radiation Control Program Directors. Because this was not a sample

survey, but rather a census of all states, there are no sampling errors.

However, the practical difficulties of conducting any survey may introduce

errors, commonly referred to as nonsampling errors. For example,

measurement errors are introduced if difficulties exist in how a particular

question is interpreted or in the sources of information available to

respondents in answering a question. In addition, coding errors may occur

if mistakes are entered into a database. We took extensive steps in the

development of the questionnaires, the collection of data, and the editing

and analysis of data to minimize total survey error. To reduce measurement

error, we conducted two rounds of pretesting to make sure questions and

response categories were interpreted in a consistent manner with both

agreement and non-agreement states. We also provided draft copies of the

questionnaires to NRC, the Organization of Agreement States (OAS), and

the Conference of Radiation Control Program Directors (CRCPD) for their

review and comment. Based on both pretesting and comments received

from NRC, OAS, and CRCPD, we made relevant changes to the questions

based upon these pretests. Copies of the agreement and non-agreement

state questionnaires, along with the results to each question, are in

appendixes IV and V, respectively.

In addition, we edited all completed surveys for consistency and, if

necessary, contacted respondents to clarify responses. All questionnaire

responses were double key-entered into our database (that is, the entries

were 100 percent verified), and a random sample of the questionnaires was

further verified for completeness and accuracy. In addition, all computer

syntax was peer reviewed and verified by separate programmers to ensure

that the syntax was written and executed correctly.

We made extensive efforts to encourage respondents to complete and

return the questionnaires, including sending up to four reminder electronic

mail messages to non-respondents, calling state radiation control program

directors directly, and collaborating with OAS to promote completion of

this survey. Our efforts yielded responses from 31 of 32 (96.8 percent

response rate) agreement states and 11 of 18 (61.1 percent response rate)

non-agreement states. We also received responses from Puerto Rico and

the four NRC regional offices. In total, we achieved an overall response rate

of 80.4 percent, receiving 45 of the 56 surveys disseminated. We did not

receive a response from one agreement state: Arizona. The non-agreement

states of Alaska, Connecticut, Minnesota, Missouri, Pennsylvania, South

Dakota, and Wyoming did not respond to our survey, nor did we receive a

response from the District of Columbia. Although we did not receive

surveys from these states, we obtained data on incidents involving sealed

sources and numbers and types of licensees from NRC. Three states (New

York, South Carolina, and Texas) have multiple agencies with jurisdiction

over sealed sources. We sent and received surveys from the appropriate

agencies in each of these states.

To determine the number and types of sealed source licenses in the United

States and the number of sealed sources lost, stolen, or abandoned, we

relied upon information provided by state radiation control programs in

their responses to our survey. In addition, we obtained data from NRC’s

license tracking system database on licensees NRC regulates—both in the

non-agreement states and on federal facilities in the agreement states. To

determine the number of sealed sources lost, stolen, or abandoned over the

past 5 years, we obtained data on incidents from NRC’s Nuclear Materials

Events Database. We chose to examine the past 5 years because

information was readily available through this database. Because each

state uses different systems to track its licensing activities, we did not

attempt to independently assess the reliability of data provided by the

states in their responses to our survey. However, we did ask states in what

ways and how frequently information in their databases is validated. To

assess the reliability of NRC’s databases, we interviewed officials at NRC in

charge of maintaining its license tracking system database and the Nuclear

Materials Events Database to determine if data in these systems are

reasonably complete and accurate. As a result of these interviews, we did

not find any reasons to question the reliability of these data. In addition, we

also performed limited testing on NRC’s license tracking system database

to find missing data or data outside expected ranges. We did not find

significant errors or incompleteness as a result of these tests and

concluded that the use of the data would not lead to incorrect or

unintentional findings. These are the only data on NRC licensing activities

in the United States and program managers at NRC regularly use the data.

In addition to data on state programs obtained through our survey, we

obtained information through interviews with officials from state radiation

control programs. We visited the following states during our review:

Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Maryland, New Jersey, North Carolina,

Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Utah. We also interviewed

officials from the Massachusetts, Nevada, New York, and Ohio state

radiation control programs.

We selected states to visit based upon the numbers of licensees regulated

by the state and the different uses of sealed sources. We selected states

with a low number of licensees (Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Utah), a

medium number of licensees (Georgia, Maryland, New Jersey, North

Carolina, and Pennsylvania), and a high number of licensees (Florida and

Illinois). In addition, we considered the types of licensees in each state. For

example, we visited South Carolina and Utah because they have two of the

nation’s three low-level radioactive waste disposal facilities—the Chem-

Nuclear Systems, L.L.C. facility in Barnwell, South Carolina and the

Envirocare of Utah, Inc., facility in Clive, Utah. When visiting states, we met

with officials from selected licensees that represented the major uses of

sealed sources. We also visited manufacturers because they may possess

larger quantities of radioactive material for installation in devices for sale.

In summary, we visited three sites being decommissioned and

decontaminated, two low-level radioactive waste disposal facilities, two

moisture/density gauge manufacturers, two industrial radiographers, two

medical licensees (hospitals), two large irradiator facilities, a well-logging

licensee, a nuclear pharmacy, a research and development licensee, and an

academic licensee to obtain their views on the effectiveness of NRC and

state regulations, including the challenges associated with sealed source

security. Additionally, we examined physical security measures during

tours of these facilities.

We also visited Rhode Island, Florida, and the NRC Region III office in

Lisle, Illinois, because they were undergoing NRC program performance

evaluation reviews under the Integrated Materials Performance Evaluation

Program. Visiting a program while it was being evaluated gave us the

opportunity to witness review procedures for evaluating performance,

consistency of application of NRC’s review criteria, transparency of the

review process, and the level of cooperation and involvement between

NRC officials and representatives from agreement states. To follow up our

review of the program evaluation process, we attended a 2-day NRC

training class on the Integrated Materials Performance Evaluation Program

and observed two program evaluation Management Review Board

meetings at NRC headquarters in Rockville, Maryland.

We attended two conferences related to sealed source regulation—the May

2002 CRCPD annual meeting held in Madison, Wisconsin, and the annual

OAS Conference held in October 2002, in Denver, Colorado. We also

obtained a position paper from the Health Physics Society on the regulation

of sealed sources. Furthermore, we met with the chairman of the Southeast

Compact for low-level radioactive waste and the Advisory Committee on

the Medical Uses of Isotopes to elicit views on the regulation and security

of sealed sources.

