

Order No. S/0906

IN THE CENTRAL CRIMINAL COURT

Old Bailey,
London E.C.4.

Thursday, 23rd September 1993

BEFORE:

THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE BLOFELD

REGINA

- v -

MICHAEL SMITH

MR. D. SPENCER O.C. (The Solicitor General, MR. J. NUTTING and MR. J. KELSEY-FRY appeared on behalf of the prosecution.

MR. R. TANSEY O.C. and MR. G. SUMMERS appeared on behalf of the defendant.

Transcript of the palantype notes of D.L. Sellers & Co.
(Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)
10 High Street, Leatherhead, Surrey KT22 8AN

CROSS-EXAMINATION OF MRS C

A Thursday, 23rd September 1993

MRS. 'C' continued
Cross-examined by Mr. Tansey

Q. Mrs. C, when you gave your evidence, were you trying to be fair and impartial? A. Yes, I hope I was. I mean that was certainly my intention.

B Q. I ask you this, so far as Oporto is concerned, and you say that these crosses which we can see or have seen -- I think you and I have looked at them quite often but the jury very recently. A. Hmm.

Q. These crosses are what? A. I have said they could be interpreted -- could be interpreted.

C Q. Right. Have you considered the possibility that they could be in themselves totally innocent? A. Yes, yes.

Q. When you went to Portugal to Oporto did you -- have you given us all the relevant information to assist us in determining whether they could be innocent? A. I think so. I visited those sites. I have looked to see whether there might be something there that would be of interest to a tourist, perhaps -- and apart from one of them I could see nothing. They were streets in which there were offices, shops, cafes, nothing of immediate tourist interest. I am simply saying that this could be interpreted in that way. There may be other explanations.

E Q. Because the three crosses in question that we find -- the top part if I can describe it that way -- you accept, do you, that they in fact are bus stops? A. Yes, there are bus stops on those sites, yes.

F Q. You have not told us much if anything about page 3 of this bundle. A. Which is?

Q. Sorry the map of the Parque de Campismo da Prelada. A. Oh, the camp site.

Q. It is exhibit 46, sorry. A. Yes.

G Q. As we look at it, we can see at the top in various languages "Welcome" and the Parque de campismo da Prelada. A. Yes.

Q. This is the camp site? A. Yes.

Q. A significant camp site? A. Yes, I visited there. I went there.

H Q. It is a large camp site, is it not? A. Yes.

A Q. It is about, would you agree, 5-6 kms from the camp site to the town centre? A. I would think about that. I mean, I didn't measure it, but it's that sort of -- it's on the outskirts of Oporto.

Q. For example, if you take a taxi from the camp site to get into the centre ----- A. Yes.

B Q. ----- that would take you around 15/20 minutes?
A. Probably.

Q. One thing you have not told us about is this. Do buses run from that camp site? A. I have no idea. They probably do. I would think of a camp site you would expect there to be buses into town.

C Q. Did you not bother to find out? A. I didn't enquire specifically.

Q. Did you not notice with your expertise and training that, as you come out of the exit from the camp site and turn left, there is a bus stop which has a number of bus numbers on it? A. There may have been.

D Q. But you did not bother to find out? A. There was no reason for me to find out. I had visited the camp site and looked at the markings. In my opinion they seemed to have no intelligence significance.

Q. I do not think the camp site -- because that is where the defendant was staying, was it not? A. Yes, as I understand it.

E

Q. Yes, that is where he was staying for several days.
A. Hmm.

Q. And so, if one in fact wishes to get from the camp site into the centre of Oporto, then the buses would be or might be very useful indeed? A. Yes, yes.

F

Q. You did not notice the bus numbers when you went in May 1992? Let me assist you: the bus numbers for the bus stop immediately outside the camp site are numbers 6, 50, 54 and I think it is 87. A. Hmm.

Q. Do you know where those buses go to from the camp site?
A. No, but I would imagine that they certainly would go to the -- there are a lot -- the main bus stops, many of them are in the -- where the top left-hand cross and the central one are both -- the top three crosses -- the central one and the left hand one are I won't say bus stations but there are a large number of bus stops there. So I think it very likely that they would go to those points.

H

- A Q. Let me just put this to you as well: did you enquire and find out that the number 6 bus from the camp site stops at a certain time and other buses take over, I think 50 or 54? A. No.
- Q. Did you know that the number 6 from outside the camp site runs into the centre of Oporto? A. No.
- B Q. Did you know that the numbers 54 -- when I say the centre, I think -- I hope we all understand the point, but the centre piece of the plan, where we can see one cross and an arrow and then another cross -- those there, that is for the centre of Oporto, is it not? A. Yes.
- C Q. The one to the left is the Praga da Lisboa, is it not? A. Yes, which is by the university where the long distance buses -- a lot of long distance buses go.
- Q. That is where the long distance buses now stop at a certain point? A. Yes.
- D Q. Did you know that the numbers 54, 85 and 87 from the camp site actually stop at the Praga da Lisboa? A. No, but I wouldn't dispute that; I would expect them to stop there.
- Q. You would expect them to stop there, would you, terminate there possibly? A. Possibly. One accepts that these are bus stops, that there are buses from the camp site that may stop there.
- E Q. You have not mentioned that before, not until I put it to you. You did not mention this. That is why I asked you: are you being fair? I suggest you are not. You see, do you accept, this looking at the marking -- the one we just referred to, the one on the acute left the Praga da Lisboa -- that is where buses from the camp site going into or towards the centre stop and, I believe, possibly terminate? A. I will accept that.
- F Q. The cross on the bottom -- it is very hard to see but in the middle, where it has the Praga da Liberdade, it is very hard to see, but I think you know the one I am referring to. A. The centre one, yes.
- G Q. Which has an arrow going to the right? A. Yes.
- Q. Did you know which buses stopped there from the camp site? A. No.
- Q. It is number 6, number 50 and number 54; did you know that? A. No.
- H Q. That if one went to or came back from the camp site -- I am not sure which one it is; it is my mistake -- that