At the federal level, we interviewed numerous NRC officials representing

several different offices and programs. During these interviews, NRC

provided us with information and documents about the regulation of sealed

sources and the challenges it faces in the post September 11, 2001, security

environment. We met with NRC’s Office of Enforcement, Office of

Investigation, Office of Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards, Office of

Nuclear Security and Incident Response, and Office of State and Tribal

Programs. Additionally, we attended an August 2002 meeting between

representatives of OAS and CRCPD and the Commissioners of NRC.

Finally, to gain the perspective of federal regulators at the regional level,

we visited three of the four NRC regional offices, including NRC Region I

located in King of Prussia, Pennsylvania; Region II located in Atlanta,

Georgia; and Region III located in Lisle, Illinois.

In addition to officials at NRC, we interviewed several other federal

government agency officials. To learn about sealed source transportation

regulations and issues, we interviewed officials from the Department of

Transportation, including the Office of Hazardous Materials Safety. To

establish the role of the Environmental Protection Agency in regulating

sealed sources, we met with officials from the Office of Radiation and

Indoor Air. We also met with officials from the Federal Emergency

Management Agency (FEMA) and observed a FEMA evaluated exercise in

March 2003 in Springfield and Morris, Illinois, that simulated a radiological

release at a nuclear power plant. We also interviewed Department of

Justice and Department of Energy officials.

We performed our review from August 2002 through June 2003 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Appendix II

Medical and Industrial Devices That Use

sterilization, such as spices, milk containers, and hospital supplies.

Irradiator facilities are relatively few in number and contain very high

activity sources, which vary in physical size. Non-self shielded irradiators

do not provide shielding from the radiation beam; therefore, the facilities

that contain the irradiation must be specially designed, often including

thickly shielded walls, interlocks, and other protective equipment. Selfshielded

irradiators do not emit external radiation beams and are usually

small cabinet type devices. These irradiators are commonly used in

research applications or for blood irradiation. According to our survey and

NRC specific license data, there are a total of approximately 350 irradiator

specific licensees in the United States, about 70 of which are large

irradiators.

Note: Cobalt-60 sealed sources are placed in racks and stored while not in use in a deep water-filled

pool beneath the product conveyor system.

multibeam teletheraphy units focus gamma radiation from an array of over

200 cobalt-60 sources on cancer lesions. The facilities within which the

units are located are specifically designed to include thickly shielded walls

and have other protective equipment, due to the high activity sources.

According to our survey and NRC specific license data, there are

approximately 60 teletherapy licensees and about 60 gamma knife

licensees in the United States.

internal features on photographic film to inspect metal parts and welds for

defects. Industrial radiography sources and devices are generally small in

terms of physical size, although the devices are usually heavy due to the

internal shielding. The sources are attached to specially designed cables for

their operation. The use of radiography sources and devices is very

common—a total of over 570 licensees nationwide—and their portability

may make them susceptible to theft or loss. Further, the small size of the

source allows for unauthorized removal by an individual, and such a source

may be placed into a pocket of a garment. Industrial radiography cameras

typically contain a high radioactivity iridium-192 source that is capable of

inflicting extensive radiation burns if handled improperly.

or sources are placed in or near the tumor itself, giving a high radiation

dose to the tumor while reducing the radiation exposure in the surrounding

healthy tissues. Brachytheraphy applications are of three slightly different

varieties, generally referred to as low dose rate, medium dose rate, and

high dose rate. These applications use sealed sources that are small

physically (less than 1 centimeter in diameter and only a few centimeters

long), and, thus, are susceptible to being lost or misplaced. High and

medium dose rate sources, and some low dose rate sources, may be in the

form of a long wire attached to a device (a remote after loading device).

The after loading device may be heavy, due to the shielding for the sources

when not in use, and the device may be on wheels for transport within a

facility. The remote after loading device may also contain electrical and

electronic components for its operation. Brachytherapy sources and

devices are located in hospitals, clinics, and similar medical institutions,

and such facilities may have a large number of sources.

radioactive materials to determine whether a well, drilled deep into the

ground, contains minerals, such as coal, oil, and natural gas. The sources

are usually contained in long (1 to 2 meters, typically) and thin (less than 10

centimeters in diameter) devices that also contain detectors and various

electronic components. The actual size of the sources inside the devices is

generally small, but the device is heavy, due to the ruggedness needed for

the environments in which they are to be used. Our analysis of NRC’s

license tracking system and responses to our survey of agreement states

indicates that there are about 210 well logging licensees in the United

States.

material density, flow, level, thickness, weight, and so forth. The gauges—

possessed by over 1,600 specific licensees and an unknown number of

general licensees—contain sealed sources that radiate through the

substance being measured to a readout or controlling device. Depending

upon the specific application, industrial gauges may contain relatively

small quantities of radioactive material, or may contain sources with

activities approaching 30 curies. The devices generally are not large, but

may be located some distance from the radiation detector, which may have

electrical or electronic components located within the detector. A facility

may have a large number of these gauges and the locations of such devices

or sources within a facility may not be recognized, since the devices may be

connected to process control equipment. This lack of recognition may

result in a loss of control if the facility decides to modernize or terminate

operations.

locations and contain the sources, detectors, and electronic equipment

necessary for the measurement. These gauges—over 4,600 licensees in the

United States—contain a gamma emitting sealed source, usually cesium-

137, and a sealed neutron source, usually americium-241 and beryllium.

The source is physically small in size, typically a few centimeters long by a

few centimeters in diameter, and may be located either completely within

the device or at the end of a rod/handle assembly. The portability of the

device makes it susceptible to loss of control or theft.

Irradiator (sterilization/food preservation) Industrial Cobalt-60 5,000-15,000,000

Cesium-137 5,000-5,000,000

Irradiator (self-shielded) Research Cesium-137 2,500-42,000

Cobalt-60 1,500-50,000

Irradiator (blood) Medical Cesium-137 1,000-12,000

Cobalt-60 1,500-3,000

Teletherapy Medical Cobalt-60 1,000-15,000

Cesium-137 500-1,500

Teletherapy (fixed, multibeam/gamma knife) Medical Cobalt-60 4,000-10,000

Industrial radiography Industrial Cobalt-60 11-200

Iridium-192 5-200

Selenium-75 80

Ytterbium-169 2.5-10

Thulium-170 20-200

Brachytherapy (high/medium dose rate) Medical Cobalt-60 5-20

Cesium-137 3-8

Iridium-192 3-12

Brachytherapy (low dose rate) Medical Cesium-137 .01-.7

Radium-226 .005-.05

Strontium-90 .02-.04

Palladium-103 .03

Iodine-125 .04

Iridium-192 .02-.75

Gold-198 .08

Californium-252 .083

Ruthenium/Rhodium-

106

.00022-.0006

Well logging gauge Industrial Americium-

241/Beryllium

.5-23

Cesium-137 1-2

Californium-252 .027-.11

Fixed industrial gauge (e.g. level/thickness gauge) Industrial Americium-241 .012-.12

Cesium-137 .05-.065

Portable gauge (e.g. moisture/density gauge) Industrial Americium-

241/Beryllium

.01-.1

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency, “Categorization of Radioactive Sources, Revision of IAEA-TECDOC-1191” Vienna, Austria, 2003.