- A is where you either get off the bus or get on it to the camp site? A. Yes, I will accept that.
- Q. Likewise, when we come to the arrow which you will see, the arrow and the cross to the right, the Rua de Sa da Bandeira; do you see that? A. Yes.
- Q. There is a bus stop there, is there not? A. Yes.
- B Q. Can you please tell us: is it not right that the buses from the camp site stop there? A. If you say so. If I may say that the reason I did not look at the buses is that, when I looked at this map and the relevant portions of the questioning of the defendant, when he was talking about his trip to Portugal, he said that they were at the camp site and they had a car and they drove around. Perhaps it is my misunderstanding, that I didn't then look at where buses went but
- C Q. Sorry, I do not think that is right actually but we can check. A. That is all right, yes.
- Q. I want to check one point before I say you are wrong. A. It wouldn't preclude obviously that they caught buses, but it was my understanding that they had a car with them.
- D Q. Yes, they had a car. A. Yes.
- Q. You would agree, would you not, from your having been to Oporto, that parking is ----- A. Yes, it's difficult.
- E Q. It is a nightmare. A. Yes, it is.
- Q. So nobody in their right mind would really bring their car into Oporto? A. Probably not.
- Q. If you could catch a bus very easily. So you would accept therefore, would you, that each of these crosses here are bus stops from where the defendant could either have got off the bus from the camp site or caught the bus to return? A. I will accept that. I have always said that there could be other explanations. It looks like it is -- it could be for intelligence purposes this, but there could be -----
- F Q. Sorry. A. That is all right.
- Q. But of course, to be fair, the one thing you would find out is what are the bus numbers that come from the camp site and where do they stop. Why did you not do that, if you were trying to be fair? A. Because I was looking at this as a possibility of it having an intelligence purpose.
- H

- A Q. You would agree now, would you? A. Of course.
- Q. That in fact it could well have an utterly and totally innocent explanation? A. All of these things could be capable of other explanations.
- B Q. But this one, bearing in mind the camp site, the bus stops to and from are strongly suggestive, are it not, of an innocent explanation? A. Well, I wouldn't put it as strongly as that. I mean, it is -- I have said all along it's capable of other explanations, and that is one of them.
- C Q. But you would agree that what is marked here is what somebody might get marked down if they said, "Tell me, please, where I get the bus" etc, "which way", you know, "where they stop"? A. But there are no bus numbers. You have said some buses go one way and some the other. You would expect to put the cross and number 6 or 54 or whatever it is, so that they knew which bus to get at which stop.
- D Q. Because at the bottom here the centre one, da Liberdade, and the one at the Rue de Sa da Bandeira --- A. Yes.
- E Q. ----- they are all clearly marked at the bus stop. You can see it clearly. Likewise the ones at the de Lisboa, exactly, as clear for anyone to see. A. Yes, but if this -- if the explanation is that someone was saying, "This is where the bus stops are", they might -- you might expect them to actually put the numbers of the buses by the crosses.
- F Q. You might do but in fact, if you know the buses, if they told you the bus to look for and they marked them there, that is perfectly good enough, is it not? A. But as you say there are a number of buses, and they might wish to be reminded of the numbers.
- G Q. Did you not pick up any literature of any kind at the camp site to assist you? A. The small map that is here, the one, you know, with the welcome in different languages at the top. They still produce that same one, and so I looked and saw that they are still producing exactly the same map, but that was all.
- H Q. You see, when you went in May 1992 ----- A. I don't think -----
- Q. Was it May 1992? A. No, I think it was October. It was in the autumn, September/October I think, I visited.
- H Q. I do not think the date matters too much. A. No, but it was certainly in the autumn.

- A Q. Did you not pick up a leaflet which said this part of it gives the details about the place, transport to the centre of town, a bus opposite it and the numbers 6, 50, 54, and 87? Did you not bother to pick that up?
A. No, I saw that. I mean, I looked to see that the same leaflets that you have got here were still being produced by the camp site.
- B Q. Moving on from that, I suggest you have not been fair in how you have selected the evidence that you have given; that you did not bother to check the key point about the buses, where they came from and to. But I want to ask you about the other one. Can we now look please at exhibit 46, the first page of it, where we have the O Fado. A. Which is the restaurant which is in the square where the bottom left-hand cross is.
- C Q. That is where it is. A. Yes.
- Q. Did it cross your mind that it might be a place where in fact tourists would be rather keen to go? A. It didn't cross my mind. It is a place where tourists would go and it's quite clearly -- I mean whether -- quite how it happened -- whether the camp site recommended it as a place or whether it was asked, you know, "Can you tell me where it is?" I don't know, but it is a place -- I mean the whole of that square, as I said in my evidence, is a place where tourists go. There is a museum there; there is the O Fado restaurant, and there is a little bar/pub. I mean -- and it's going down towards the river where there are a number of tourist sites.
- D Q. And in fact the restaurant extends quite a little bit?
A. What?
- E Q. Extends. A. Well yes, except it was closed for refurbishment when I was there, so you could only see the outside of it.
- F Q. Marked at the outside of it it has "tipique restaurant", does it not, typical restaurant?
A. Yes.
- Q. And if we look at this card here -- read what it says - - it says "O Fado the restaurant" etc., restaurant typique. Then if we look to the right of it, we can see Fado folk dances. A. Yes.
- G Q. Typical songs? A. Yes.
- Q. Portuguese food? A. Hmm.
- H Q. The very sort of things that any tourist, or many tourists would be interested in doing? A. In what I said in my evidence, I said that this was a tourist

A place with a restaurant and museum and an area that was frequented by tourists.

Q. Yes, of course. So therefore, when one looks at all the evidence to which I have referred so far as this is concerned, it is all totally consistent with an innocent explanation of a tourist being in Oporto, is it not? A. Exactly. I mean, I have said that it is capable of other explanations.

Q. It is not merely capable but it is very reasonable to say that this is a totally innocent explanation, is it not? A. Well, I won't -- I mean, you may say it's reasonable. I'm saying it is capable of -- that is one explanation that it is capable of. There are others.

C Q. I want to ask you about a slightly different matter. You have given us a history, a potted history -- I appreciate it is a potted history -- of the events in Russia since 1985. A. Yes.

D Q. But I am going to suggest to you that it has been highly selective one indeed. I want to ask you therefore just few questions to see if you can assist us upon it. A. Yes.

Q. Do you accept that in October 1989 the Warsaw Pact abandoned the Brezhnev Doctrine and pledged non-interference in each other's affairs. A. Yes, it was the beginning of the break-up of the Warsaw Pact.

E Q. That was October 1989? A. Yes.

Q. In November 1989 -----

F MR. JUSTICE BLOFELD: Hold on, you have no doubt a great deal of experience in Russian/Soviet Union history. You must not assume the jury have. I think we probably all know what the Warsaw Pact is, which is countries behind the Iron Curtain that had a pact to support each other. The Brezhnev Doctrine leaves me cold. Perhaps the jury have it at their fingertips.

G MR. TANSEY: Yes, Mrs. C, would you ----- A. You mentioned it. It's not -- I'm interested in the effect. I mean, my job, prevention, whatever you like to call it, is to look at what's happened in the intelligence security services. Obviously they are affected by the break-up of the Warsaw Pact, and I'm more than happy to talk about that, but the Brezhnev Doctrine you must explain to the jury.

H Q. Well, the Brezhnev Doctrine, you know, in fact was a doctrine by which the USSR gave itself the right to interfere in the affairs of other communist governments in Eastern Europe for various reasons. A. Yes.

A Q. So in October 1989 it abandoned that doctrine.
A. Hmm.

Q. In November 1989, is it right that the East German Government resigned? A. That's right, and the Berlin Wall came down.

B Q. And the Berlin Wall came down in November 1989. Is it correct that on 1st December 1989 President Gorbachev, as he then was, made the first visit of a Soviet leader to the Vatican? A. Yes.

MR. JUSTICE BLOFELD: 1st December 1989?

C MR. TANSEY: Yes. (To the witness) Was there a summit meeting in December 1989 between Mr. Bush and Mr. Gorbachev announcing the end of the Cold War?
A. Yes.

Q. The Cold War between, if I put it this way, Warsaw Pact and NATO, basically between East and West? A. Yes.

D Q. Is it correct that in February and March 1990 the USSR agreed with the governments of Hungary and Czechoslovakia to remove all Soviet troops by July 1991? A. Yes. I don't remember the exact date but certainly that was agreed, yes.

Q. I am going to ask you about this: the North Atlantic

E MR. JUSTICE BLOFELD: Remove troops by what date?

MR. TANSEY: July 1991. (To the witness) Now, in June 1990 there was a meeting of the North Atlantic Council, June 1990? A. I mean, if you say so.

F Q. And do you recall -- may I put to you and see if it jogs your memory -- that Mrs. Thatcher gave this speech? I am going to put part of it to you: "Now the landscape with which we became so familiar" -- my Lord I will read it and I can arrange copies; it is about seven lines -- "Now the landscape with which we became so familiar as we looked eastward is changing radically. Communism has crumbled." A. Yes.

G Q. "It has lost all credibility." A. Yes.

Q. "Even amongst its nominal believers." A. That's right.

Q. "The countries of Eastern Europe are reaching out to the West." A. Hmm.

H Q. This is the material part. "We no longer think of them as potential enemies or as part of a wider threat to

- A our way of life. They are friends in need of help, wanting to return to their rightful place in Europe."
A. Yes, would you like me to comment on that?
- Q. Firstly may I say ----- A. I accept it, yes.
- Q. You are perfectly entitled to comment. May I put this to you first. A. Yes.
- B Q. This was in June 1990. A. Yes.
- Q. She -----
- MR. JUSTICE BLOFELD: Speaking to whom?
- C MR. TANSEY: At the NATO Council. A. And talking of the Warsaw Pact as a whole, not just talking about Soviet Union.
- Q. Oh, yes, because her language there was "the countries of Eastern Europe are reaching out. We no longer think of them as potential enemies." A. Yes.
- D Q. Margaret Thatcher was then the Prime Minister of this country. A. Yes.
- Q. Speaking on behalf of this country. A. Yes.
- Q. To NATO. A. Yes.
- Q. And she described them as being no longer potential enemies. A. Hmm.
- E Q. Is she not entitled to speak on behalf of the nation? A. Of course.
- MR. JUSTICE BLOFELD: Now you want to make a comment?
- F MR. TANSEY: Of course, yes. I do not want to stop you, please. A. No, what I was going to say was all of that is perfectly true, and there -- no doubt there's been considerable change, certainly in fact since Gorbachev came to power, and indeed since the fall of the Berlin Wall, which precipitated the break-up of the Warsaw Pact, but my and my service's interest is the effects of that on the intelligence and security services, and it was different in each of the countries. The countries of Eastern Europe, if I may talk of that -- not the Soviet Union, the others: Poland, Czechoslovakia, former East Germany, Hungary and so on -- after the fall of the Berlin Wall, when they all broke away from the Warsaw Pact, they all in varying ways and varying degrees reformed their intelligence and security services. I mean, some of them disbanded entirely their previous services and built entirely new ones. Others weeded out what they
- H

A considered the far left communist elements. But they all reformed them. They all made approaches to the West, giving us assurances that they would no longer spy against us; and indeed my service, which is concerned with monitoring and looking at the activities of these services, very quickly gave up indeed looking and monitoring any of the services of Eastern Europe. That happened fairly quickly because of the assurances we were given and the evidence of reform that we saw.

B

The same did not happen in the Soviet Union and indeed, up until the coup in August 1989, or 1991, there was virtually no change in the intelligence security services of the Soviet Union. They were great supporters of Gorbachev and he in turn supported them. They did not have the radical financial cuts that were placed on other government departments, and it wasn't until after the coup that they set about reforming their intelligence security services at all, and even then they -- it has been very gradual. As I said in my evidence, the -- their activities have reduced. There is no doubt that the threat has changed, but it has not gone away altogether, and I am talking about the espionage threat not the military threat. There is no doubt that the Soviet -- that Russia at the moment, and indeed the former Soviet Union, does not present an -- the immediate military threat to the United Kingdom that it did in the past. But nevertheless they retain the capability, and the events of the last few days have shown how unstable the former Soviet Union still is.

C

D

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So I am not denying there have been changes and very significant changes in Eastern Europe, in their attitude and activities towards the West, but it has not -- the espionage threat has not disappeared altogether and indeed, as I said in my evidence, Yevgeniy Primakov in public statements has made this absolutely clear, that they need their intelligence services and it will continue to work against the West. I mean I'm trying to be as fair as possible about it. I am not denying the changes at all.

F

Q. So the June 1990 speech of Mrs. Thatcher, "We no longer think of them as potential enemies", you say -----

G

A. I'm sure that means in the military sense. My -- and that is true in a military sense -- and that is what I'm sure that means. I mean, I don't know what was in the mind of her or the person that wrote the speech, but certainly at that time the military threat had receded considerably.