Cesium-137 .008-.011

Radium-226 .002-.004

Californium-252 .00003-.00007

Appendix III

Legislation Introduced in the 108th Congress

S.6 Comprehensive Homeland

Security Act of 2003

Sec. 3006 and Sec. 170.

Amends the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 to include the

following major efforts: (1) based on a new classification

system, develop a national system for recovery of sealed

sources that are stolen or lost; (2) develop a national

tracking system that takes into account the new

classification system; and (3) establish procedures to

improve the security of sealed sources in use, transport,

and storage.

Establishes a task force to develop a

classification system for sensitive sealed

sources that is based on the potential for

use by terrorists and the extent of the

threat to public health and safety.

S.350 A bill to amend the Atomic

Energy Act of 1954 to strengthen

the security of sensitive

radioactive material.

Directs a task force to (1) determine which sealed

sources should be classified as sensitive sealed sources,

(2) develop a national system to recover sensitive sealed

sources that are lost or stolen, (3) develop a national

tracking system for sealed sources, and (4) establish

procedures to improve the security of sensitive sealed

sources.

Establishes a multiagency task force to

evaluate the security of sealed sources

and recommends administrative and

legislative actions to provide the maximum

degree of security against radiological

threats.

H.R.891 A bill to establish a task

force to evaluate and make

recommendations with respect to

the security of sealed sources of

radioactive materials, and for

other purposes.

Directs a task force to (1) establish or modify a

classification system for sealed sources based on sealed

source attractiveness to terrorists, (2) establish or modify

a national tracking system, (3) establish a system to

impose refundable fees for proper disposal, and (4)

improve the security of sealed sources.

Establishes a multiagency task force to, in

consultation with state agencies, make

recommendations for appropriate

regulatory and legislative changes to

strengthen controls over sealed sources.

S. 1043 A bill to provide for the

security of commercial nuclear

power plants and facilities

designated by the Nuclear

Regulatory Commission

Sec. 6

Changes the definition of byproduct material to include

naturally occurring and accelerator produced radioactive

material and, within 4 years, transition regulatory

authority over this material from non-agreement states to

the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

None.

S. 1005 The Energy Policy

Policy Act of 2003

Title IX Subtitle D—Nuclear

Energy Sec. 946

Instructs the Secretary of Energy to establish a research

and development program to develop alternatives to

sealed sources that reduce safety, environmental, or

proliferation risks to workers using the sources or the

public.

Directs the Secretary of Energy to conduct

a survey of industrial applications of large

radioactive sources. Requires the survey

to include information on the management

and disposal of sealed sources.

S. 1045 Low-Level Radioactive

Waste Act of 2003

Directs the Secretary of Energy to (1) identify options for

disposal of low-level radioactive waste, (2) develop a

report for Congress on a permanent disposal facility for

greater-than-Class C waste, and (3) submit to Congress a

plan to ensure continued recovery of greater-than-Class

C waste until a permanent disposal facility is available.

None.

Source: GAO.

S. 1161 Foreign Assistance

Authorization Act, fiscal year

2004

Title III Sec. 301—308

Radiological Terrorism Threat

Reduction Act of 2003

Authorizes the Secretary of Energy to engage in activities

with the International Atomic Energy Agency to (1)

propose and conclude agreements with up to 8 countries

under which the countries would provide temporary

secure storage for orphaned, unused, and surplus sealed

sources, (2) promote the discovery, inventory, and

recovery of sealed sources in member nations, and (3)

authorizes the Secretary of Energy to make voluntary

contributions to the International Atomic Energy Agency

to achieve the aforementioned goals.

None.

Appendix IV

1

The U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), the

investigative arm of Congress, is reviewing the

regulation of radioactive materials in the United

States. Congress has asked the GAO to answer

the following questions:

1. What is the known universe of

radiological sources in the United States

and how many have been lost, stolen, or

abandoned?

2. How effective are federal and state

controls over radiological sources?

3. What efforts are underway since

September 11, 2001, to improve the

controls over radiological sources?

As part of our review, we are conducting

surveys of state radiation control agencies,

including agreement and non-agreement states,

Puerto Rico, Guam, and the District of

Columbia. The principal aims of this survey are

to obtain information from each state on the

number and types of radiological sources being

regulated by the state and obtain states’ views on

the effectiveness of the current federal and state

regulatory framework.

Your cooperation in completing this survey is

essential for an accurate and timely report to the

Congress on the current state of regulatory

control over radioactive materials. To be

included in our report, your response within 3

weeks of receipt is greatly appreciated.

Please complete this questionnaire and return it

GAO will take steps to safeguard the privacy of

your responses.

If you have any questions about the survey,

please contact:

Office: 202-512-6888

Office: 202-512-8753

Office: 202-512-6768

If you prefer to return the survey via FedEx, the

return address is:

U.S. General Accounting Office

Attention: Ryan T. Coles

Natural Resources and Environment

441 G Street, NW Room 2T23

Washington, DC 20548

Due to increased security put in place following

the anthrax incidents of October 2001, please do

not use the U.S. Postal Service to return surveys

to GAO.

Although this questionnaire may require input

from various individuals, we ask that one person

assume responsibility for coordinating its

completion. Please list that person’s name

below in case we have questions or need followup.

Thank you.