Q. It was not merely military. The way she phrased it was, "They are friends -- there is no enemy there; they are friends." A. Well, certainly in June 1990 the intelligence security services of the Soviet Union, as

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- A it then was, were unchanged. They were in the same form as they had been for the previous 40 years and they were still behaving in the same way.
- Q. Just as Margaret Thatcher, the then Prime Minister, said in June 1990, "We no longer see them as potential enemies", that was also, was it not, likewise put by the President of Russia, President Gorbachev? It was exactly the same approach, was it not? A. Well, we have throughout -- and even in this period we would obviously wish -- it is in everyone's interest that the Soviet Union, or Russia as it now is, moves towards a democracy, and anything the West can do to support that obviously we would do. It is in our interests to do that.
- B
- C Q. But Margaret Thatcher was no softy, was she? A. No.
- Q. If she says of people that they are our friends, that is what she means: not our enemies; they are our friends. A. Well -----
- Q. That you say covers the whole of Eastern Europe basically? A. Well, if it -- yes.
- D
- Q. But she also made a major speech, when she was awarded the Aspen Institute statesman award, when she spoke on shaping a new global community, in Colorado on 5th August 1990. Let me put to you what she said then. This is 5th August 1990. "We do not see this new Soviet Union as an enemy" -- those were her words -- "but as a country groping its way towards freedom. We no longer have to view the world through a prism of East-West relations. The Cold War is over."
- E A. That is perfectly true. There is no doubt that the Soviet Union from 1985 onwards has been moving towards a more democratic system, and certainly this country and other western countries have done a lot to support them in that. But the fact is that their intelligence security services have been much slower to reform.
- F
- Q. Well, just consider the words: "We do not see this new Soviet Union as an enemy." You agree that she was articulating the policy of the government of the day? A. Yes.
- G
- Q. And she was saying -- and the date is important. A. Because it's before the coup.
- Q. It is August 1990. A. Yes.
- Q. The Cold War is over. A. Well, I'm sure everyone would mark the end of the Cold War with the fall of the Berlin Wall. There is no doubt that that is the significant date, and that is the start of all the changes in Eastern Europe.
- H

- A Q. And it is right, is it not, that on 31st March 1991 the Warsaw Pact was disbanded? A. That's right.
- Q. And in June 1991, only a month before the coup, which only lasted four days, I think? A. Hmm.
- Q. The West offered substantial economic assistance to the USSR, as it then was, dependent on its pursuing further reforms? A. Yes.
- B Q. That is right, is it not? A. Yes.
- Q. In fact at 31st July 1991 there was a treaty signed, the START Treaty? A. Yes.
- Q. The coup occurred on 19th August. A. Hmm.
- C Q. Four days later Mr. Gorbachev was restored to power as President? A. Yes.
- Q. So the position clearly was, as stated by the government at the time in August 1990, that the USSR was not an enemy of this country. Are you aware that the French secret service has spied upon American large companies? A. I have seen reports of that in the newspaper. I have no first-hand knowledge of it.
- D Q. Did you seek confirmation of it one way or the other? A. It is not the United Kingdom's business, I mean, for us to ask questions as to whether the French are spying on the Americans. That is something between those two countries.
- E Q. Is it true to your knowledge? A. I know what I read in the newspapers; I have no first-hand knowledge.
- Q. Is it correct France is an ally? A. France is an ally; France is part of NATO.
- F Q. And a friend? A. Yes.
- Q. And its secret service is spying allegedly upon American companies? A. So the newspapers allege.
- Q. Is it correct that this year, at the Paris Air Show, the big aircraft manufacture Hughes refused to go because of its fears of French government spies secreting its secrets? A. Again I have read that in newspapers. I have no first-hand knowledge of whether it's true. It's certainly what's reported in newspapers.
- G Q. Tradecraft or spycraft which you have given evidence about ----- A. Yes.

H

- A Q. ----- has been around for many many years.
A. Absolutely. I mean, it changes and it grows up over the years, to change, to fit particular circumstances, but yes.
- Q. It is used by many persons, many groups? A. Yes.
- B Q. Who wish to maintain a relationship but concealing it from others? A. Yes.
- Q. That is one of the key things? A. That is one of the key things.
- Q. So there is nothing special about it, nothing unique?
A. No, well, different services use different methods but there are similarities between all of them.
- C Q. And it has been referred to in many spy fiction stories. A. Yes, usually exaggerated.
- Q. In fact has there not been a book written for children, published by the Usborne publishing company, the Know How Book of Spycraft? A. I have no idea.
- D Q. First published in 1975. A. I'm aware of Usborne as a children's publishers.
- Q. Indeed much of what you have been telling this Court as being KGB tradecraft -- all the principles are set out for children in this book. A. Yes, well, that may be true but it does not alter the fact that that is how the KGB operate and have operated for years.
- E Q. Everybody operates this way, do they not? A. Not all exactly the same and certainly not in the United Kingdom.
- Q. Well, let me just put this to you then: the carrying of secret messages? A. Yes.
- F Q. Pretty common, usual techniques; is that right?
A. Hmm.
- Q. The use of containers with false bottoms, that sort of thing? A. Yes. I mean, it's all pretty old-fashioned stuff this, but yes, it has happened.
- G Q. Page 6 of this book for children: the spy finds a message pushed into a crack in the wall. A. Yes.
- Q. The dead letter box. A. Dead letter box, yes, again it's -----
- H Q. The spy picks up an umbrella; takes it home; when he is alone he unscrews the handle and finds a message inside the secret container? A. Yes.

- A Q. Then codes? A. Yes.
- Q. Lots of codes set out; spies equipment; invisible writing. It is all there, is it not? A. Yes, so you say. I don't know this book but I will take your word for it.
- B Q. And quick disguises, trapping spies, silent signals -- very important. You say it is part of KGB tradecraft? A. Yes.
- Q. Very important in Usborne for children. A. Hmm.
- Q. Let me read this bit to you. "If you and your contact can see each other but cannot speak or get close enough to pass a message, signal with the silent alphabet. Silent hand and leg signals: one hand in pocket means yes; two hands in pocket means no." A. Just because it's in a book does not mean to say that it is not still being used.
- C Q. No. A. But -----
- D Q. I am saying everybody knows about it -- well, not everybody but ----- A. Anybody.
- Q. Lots and lots of people know about it. A. Yes.
- Q. And spy language -- the back page -- I want to ask you about this. This book was published in 1975, then republished in 1989. Can I give you a copy. A. It's obviously -- I mean, as everybody knows, the public has an eternal fascination with spies.
- E Q. Absolutely. A. I'm not in any way surprised.
- Q. I want you to look at the back page as well of this. Spy language: we have contact, courier, dead -- just read out what it has for dead. A. "Viktor is dead" means Viktor has been caught by the enemy.
- F Q. Then come to ill. A. "Viktor is ill" means Viktor is being watched by the enemy.
- Q. Is this a coincidence, Viktor in Usborne in 1975? A. Well, Viktor is a common -- certainly a very common Russian name, and I would imagine it was picked for that reason.
- G Q. Would you agree with me it is the third most popular name in Poland? A. I would agree with you. There are lots of people in Poland called Viktor. It certainly is a popular name; it's a popular Eastern European name generally.
- H

A Q. So we can put the book down -- and that is for children. Then we look at the many spy novels -- and there are many of them -- and would you agree that every item that you refer to is pretty well set out in each of these novels? A. Yes.

B Q. You would? A. As I have said, there is an eternal fascination with spy, spies and spying. It's clearly a very lucrative area of books, and obviously over the years these sort of things become known. It does not alter the fact that they are still used.

Q. John Le Carre -- he was an ex-security service man, was he not? A. Yes.

C Q. And he has written novel after novel. I have just extracts. A. Yes.

Q. He sets it all out, does he not? A. Yes. I have never said that there is anything secret about the tradecraft.

D Q. What I am saying is: this tradecraft that you describe -- anybody reading novels could pick it all up so easily. A. They could, but it is the necessity of using it, if Russians particularly need to use it, because they are in a hostile operating environment. You don't need to use these things unless there are reasons not only to keep secret what you are doing but that you believe that if you don't you are likely to be discovered.

E Q. So I think we agree -- this may save a lot of time -- all this material here in the exhibits that we have, the document you have looked at, nearly all of that in fact is clearly set out in novels? A. But it does not alter the fact -- yes.

F Q. Can you say yes or no and then ----- A. There are -- I won't say the particular things. I don't know that the particular documents and notes are actually in novels, but certainly a large number of spy novels contain details of tradecraft, Russian tradecraft. I mean there is no doubt about that.

G Q. Can you tell me any of them in this case, in the exhibits we have, which have not been in novels?
A. I haven't really -- well, first of all, I have not read every single spy novel that there is, so I would not know. I really do not know whether they have been in novels or not. Certainly many novels talk about dead letter boxes and contact arrangements and things like that, but it's not something I'm either qualified or -- indeed I simply don't have the information to say whether all these are in novels or not.

H

- A Q. But would you accept that it is more than likely -- let me put it this way: is there anything in the documents exhibited in this case -- in other words the tradecraft that you have referred to -- is there anything in the tradecraft which we would not expect to find anywhere in any of these novels? A. I think that is just -----
- B MR. JUSTICE BLOFELD: It is a little difficult for any witness, you know, to answer that because she says she has not read ----- A. I haven't read every single novel. I don't know.
- MR. JUSTICE BLOFELD: She has said tradecraft generically is used. You can take anything we have seen: a mark which is a vertical mark for "danger", and horizontal mark for "come again later" or whatever it is. Whether you -- you and your learned junior, may have avariciously read novels and you can point out details and put them, but I do not think you can expect the witness to have exhaustively read all the literature.
- C
- MR. TANSEY: I was hoping to shorten it. A. As I say, I'm sure there's been much tradecraft written about in all sorts of books so -----
- D
- Q. But from your general knowledge ----- A. Hmm.
- Q. ----- of what is in the literature etc ----- A. Hmm.
- E
- Q. From your general knowledge, is there anything that you can think of in this tradecraft here that I could not read in a novel, that you can think of, that springs to mind? A. The only thing that immediately springs to mind is the instructions to follow a particular route to a meeting. Many books have things about meeting in certain places and indeed the signals and those things, but the instructions to follow a particular route is not something that I can recall having seen in a book. But, as I say, I have not read every single one.
- F
- Q. I know it is in here. A. Are you looking at -- which exhibit is that?
- Q. Oh no, sorry. A. Oh, you are looking at a book?
- G
- Q. I am talking about the novels. What you are saying is that following a certain route to allow counter-surveillance ----- A. And anti and counter -- it's not something that I personally have actually read in a book but then, as I say, firstly I have not read them all, and secondly I may not have remembered because, to be perfectly honest, reading books about spies is not necessarily something I really wish to do, unless there may be something that would be of particular interest.
- H

A Q. It is like lawyers reading books about law, exactly the same, so we understand that. A. Exactly.

Q. While that is being sought out, the precise novels in question, would you agree from your knowledge that the CIA uses exactly the same techniques? That is the Central Intelligence Agency. A. Yes, I do know what the CIA is. I wouldn't say they used exactly the same techniques.

B They may use -- as you have already said, intelligence services operating in what is a hostile environment may well use many of the same tradecraft, because obviously if you are operating in a hostile environment you need to protect yourself and your agent so that -----

C MR. JUSTICE BLOFELD: Well, you say they do not use exactly the same techniques but techniques which are reasonably similar? A. Yes, all intelligence services who are operating in a hostile environment need to take precautions to protect themselves and their agents, and obviously they are going to be similar.

D Q. Yes. A. If not exactly the same. And I am not really prepared to comment on what the CIA -- I mean, my service looks at hostile intelligence services and their methods and techniques against the United Kingdom; and our sole purpose is to counter those operations, and we are not going to study the methods and techniques of a service of a country with whom we have friendly relations. I mean, that is outside our responsibilities.

E MR. TANSEY: Is it right that after the Second World War MIS assisted the CIA in their intelligence techniques?

F A. To say we assisted them I think is perhaps a little strong. I mean, after the Second World War, we assisted many friendly countries in setting up their security services, because our service has been in existence longer than many others, and they looked to us for advice. But to say that we actually assisted them with operations is something quite different. We may have helped them set up the CIA, have given them advice; helped them is probably too strong. We have worked very closely with the forerunner of the CIA, the OSS, during the War, and obviously they might look to us for advice in helping them as many other countries did.

G Q. What really happened -- I think it was after the Second World War; it may have been during it; but basically the western powers as we know, NATO basically, came to each other's help and assistance in many ways. A. Of course, of course.

H Q. One of which was advising each other on tradecraft, that sort of thing. A. I wouldn't say advising

A themselves on tradecraft. Many of those countries following the First World War did not have a security intelligence service and therefore they looked to us as having that, and having one of very long-standing, to help them set up their own, to look to how it was structured, not necessarily methods.