2

Program name:

State department/division/office (e.g. Department of Health):

City the main office is located in:

State:

Current director of program:

94.3% Fees charged to licensees

45.7% Appropriations from state general fund

60.0% Other, please specify:

3

Inspectors

License reviewers

Other Technical Staff

Other Non-Technical Staff

Inspectors

License reviewers

Other Technical Staff

Other Non-Technical Staff

17.7% Increase 17.7% Increase

11.8% Decrease 11.8% Decrease

70.6% Stay about the same 70.6% Stay about the same

4

29

More than once per year

Once a Year

Every 2-3 Years

Every 4-5 Years

Over 5 Years

Inspection Not Required

03250 Introduction of byproduct material

in exempt concentrations into

products or materials, and transfer

of ownership or possession

5

More than once per year

Once a Year

Every 2-3 Years

Every 4-5 Years

Over 5 Years

Inspection Not Required

03251 Application of byproduct material

into devices exempt from regulation

under §30.15

More than once per year

Once a Year

Every 2-3 Years

Every 4-5 Years

Over 5 Years

Inspection Not Required

03252 Manufacture of resins containing

scandium-46 designed for sandconsolidation

in oil wells

More than once per year

Once a Year

Every 2-3 Years

Every 4-5 Years

Over 5 Years

Inspection Not Required

03253 Manufacture, distribution, and

transfer of exempt quantities of

byproduct material

More than once per year

Once a Year

Every 2-3 Years

Every 4-5 Years

Over 5 Years

Inspection Not Required

03256 Manufacture, preparation, or

transfer of capsules containing

carbon-14 urea for “in vivo”

diagnostic use in humans

6

More than once per year

Once a Year

Every 2-3 Years

Every 4-5 Years

Over 5 Years

Inspection Not Required

03254 Manufacture, process, produce, or

initially transfer self-luminous

products containing tritium,

krypton-85 or promethium-147

More than once per year

Once a Year

Every 2-3 Years

Every 4-5 Years

Over 5 Years

Inspection Not Required

03255 Manufacture, process, produce, or

initially transfer gas and aerosol

detectors containing byproduct

material

More than once per year

Once a Year

Every 2-3 Years

Every 4-5 Years

Over 5 Years

Inspection Not Required

03240 Manufacture or initially transfer

generally licensed devices under

§31.5

More than once per year

Once a Year

Every 2-3 Years

Every 4-5 Years

Over 5 Years

Inspection Not Required

03241 Manufacture, assemble, repair, or

initially transfer luminous safety

devices for use in aircraft

7

More than once per year

Once a Year

Every 2-3 Years

Every 4-5 Years

Over 5 Years

Inspection Not Required

03242 Manufacture or initially transfer

calibration or reference sources

containing americium-241

More than once per year

Once a Year

Every 2-3 Years

Every 4-5 Years

Over 5 Years

Inspection Not Required

03243 Manufacture or initially transfer ice

detection devices containing

strontium-90

More than once per year

Once a Year

Every 2-3 Years

Every 4-5 Years

Over 5 Years

Inspection Not Required

03244 Manufacture and distribution of

byproduct material for in-vitro

clinical or laboratory testing under

general license

More than once per year

Once a Year

Every 2-3 Years

Every 4-5 Years

Over 5 Years

Inspection Not Required

02511 Manufacture, preparation, or

transfer for commercial distribution

of radioactive drugs containing

byproduct material for medical use

under part 35.

8

More than once per year

Once a Year

Every 2-3 Years

Every 4-5 Years

Over 5 Years

Inspection Not Required

02513 Manufacture and distribution of

sources or devices containing

byproduct material for medical use

More than once per year

Once a Year

Every 2-3 Years

Every 4-5 Years

Over 5 Years

Inspection Not Required

01100 Academic type A specific license of

broad scope

More than once per year

Once a Year

Every 2-3 Years

Every 4-5 Years

Over 5 Years

Inspection Not Required

03211 Manufacturing and distribution type

A specific license of broad scope

More than once per year

Once a Year

Every 2-3 Years

Every 4-5 Years

Over 5 Years

Inspection Not Required

03610 Research and development type A

specific license of broad scope

9

More than once per year

Once a Year

Every 2-3 Years

Every 4-5 Years

Over 5 Years

Inspection Not Required

01110 Academic type B specific license of

broad scope

More than once per year

Once a Year

Every 2-3 Years

Every 4-5 Years

Over 5 Years

Inspection Not Required

03211 Manufacturing and distribution type

B specific license of broad scope

More than once per year

Once a Year

Every 2-3 Years

Every 4-5 Years

Over 5 Years

Inspection Not Required

03611 Research and development type B

specific license of broad scope

More than once per year

Once a Year

Every 2-3 Years

Every 4-5 Years

Over 5 Years

Inspection Not Required

01120 Academic type C specific license of

broad scope

10

More than once per year

Once a Year

Every 2-3 Years

Every 4-5 Years

Over 5 Years

Inspection Not Required

03213 Manufacturing and distribution type

C specific license of broad scope

More than once per year

Once a Year

Every 2-3 Years

Every 4-5 Years

Over 5 Years

Inspection Not Required

03612 Research and development type C

specific license of broad scope

More than once per year

Once a Year

Every 2-3 Years

Every 4-5 Years

Over 5 Years

Inspection Not Required

03310 Industrial radiography fixed

location

More than once per year

Once a Year

Every 2-3 Years

Every 4-5 Years

Over 5 Years

Inspection Not Required

03320 Industrial radiography temporary

job sites

11

More than once per year

Once a Year

Every 2-3 Years

Every 4-5 Years

Over 5 Years

Inspection Not Required

02120

02121

More than once per year

Once a Year

Every 2-3 Years

Every 4-5 Years

Over 5 Years

Inspection Not Required

02200

02201

More than once per year

Once a Year

Every 2-3 Years

Every 4-5 Years

Over 5 Years

Inspection Not Required

02220

02231

02240

More than once per year

Once a Year

Every 2-3 Years

Every 4-5 Years

Over 5 Years

Inspection Not Required

12

More than once per year

Once a Year

Every 2-3 Years

Every 4-5 Years

Over 5 Years

Inspection Not Required

More than once per year

Once a Year

Every 2-3 Years

Every 4-5 Years

Over 5 Years

Inspection Not Required

02310 Stereotactic radiosurgery—gamma

knife

More than once per year

Once a Year

Every 2-3 Years

Every 4-5 Years

Over 5 Years

Inspection Not Required

More than once per year

Once a Year

Every 2-3 Years

Every 4-5 Years

Over 5 Years

Inspection Not Required

13

More than once per year

Once a Year

Every 2-3 Years

Every 4-5 Years

Over 5 Years

Inspection Not Required

More than once per year

Once a Year

Every 2-3 Years

Every 4-5 Years

Over 5 Years

Inspection Not Required

03510 Irradiators self shielded less than

10,000 curies

More than once per year

Once a Year

Every 2-3 Years

Every 4-5 Years

Over 5 Years

Inspection Not Required

03511 Irradiators other less than 10,000

curies

More than once per year

Once a Year

Every 2-3 Years

Every 4-5 Years

Over 5 Years

Inspection Not Required

03520 Irradiators self shielded greater than

10,000 curies

14

More than once per year

Once a Year

Every 2-3 Years

Every 4-5 Years

Over 5 Years

Inspection Not Required

03521 All other irradiators greater than

10,000 curies

More than once per year

Once a Year

Every 2-3 Years

Every 4-5 Years

Over 5 Years

Inspection Not Required

03110 Well logging byproduct and/or

special nuclear material tracer and

sealed sources

More than once per year

Once a Year

Every 2-3 Years

Every 4-5 Years

Over 5 Years

Inspection Not Required

03111 Well logging byproduct and/or

special nuclear material sealed

sources only

More than once per year

Once a Year

Every 2-3 Years

Every 4-5 Years

Over 5 Years

Inspection Not Required

15

More than once per year

Once a Year

Every 2-3 Years

Every 4-5 Years

Over 5 Years

Inspection Not Required

More than once per year

Once a Year

Every 2-3 Years

Every 4-5 Years

Over 5 Years

Inspection Not Required

More than once per year

Once a Year

Every 2-3 Years

Every 4-5 Years

Over 5 Years

Inspection Not Required

More than once per year

Once a Year

Every 2-3 Years

Every 4-5 Years

Over 5 Years

Inspection Not Required

More than once per year

Once a Year

Every 2-3 Years

Every 4-5 Years

Over 5 Years

Inspection Not Required

16

More than once per year

Once a Year

Every 2-3 Years

Every 4-5 Years

Over 5 Years

Inspection Not Required

03221 Instrument calibration service

only—source less than 100 curies

More than once per year

Once a Year

Every 2-3 Years

Every 4-5 Years

Over 5 Years

Inspection Not Required

03222 Instrument calibration service

only—source greater than 100

curies

17

More than once per year

Once a Year

Every 2-3 Years

Every 4-5 Years

Over 5 Years

Inspection Not Required

More than once per year

Once a Year

Every 2-3 Years

Every 4-5 Years

Over 5 Years

Inspection Not Required

More than once per year

Once a Year

Every 2-3 Years

Every 4-5 Years

Over 5 Years

Inspection Not Required

More than once per year

Once a Year

Every 2-3 Years

Every 4-5 Years

Over 5 Years

Inspection Not Required

18

More than once per year

Once a Year

Every 2-3 Years

Every 4-5 Years

Over 5 Years

Inspection Not Required

More than once per year

Once a Year

Every 2-3 Years

Every 4-5 Years

Over 5 Years

Inspection Not Required

More than once per year

Once a Year

Every 2-3 Years

Every 4-5 Years

Over 5 Years

Inspection Not Required

More than once per year

Once a Year

Every 2-3 Years

Every 4-5 Years

Over 5 Years

Inspection Not Required

19

Strictest regulation Least strict regulation

1. 1.

2. 2.

3. 3.

Strictest regulation Least strict regulation

1. 1.

2. 2.

3. 3.

20

16.1% Yes, but only certain generally licensed devices are required to be registered.

3.2%

Yes

21

97.1% Yes

46.9% More than once per year

40.6% Once a year

9.4% Every 2-3 years

3.1% Every 4-5 years

0.0% Over 5 years

94.3% Yes

22

100% Notices of violation/citations

77.1% Fines/civil penalties

88.6% License suspension

97.1% License termination

57.1% Facility closure

71.4% Imprisonment/criminal penalties

45.7% Other, please specify:

Notices of violation

only (without other

action)

2,135

(N=24)

2,675

(N=25)

3,056

(N=27)

2,845

(N=28)

2,568

(N=28)

Fines/civil penalties 45 (N=23) 50 (N=24) 47 (N=24) 66 (N=26) 57 (N=25)

License suspension 3 (N=25) 3 (N=26) 8 (N=26) 9 (N=27) 9 (N=27)

License termination 24 (N=25) 25 (N=26) 26 (N=26) 27 (N=27) 53 (N=27)

Facility closure

1 (N=24) 0 (N=25) 1 (N=25) 0 (N=25) 1 (N=25)

Imprisonment/criminal

penalties

0 (N=24) 0 (N=25) 2 (N=25) 0 (N=26) 2 (N=26)

Other:

7 (N=15) 6 (N=16) 14 (N=16) 56 (N=19) 87 (N=19)

23

25.7% Available for use by the state radiation control program

45.7% Deposited into state general fund

11.4% Other, please specify:

20.0% Not applicable

24

a) the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (NRC) (N=35)

8.6% 2.9% 28.6% 28.6% 31.4% 0.0%

b) the U.S. Department of Energy

(DOE) (N=35)

11.4% 20.0% 25.7% 22.9% 5.7% 14.3%

c) the Environmental Protection

Agency (EPA) (N=35)

11.4% 14.3% 25.7% 28.6% 17.1% 2.90%

d) the Food and Drug

Administration (FDA) (N=35)

2.9% 5.7% 20.0% 25.7% 35.7% 8.6%

e) the U.S. Department of Justice

(DOJ) (N=35)

8.6% 14.3% 14.3% 8.6% 8.6% 45.7%

f) the U.S. Department of

Transportation (DOT) (N=35)

5.7% 14.3% 28.6% 28.6% 14.3% 8.6%

g) other agreement states (N=35) 2.9% 0.0% 8.6% 20.0% 68.6% 0.0%

h) non-agreement states (N=35) 2.9% 0.0% 11.4% 25.7% 57.1% 2.9%

i) Organization of Agreement

States (OAS) (N=34)

0.0% 2.9% 5.9% 23.5% 67.6% 0.0%

j) Conference of Radiation

Control Program Directors

(CRCPD) (N=34)

0.0% 2.9% 5.9% 17.6% 73.5% 0.0%

25

a) Communications and

coordination needs to be

improved between federal

agencies with regulatory

authority for radioactive

materials

34.3% 34.3% 17.1% 14.3% 0.0% 0.0%

b) The current division of

regulatory authority for

radioactive materials between

NRC, DOE, EPA, DOT and

FDA is the most effective

means of federal regulation

0.0% 2.9% 5.7% 20.0% 71.4% 0.0%

c) Consistent radiation protection

standards need to be developed

that would apply across all

federal and state regulatory

programs.