B Q. So, Mrs. C, is there any difference therefore -- can you point to any difference at all between the tradecraft that is there in the exhibits in this case and that used by western security services?

C A. First of all, we are talking about a security service -- this tradecraft here is indicative of an intelligence service, which is a quite different thing. My service is a security service. We are looking to counter the operations and activities of foreign intelligence services in our country. Intelligence services -----

MR. JUSTICE BLOFELD: Pause there. This tradecraft is indicative of intelligence? A. Intelligence-

D gather service and indeed many other intelligence-gathering services may use similar techniques, but I come from a security service which is a counter-espionage service. We are looking at how to counter the operations of foreign intelligence services, and to do that we need to be aware of how those services operate, and obviously study them. We do not study friendly foreign intelligence services. It is not within our remit and not something we would do.

E Q. Can I interrupt. There is something that is puzzling me; I want to try and follow it. I am not getting involved with the enemy situation that Mr. Tansey has been asking you about, but at that time your security service at any rate regarded USSR and its successor body Russia as potentially hostile? A. In the espionage sense, yes.

F Q. Now, they had people in this country who were, as you thought, members of their intelligence-gathering service? A. Yes, under cover in the embassy as diplomats.

Q. They had special rules including rules, you said, that they could only go within 25 miles of their embassy? A. Of Central London.

G Q. One of the difficulties you mentioned is that they wanted to try and recruit agents and then to pass on and get information from them without being under surveillance? A. Yes.

Q. From your security service. A. Yes.

H

- A Q. May I go on, please; would you forgive me. A. I don't -- yes, of course, yes, I'm sorry.
- Q. Does that suggest that, rightly or wrongly -- I am going to call them the Russians. A. Yes.
- B Q. The Russians suspected if any member -- if they are KGB agents and it is probably accepted that they would be --they would be likely to be known to your security service. A. Yes.
- Q. If he went for a jaunt from Central London out, there was a risk he might be being followed by one of your agents? A. Yes, well yes.
- C Q. Therefore he would have -- I am saying he rather than she. A. Yes, yes.
- Q. Would have a thought in his mind that if he met an agent who was getting information for him that agent might be identified and spotted. A. Yes, and would also result in him being caught and expelled.
- D Q. I follow that. What I just want to know, dealing with other powers, not Warsaw Pact powers ----- A. Yes.
- Q. ----- which were also intelligence-gathering services, from people that in an espionage sense you thought were potentially hostile. A. Non-Warsaw Pact?
- E Q. For instance, Mr. Tansey is dealing with whether it is French, United States, any other country, non-Warsaw Pact -- did you follow them too? A. No, you see, you have to decide which countries are potential enemies, in an espionage sense, and are a potential risk to the security of the United Kingdom and, at the time we are talking of, obviously the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact, and some other countries such as China and at that time Cuba. But countries with whom we are in friendly, have friendly relations -- Americans, French, other Europeans -- are not regarded as hostile. My service is not studying them and therefore they are not a target. They are not in a hostile environment and as friends we would not expect them to be indulging in espionage activities. In fact it would be, if Americans or indeed French were discovered to be indulging, I think, in espionage activities in the
- F G United Kingdom, it would be, I think, very damaging to our relationship with them, and we wouldn't expect them to do that. We have no reason to believe they do do it, and certainly we are not looking at them or expecting them to do it.

MR. JUSTICE BLOFELD: That is as far as I want to go.

H

- A MR. TANSEY: So because the French might not want to lose their good relations, they might disguise things to make them look as though they are somebody else?
- A. They might. Again this is a very common tradecraft technique of the Russians. Indeed, they are using it more these days of pretending to be some other nationality. That is another tradecraft technique, called a false flag technique, which is indeed quite common.
- B
- Q. It is quite common across the whole of Western Europe.
- A. I don't know about Western Europe. It's certainly a very common Russian technique.
- Q. What is the false flag technique?
- A. That is where the Russian intelligence officer will pretend to be some other nationality, something which is perhaps -- because after all some people might be quite nervous about being in contact with a Russian. They might not want to have -- particularly if you are talking in the time of the Cold War, they would see some danger in it. And so the Russian intelligence officer will pretend to be South American, some other nationality which is not perhaps immediately so dangerous.
- C
- D
- Q. And so, vice versa -- you say the Russian posing as somebody else -- vice versa -----
- A. Well, maybe again I can't comment on that.
- Q. But coming back to the question that I asked you some time ago -----
- A. Yes.
- E
- Q. ----- when we look at the tradecraft here -----
- A. Hmm.
- Q. ----- in these exhibits would you agree -----
- A. Yes, you are agreeing those are tradecraft notes, are you?
- F
- Q. I am saying they have the hallmarks of tradecraft. I accept that.
- A. Yes.
- Q. That those are tradecraft notes; that is referring to what you call the red and the green etc.
- A. Yes.
- Q. Those are in fact across the board for all intelligence agencies or anybody practising intelligence across the whole of Europe and the United States as well.
- A. May well -- other services may well use similar things. I have seen no evidence of it in the United Kingdom other than from the Warsaw Pact countries.
- G
- H
- Q. There is nothing therefore in this tradecraft which points to it necessarily being the KGB. It could be but it could be others.
- A. It certainly -- yes, it could be. It certainly has all the hallmarks of the

- A KGB tradecraft in the United Kingdom. If these notes had been found in some other country, well maybe it could be somebody else; but as far as I'm aware no-one other than the Warsaw Pact including Soviet Union/Russia, old Warsaw Pact pre-1989, would use this sort of tradecraft in the United Kingdom.
- B Q. Well, this is what I want to -- this making a further jump. What I am saying to you, looking at the tradecraft itself, the actual the green, the red -----
A. Yes.
- Q. ----- all that; that is the tradecraft. A. Hmm.
- Q. That could be done by any agency from any country throughout the West or Eastern Europe. A. That is.
- C Q. Looking at the tradecraft itself. A. Yes, it could be. I have no doubt all services use similar tradecraft because, if they are in a hostile environment, they need to protect themselves and their agents. My point is that we are talking about the United Kingdom here.
- D Q. Yes, but I'm asking ----- A. Yes, and I agree with what you are saying, yes.
- Q. So there is nothing in there which points to its being exclusively KGB, nothing in the tradecraft itself.
A. Well, I do beg to differ on this.
- E Q. I ask you to point to the particular tradecraft point.
A. Well, particular trade -- these are -- this is happening in this country.
- Q. Yes, I appreciate that. A. If there was no reference to meetings in Horsenden, Rixteth and Sudbury and all these places, then I might be tempted to agree with you. But these tradecraft notes are quite clearly relevant to the United Kingdom, and in that respect I would not think they were anything other than Soviet/KGB.
- F Q. You are saying that because it is in the United Kingdom? A. Certainly that is very important because, I mean, I'm not denying that other intelligence services may use similar techniques. They clearly need to if they are operating in a hostile environment.
- G Q. Right. I am going to come to other activities as such, but what you are saying is it is KGB because it is operating in this country; that is what you are saying, is it not? A. I think that is why one can be more certain that it is KGB or Russian/KGB because of that. I mean, certainly I, my service, have no reason to believe that other services such as the ones you have
- H