48.6% 31.4% 5.7% 8.6% 5.7% 0.0%

sufficient budgetary resources to

effectively regulate radiological

sources

8.6% 20.0% 25.7% 28.6% 17.1% 0.0%

sufficient technology (e.g.

radiation survey meters,

laboratory resources) to

effectively regulate radiological

sources

11.4% 31.4% 34.3% 17.1% 5.7% 0.0%

effectively regulate radiological

sources

8.6% 31.4% 25.7% 25.7% 8.6% 0.0%

effectively regulate radiological

sources

22.9% 42.9% 17.1% 11.4% 5.7% 0.0%

h) NRC’s Nuclear Materials

Events Database (NMED)

accurately and completely

reflects incidents involving

radioactive materials in my state

14.3% 25.7% 34.3% 17.1% 5.7% 2.9%

26

i) DOT’s regulations adequately

ensure safe and secure transport

of radioactive materials

0.0% 40.0% 48.6% 8.6% 2.9% 0.0%

j) The federal government should

have a greater role in regulating

radioactive material in the

United States

0.0% 0.0% 2.9% 40.0% 57.1% 0.0%

k) Additional federal training

could improve regulation of

radioactive material in my state

31.4% 28.6% 20.0% 11.4% 8.6% 0.0%

l) My state’s public safety/law

enforcement agencies need

additional training to respond to

radiological incidents

22.9% 31.4% 28.6% 8.6% 5.7% 2.9%

m) My state program can

effectively respond to a

radiological incident with its

current resources

5.7% 22.9% 45.7% 20.0% 5.7% 0.0%

n) In the event of a major

radiological incident, adequate

federal resources can be brought

to bear in a timely manner

5.7% 34.3% 20.0% 20.0% 5.7% 14.3%

o) My state program is adequately

addressing the post-September

11th heightened security

concerns involving malicious

use of radioactive material (i.e.

possible use as a “dirty bomb”)

11.4% 42.9% 31.4% 11.4% 2.9% 0.0%

state program will have

sufficient budgetary resources to

effectively regulate radiological

sources

8.6% 20.0% 25.7% 20.0% 17.1% 8.6%

state program will have

sufficient technology (e.g.

radiation survey meters,

laboratory resources) to

effectively regulate radiological

sources

8.6% 25.7% 31.4% 22.9% 5.7% 5.7%

27

state program will have

effectively regulate radiological

sources

8.6% 20.0% 34.3% 20.0% 11.4% 5.7%

state program will have

effectively regulate radiological

sources

8.6% 31.4% 22.9% 25.7% 5.7% 5.7%

Equipment malfunction 48 (N=24) 32 (N=26) 26 (N=25) 33 (N=25) 47 (N=26)

Radiation overexposure 18 (N=26) 33 (N=26) 33 (N=28) 32 (N=28) 21 (N=28)

Lost, stolen, or abandoned

materials

100 (N=28) 129 (N=27) 129 (N=27) 167 (N=28) 220 (N=28)

Medical events 101 (N=24) 107 (N=24) 123 (N=27) 114 (N=27) 91 (N=26)

Transportation events 30 (N=26) 37 (N=26) 47 (N=28) 38 (N=28) 34 (N=27)

Leaking sealed sources 9 (N=25) 20 (N=27) 19 (N=27) 14 (N=27) 23 (N=28)

28

100% Yes

0.0% No

91.4% Yes

8.6% No

a) Status of evaluation program

(N=35)

42.9% 48.6% 2.9% 0.0% 5.7%

b) Technical quality of inspections

(N=35)

57.1% 37.1% 5.7% 0.0% 0.0%

c) Quality of technical staffing and

training (N=35)

48.6% 40.0% 8.6% 2.9% 0.0%

d) Technical quality of licensing

actions (N=35)

48.6% 48.6% 2.9% 0.0% 0.0%

e) Quality of response to incidents

and allegations (N=35)

40.0% 51.4% 8.6% 0.0% 0.0%

f) Sealed source and device

evaluation program (N=34)

8.8% 44.1% 5.9% 0.0% 41.2%

g) Low-level radioactive waste

disposal program (N=34)

5.9% 17.6% 8.8% 0.0% 67.6%

h) Legislation and program elements

required for compatibility (N=35)

42.9% 40.0% 14.3% 0.0% 2.9%

29

100% Yes

0.0% No

30

97.1% Yes

2.9% No

97.1% Yes

60.0% Spent nuclear fuel

57.1% DOE waste material (i.e. shipments to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant)

51.4% Byproduct material with high radioactivity

37.1% Other, please specify:

2.9% No shipments monitored

31

32

a) State radiological protection

laws (N=33)

54.5% 15.2% 6.1% 3.0% 21.2%

b) State radiological protection

regulations (N=33)

39.4% 39.4% 9.1% 0.0% 12.1%

c) License review procedures

(N=34)

20.6% 44.1% 23.5% 5.9% 5.9%

d) Inspection frequency (N=34) 55.9% 29.4% 8.8% 0.0% 5.9%

e) Inspection procedures (N=34) 17.6% 38.2% 38.2% 2.9% 2.9%

f) Number of enforcement actions

(N=32)

71.9% 12.5% 12.5% 0.0% 3.1%

g) Severity of enforcement actions

taken (N=34)

60.6% 21.2% 15.2% 0.0% 3.0%

h) Incident response procedures

(N=34)

14.7% 35.3% 32.4% 14.7% 2.9%

i) Incident investigation

procedures (N=34)

20.6% 47.1% 20.6% 5.9% 5.9%

j) Coordination with federal

agencies (N=34)

2.9% 23.5% 44.1% 23.5% 5.9%

k) Coordination with other states

(N=34)

29.4% 35.3% 26.5% 2.9% 5.9%

l) Coordination with state law

enforcement/public safety

agencies (N=34)

2.9% 32.4% 38.2% 26.5% 0.0%

m) Financial support from state

legislature (N=33)

63.6% 9.1% 0.0% 6.1% 21.2%

n) Monitoring of transportation of

radioactive material through

your state (N=33)

45.5% 18.2% 27.3% 6.1% 3.0%

o) Federal financial aid to your

state program (N=33)

63.6% 9.1% 3.0% 3.0% 21.2%

p) Federal training support to your

state program (N=33)

60.6% 21.1% 9.1% 0.0% 18.2%

q) Federal technology support to

your state program (N=33)

57.6% 21.2% 3.0% 0.0% 18.2%

33

34

#1.