- A mentioned would be operating in this way in the United Kingdom.
- Q. Well, I shall come to the question of espionage by other countries. You are aware that industrial espionage is a major problem throughout the whole of western Europe? A. I am well aware that industrial espionage -- but it's not a matter for the security service. Industrial espionage does not affect the security of the United Kingdom.
- B Q. Is it correct that, when employees of the security services finish their work employed by their government department etc., they frequently obtain work in firms dealing with security? A. They may do. I don't know about frequently. I mean, clearly people who have worked in security have an expertise that may well be -- but we are talking about security people, people who, if they do use that expertise, are using it to protect. I mean, the security service is concerned with protecting the security of the United Kingdom and, if that expertise might be useful to a company wishing to protect them -----
- C Q. It might be useful to somebody else as well to work the other way? A. But again you are -- you see, I suppose it's very easy for me to say this but there is a great difference between a security service and an intelligence-gathering service. I come from the security service.
- D Q. Yes, I appreciate that. A. Yes.
- E Q. I appreciate the difference, and one is talking about intelligence and espionage. A. Yes.
- Q. And one of the aspects that is of great concern is industrial espionage. A. Absolutely, yes.
- F Q. In this country, by company against company. A. Yes, again -- I mean, as I say, it is not a subject that professionally is of any interest to us, but anyone reading the newspapers can see that that is a big problem.
- Q. Well, I shall come to that, but it is a very big problem in this country, is it not? A. Hmm.
- G Q. Because there have been, in fact not just the United Kingdom but in Western Europe ----- A. Yes.
- Q. There have been major cases of industrial espionage of a very major nature? A. All major industrial countries, I think, have this problem.

H

- A Q. That is right. We know of some minor ones. A. Yes.
- Q. Virgin and B.A. A. Yes.
- Q. National Car Parks. A. Yes.
- Q. British Petroleum. A. Yes but, as I say, this is not a matter of any concern to the security service.
- B It's between the companies concerned. It is not -- that sort of espionage is not a threat to the United Kingdom and its security.
- Q. No, I appreciate that, but I am saying to you that espionage, industrial espionage takes place on a significant scale in this country. A. Yes, according to what one reads, that is so.
- C Q. Were you aware that James Wolsey -- do you know who he is, the head of the CIA? A. Oh, the present -- the new head, yes.
- Q. He took over from Robert Gates. A. He took over from Robert Gates, yes, but he's a political appointee. He's not a career CIA officer.
- D Q. Were you aware of what he said at the select committee, that one of the greatest concerns of the United States is industrial espionage by friendly powers? Are you aware of that? A. Yes I'm aware that the Americans -- that Americans are very concerned about it.
- E Q. What they are saying is that they are concerned about industrial espionage by the intelligence services of friendly powers? A. But again -- the American agencies have a different charter to the -- to my service, and they may well be allowed, by their rules, to actually look at industrial espionage. It is not something that my service is concerned about.
- F Q. What I put to you ----- A. Yes, I mean, I am aware that they are very concerned about it.
- Q. What they are concerned about is the intelligence services in fact indulging in illegal intelligence-gathering operations against friendly -- against their companies. A. Yes.
- G Q. So friendly governments in fact wage war economically against each other. A. So the Americans believe. We have no evidence of it here.
- Q. The defence industry is a major competitive industry throughout the whole of Western Europe and the United States and Japan, is it not? A. Yes, but not everything that the defence industry does is classified.
- H

- A Q. No, I appreciate that that is a different matter. In fact the costs involved in those industrial operations are immense. A. So I believe.
- Q. Are you aware of operation Ill Will in the United States? A. No.
- B Q. You are not aware of that? A. No, but I'm sure you will tell me.
- Q. I am sorry, I am told it is Ill Wind. A. Again
- Q. Bribery on a large scale in respect of United States defence companies to get work, information and plans? A. There are many of those sort of cases in the United States. I imagine this is just yet another one of them.
- C Q. Is it correct that the CIA has expressed its concern about the intelligence services of Israel, Sweden, Switzerland and France? A. They may have done. I really do not know. There is no reason why I should know that. I mean, what -- the CIA will have its own concerns, own targets, priorities. They don't make the British Security Service privy to all their things. Indeed there is no reason why they should.
- D Q. Do you monitor industrial espionage at all? A. No. As is public knowledge, the security service is concerned with the threats to the security of the United Kingdom. Industrial espionage is not a threat to our security. It may be a threat to the particular companies involved. I mean, they may lose a lot of money; there may be all sorts of things, but it's no concern of the security service.
- E Q. So if a secret service intelligence-gathering operation of a friendly country was taking place here, it would not concern you in respect of industrial operations? A. It depends. If what they are doing is no threat to our security -- I mean, it is a very narrow responsibility that we have, that we are looking at: threats to national security. If a company is being targeted by a foreign intelligence service and the information they are getting is not classified, is simply commercially valuable, that is no threat to the security of the United Kingdom.
- F Q. Now, I am going to move onto a different matter. One of the important matters, from your knowledge of the KGB, is that it tells its agents/spies not to keep notes, does it not? A. To say that, they would justly -- it is an important thing in handling an agent that you are concerned about his security, and therefore it would be sensible advice that they did not
- G H