#2.

#3.

#1.

#2.

#3.

#1.

#2.

#3.

35

Appendix V

1

The U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), the

investigative arm of Congress, is reviewing the

regulation of radioactive materials in the United

States. Congress has asked the GAO to answer

the following questions:

1. What is the known universe of

radiological sources in the United States

and how many have been lost, stolen, or

abandoned?

2. How effective are federal and state

controls over radiological sources?

3. What efforts are underway since

September 11, 2001, to improve the

controls over radiological sources?

As part of our review, we are conducting

surveys of state radiation control agencies,

including agreement and non-agreement states,

Puerto Rico, Guam, and the District of

Columbia. The principal aims of this survey are

to obtain information from each state on the

number and types of radiological sources being

regulated by the state and obtain states’ views on

the effectiveness of the current federal and state

regulatory framework.

Your cooperation in completing this survey is

essential for an accurate and timely report to the

Congress on the current state of regulatory

control over radioactive materials. To be

included in our report, your response within 3

weeks of receipt is greatly appreciated.

Please complete this questionnaire and return it

GAO will take steps to safeguard the privacy of

your responses.

If you have any questions about the survey,

please contact:

Office: 202-512-6888

Office: 202-512-8753

Office: 202-512-6768

If you prefer to return the survey via FedEx, the

return address is:

U.S. General Accounting Office

Attention: Ryan T. Coles

Natural Resources and Environment

441 G Street, NW Room 2T23

Washington, DC 20548

Due to increased security put in place following

the anthrax incidents of October 2001, please do

not use the U.S. Postal Service to return surveys

to GAO.

Although this questionnaire may require input

from various individuals, we ask that one person

assume responsibility for coordinating its

completion. Please list that person’s name

below in case we have questions or need followup.

Thank you.

2

Program name:

State department/division/office (e.g. Department of Health):

City the main office is located in:

State:

Current director of program:

50.0% Fees charged to licensees

83.3% Appropriations from state general fund

50.0% Other, please specify:

3

Inspectors

License reviewers

Other Technical Staff

Other Non-Technical Staff

Inspectors

License reviewers

Other Technical Staff

Other Non-Technical Staff

16.7% Increase 9.1% Increase

8.3% Decrease 0.0% Decrease

75.0% Stay about the same 90.9% Stay about the same

4

Naturally occurring More than once per year

Accelerator produced Once a Year

Every 2-3 Years

Every 4-5 Years

Over 5 Years

Inspection Not Required

Naturally occurring More than once per year

Accelerator produced Once a Year

Every 2-3 Years

Every 4-5 Years

Over 5 Years

Inspection Not Required

5

Naturally occurring More than once per year

Accelerator produced Once a Year

Every 2-3 Years

Every 4-5 Years

Over 5 Years

Inspection Not Required

Naturally occurring More than once per year

Accelerator produced Once a Year

Every 2-3 Years

Every 4-5 Years

Over 5 Years

Inspection Not Required

Naturally occurring More than once per year

Accelerator produced Once a Year

Every 2-3 Years

Every 4-5 Years

Over 5 Years

Inspection Not Required

6

Naturally occurring More than once per year

Accelerator produced Once a Year

Every 2-3 Years

Every 4-5 Years

Over 5 Years

Inspection Not Required

Naturally occurring More than once per year

Accelerator produced Once a Year

Every 2-3 Years

Every 4-5 Years

Over 5 Years

Inspection Not Required

Naturally occurring More than once per year

Accelerator produced Once a Year

Every 2-3 Years

Every 4-5 Years

Over 5 Years

Inspection Not Required

7

Naturally occurring More than once per year

Accelerator produced Once a Year

Every 2-3 Years

Every 4-5 Years

Over 5 Years

Inspection Not Required

Naturally occurring More than once per year

Accelerator produced Once a Year

Every 2-3 Years

Every 4-5 Years

Over 5 Years

Inspection Not Required

Naturally occurring More than once per year

Accelerator produced Once a Year

Every 2-3 Years

Every 4-5 Years

Over 5 Years

Inspection Not Required

8

Strictest regulation Least strict regulation

1. 1.

2. 2.

3. 3.

Strictest regulation Least strict regulation

1. 1.

2. 2.

3. 3.

9

81.8% Yes

11.0% More than once per year

33.3% Once a year

44.4% Every 2-3 years

11.1% Every 4-5 years

0.0% Over 5 years

33.3% Yes

10

11

83.3% Notices of violation/citations

58.3% Fines/civil penalties

58.3% License suspension

66.7% License termination

58.3% Facility closure

25.0% Imprisonment/criminal penalties

0.0% Other, please specify:

Notices of violation

only (without other

action)

302 (N=9) 340 (N=9) 265 (N=9) 303 (N=9) 519 (N=10)

Fines/civil penalties 5 (N=6) 4 (N=6) 7 (N=6) 10 (N=6) 7 (N=6)

License suspension 0 (N=7) 0 (N=7) 0 (N=7) 1 (N=7) 0 (N=7)

License termination 0 (N=6) 0 (N=6) 0 (N=6) 1 (N=6) 2 (N=7)

Facility closure

0 (N=6) 0 (N=6) 0 (N=6) 0 (N=6) 0 (N=6)

Imprisonment/criminal

penalties

0 (N=5) 0 (N=5) 0 (N=5) 0 (N=5) 0 (N=5)

Other:

0 (N=1) 0 (N=1) 0 (N=1) 1 (N=1) 0 (N=1)

12

16.7% Available for use by the state radiation control program

41.7% Deposited into state general fund

16.7% Other, please specify:

33.3% Not applicable

13

a) the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (NRC)

0.0% 8.3% 16.7% 8.3% 66.7% 0.0%

b) the U.S. Department of Energy

(DOE)

8.3% 16.7% 41.7% 25.0% 8.3% 0.0%

c) the Environmental Protection

Agency (EPA)

8.3% 16.7% 8.3% 41.7% 25.0% 0.0%

d) the Food and Drug

Administration (FDA)

0.0% 16.7% 0.0% 41.7% 41.7% 0.0%

e) the U.S. Department of Justice

(DOJ)

8.3% 25.0% 0.0% 25.0% 8.3% 33.3%

f) the U.S. Department of

Transportation (DOT)

8.3% 16.7% 8.3% 41.7% 0.0% 25.0%

g) agreement states 0.0% 8.3% 8.3% 33.3% 25.0% 25.0%

h) other non-agreement states 0.0% 8.3% 16.7% 33.3% 16.7% 25.0%

i) Organization of Agreement

States (OAS)

0.0% 8.3% 0.0% 16.7% 50.0% 25.0%

j) Conference of Radiation

Control Program Directors

(CRCPD)

0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 25.0% 75.0% 0.0%

14

a) Communications and

coordination needs to be

improved between federal

agencies with regulatory

authority for radioactive

materials

8.3% 33.3% 0.0% 50.0% 0.0% 8.3%

b) The current division of

regulatory authority for

radioactive materials between

NRC, DOE, EPA, DOT and

FDA is the most effective

means of federal regulation

0.0% 8.3% 8.3% 25.0% 50.0% 8.3%

c) Consistent radiation protection

standards need to be developed

that would apply across all

federal and state regulatory

programs.

50.0% 8.3% 8.3% 83.3% 0.0% 0.0%

sufficient budgetary resources to

effectively regulate radiological

sources

0.0% 8.3% 8.3% 0.0% 33.3% 0.0%

sufficient technology (e.g.

radiation survey meters,

laboratory resources) to

effectively regulate radiological

sources

8.3% 16.7% 41.7% 0.0% 33.3% 0.0%

effectively regulate radiological

sources

0.0% 16.7% 0.0% 8.3% 75.0% 0.0%

effectively regulate radiological

sources

8.3% 33.3% 16.7% 33.3% 8.3% 0.0%

h) NRC’s Nuclear Materials

Events Database (NMED)

accurately and completely

reflects incidents involving

radioactive materials in my state

8.3% 8.3% 16.7% 25.0% 0.0% 41.7%

15

i) DOT’s regulations adequately

ensure safe and secure transport

of radioactive materials

16.7% 33.3% 16.7% 16.7% 8.3% 8.3%

j) The federal government should

have a greater role in regulating

radioactive material in the

United States

16.7% 0.0% 25.0% 16.7% 33.3% 8.3%

k) Additional federal training

could improve regulation of

radioactive material in my state

33.3% 25.0% 16.7% 25.0% 0.0% 0.0%

l) My state’s public safety/law

enforcement agencies need

additional training to respond to

radiological incidents

50.0% 8.3% 33.3% 8.3% 0.0% 0.0%

m) My state program can

effectively respond to a

radiological incident with its

current resources

0.0% 16.7% 41.7% 33.3% 8.3% 0.0%

n) In the event of a major

radiological incident, adequate

federal resources can be brought

to bear in a timely manner

8.3% 0.0% 58.3% 8.3% 16.7% 8.3%

o) My state program is adequately

addressing the post-September

11th heightened security

concerns involving malicious

use of radioactive material (i.e.

possible use as a “dirty bomb”)

0.0% 0.0% 25.0% 41.7% 33.3% 0.0%

state program will have

sufficient budgetary resources to

effectively regulate radiological

sources

0.0% 8.3% 16.7% 0.0% 66.7% 8.3%

state program will have

sufficient technology (e.g.

radiation survey meters,

laboratory resources) to

effectively regulate radiological

sources

0.0% 25.0% 25.0% 16.7% 25.0% 8.3%

16

state program will have

effectively regulate radiological

sources

0.0% 8.3% 0.0% 8.3% 75.0% 8.3%

state program will have

effectively regulate radiological

sources

0.0% 8.3% 33.3% 25.0% 25.0% 8.3%

Equipment malfunction 0 (N=7) 0(N=7) 0(N=7) 0(N=7) 0(N=7)

Radiation overexposure 0 (N=7) 0(N=7) 2 (N=8) 2(N=7) 1(N=7)

Lost, stolen, or abandoned

materials

26 (N=9) 32(N=9) 13 (N=10) 18 (N=10) 19 (N=10)

Medical events 6 (N=7) 4 (N=7) 0 (N=8) 2 (N=8) 5 (N=8)

Transportation events 16 (N=8) 23 (N=8) 9 (N=8) 10 (N=9) 5 (N=8)

Leaking sealed sources 1 (N=7) 0 (N=7) 0 (N=7) 0 (N=7) 0 (N=7)

17

66.7% Yes

33.3% No

8.3% Yes

91.7% No

18

25.0% Yes

75.0% No

16.7% Yes

100% Spent nuclear fuel

85.7% DOE waste material (i.e. shipments to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant)

100% Byproduct material with high radioactivity

62.5% Other, please specify:

19

a) State radiological protection

laws

50.0% 8.3% 0.0% 0.0% 41.7%

b) State radiological protection

regulations

58.3% 8.3% 0.0% 0.0% 33.3%

c) License review procedures 41.7% 8.3% 16.7% 0.0% 33.3%

d) Inspection frequency 54.6% 9.1% 0.0% 9.1% 27.3%

e) Inspection procedures 41.7% 8.3% 8.3% 0.0% 41.7%

f) Number of enforcement actions 66.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 33.3%

g) Severity of enforcement actions

taken

66.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 33.3%

h) Incident response procedures 16.7% 16.7% 8.3% 41.7% 16.7%

i) Incident investigation

procedures

16.7% 8.3% 33.3% 16.7% 25.0%

j) Coordination with federal

agencies

8.3% 41.7% 8.3% 25.0% 16.7%

k) Coordination with other states 25.0% 25.0% 16.7% 8.3% 25.0%

l) Coordination with state law

enforcement/public safety

agencies

16.7% 33.3% 8.3% 33.3% 8.3%

m) Financial support from your

state legislature

58.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 41.7%

n) Monitoring of transportation of

radioactive material through

your state

33.3% 25.0% 8.3% 0.0% 33.3%

o) Federal financial aid to your

state program

41.7% 8.3% 16.7% 0.0% 33.3%

p) Federal training support to your

state program

50.0% 16.7% 16.7% 0.0% 16.7%

q) Federal technology support to

your state program

58.3% 8.3% 8.3% 0.0% 25.0%

20

91.6% of states responding to the survey indicated they do not have sufficient resources to

support new efforts.

8.3% of states responding to the survey indicated they have sufficient resources to support new

efforts.

21

#1.

#2.

#3.

#1.

#2.

#3.

#1.

#2.

#3.

22

Appendix VI

Comments from the Nuclear Regulatory

Appendix VII

Doreen S. Feldman, Judy K. Pagano, Terry L. Richardson, Peter E. Ruedel,

Rebecca Shea, and Heather W. Von Behren also made key contributions to

this report.

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