- A keep anything that is incriminating. However, one knows from any number of OSA prosecutions that agents do not always obey that, that they do keep things and they keep incriminating evidence.
- Q. The one point that a KGB operative would point out strongly to the person: do not keep notes. A. They would. If they were a good intelligence officer, they would certainly give that advice.
- B
- Q. Secondly, is it one of the important practices to try and avoid meets, meeting if possible? A. Well, not to avoid them if possible, because that would be really very difficult, to run an agent with no meetings at all. Obviously again every case will be different, but you are concerned about your own security, the agent's security, and therefore you will make sure that such meetings that you do have -- that arrangements are made that hopefully will mean that you will not be detected; and hence the sort of elaborate arrangements we have had here.
- C
- Q. So you have things like dead letter boxes to avoid meetings? A. Dead letter boxes, if you have actually got things to pass over; again it's one method.
- D
- Q. It is certainly a very secure method. A. It's perhaps more secure than a personal meeting. But if you are actually, you know, running an agent, you need to have a good relationship, to maintain that relationship with him or her, and you therefore need to meet them occasionally to have face to face meetings. It's part of looking after an agent.
- E
- Q. But you do it as rarely as possible. A. You do it not necessarily as rarely as possible but in as secure conditions as possible.
- F
- Q. I want to ask you, because you referred already, in your evidence yesterday and this morning as well, to other cases with which you were concerned -- you referred to two in particular. A. Yes.
- Q. I just want to ask you about them. The case of Prime. A. Yes.
- G
- Q. 1982? A. Yes.
- Q. I think it was 1982 when he was tried. A. Round about then, yes.
- Q. G.C.H.Q. A. Yes.

H

- A Q. Is it correct that he had a Minox camera? A. I believe he did have a camera, yes. It's again -- many many spies do.
- Q. Can you explain -- it is a special type of camera, is it not? A. Well, it's a camera that I think can take very small photographs.
- B Q. It is ideal, if I put it this way, for photographing documents? A. Well, in one respect it's ideal but in another respect it is -- again, to have a Minox camera might well draw attention to yourself, and certainly, you know, you need to be very careful, if you have that, and it could be a danger. It is much -- and taking a camera in and out of a government building could draw attention. It isn't necessarily the best thing to use. I mean -----
- C Q. Oh, no. Would you just tell us how it works, please, so that we know. A. I couldn't possibly tell you how a Minox camera works.
- Q. No, what it actually does then. A. It takes very small photographs.
- D Q. It takes very small photographs, yes. But at the end of the number of photographs you have taken, how big is what you are left with? Is it the normal size? A. No, I mean, it's many years since I have seen one of these, but they are very -- they are really just very small photographs.
- E Q. And in fact they were used, were they not, significantly by Prime? A. Prime certainly had a camera.
- Q. He did not merely have it; he used it. A. He used it, yes.
- F Q. Significantly. Let me just remind you: he told the security services that he used 15-minute films each with 36 exposures. This is just on one occasion 76/77. A. Hmm.
- Q. What is the advantage of having photographed the document using a Minox camera? A. Well, you have -- you can photograph a lot of documents, and they will be very small and they won't take up a lot of space; and of course, if you are then going to have to pass them over to someone else, I mean, they are easier in a way too if they are very small than if you have got a lot of things of this size.
- G Q. That is right, yes. A. So it is -- again it is a facility for passing information. But it still has dangers attached to it.
- H

A Q. What it means as well is ----- A. It's absolutely accurate.

Q. Having photographed you can then return or destroy the document in question, can you not? A. Yes, and of course you have got an accurate thing, but again the dangers of -- there are all sorts of dangers attached to that.

B

Q. If you keep it. I mean, if you walk into a government department, that would be stupid. A. Indeed, since Prime, many departments do not allow their staff to take cameras in.

C

Q. But if you wish to photograph documents, for example at home, it is the ideal thing. A. At home, yes, but presumably, if you were in a position to take documents home, which most people are not who have access to classified information -----

Q. You can take them and return them. A. That's right.

D

Q. Then, when the film is finished, you hand it over to whoever it may be. A. But this is -- I mean, other people will copy things and take them out, or remember things and take them out; again less incriminating than having a camera. I mean, there are various methods by which people take classified information, not just a camera.

E

Q. So he had the Minox camera. Is it right the film is about the size of a thumb nail? A. Yes, it is really very small.

Q. It is so small so that, if anybody came along to approach you, you could either hand it over without hardly being seen or dispose of it without being seen? A. Yes.

F

Q. And the camera is a very small camera as well, is it not? A. Yes.

Q. Can you tell us, show us. A. Well, it's about like an old-fashioned matchbox, I suppose, a little camera.

G

Q. Like a Swan Vesta? A. Yes, that sort of size.

Q. There was no such camera found with Mr. Smith, was there? A. No, but then not everybody has a camera. As I say, it's quite a particularly -- I mean, there's been a lot of publicity about Minox cameras. I mean, it is almost incriminating to have one. They are known by many people as the spying camera.

H

- A Q. Prime was trained in secret writing, was he not?
A. Yes.
- Q. Was there any evidence of secret writing? A. Not as far as I'm aware.
- Q. Prime was trained in radio transmissions; he had a transmitter, did he not? A. Yes.
- B Q. There are no radio transmitters here in this case?
A. Not as far as I'm ware.
- Q. Prime knew the skill of microdots, of using microdots, did he not? A. Yes.
- C Q. There is no evidence of microdots in this case?
A. No, not as far as I'm aware.
- Q. Prime had a black briefcase with a secret compartment. There is no such briefcase ----- A. Not as far as I'm aware.
- D Q. ----- of any kind in the case of Mr. Smith; is that right? A. Not as far as I'm aware.
- Q. And one assumes you would be aware. A. Yes, I would.
- Q. Moving on to the case of Douglas Britten. A. Hmm.
- Q. Who was in 1968. A. Yes.
- E Q. When he made his statement, when he was interviewed -- I am referring to that because that is the document given to me -- in his case he had the camera, Minox camera referred to. A. Yes.
- Q. But is it right that he also had a number of containers which had false bottoms? A. Yes, I believe he did, yes.
- F Q. He had two Tennents beer cans with false bottoms; is that right? A. Yes.
- Q. A piece of water conduit pipe, and the device unscrewed in the middle? A. Yes.
- G Q. There was no such thing found in this case? A. No. I mean, these are the ways in which, if I may say, a lot of tradecraft has moved on and changed over the years, because those sort of things, as a result of many of these cases, have become very incriminating things to have: cameras, containers and such. It is -- the less people have, the less they are likely to be detected.
- H

- A Q. Are you aware that the floorboards of Mr. Smith's house were taken up? A. No, I wasn't aware of that.
- Q. But Britten had a magnetic container, again with a false bottom. A. Yes.
- B Q. There was no item of any kind in Mr. Smith's possession with a false bottom, was there? A. Not as far as I'm aware. I mean, when I drew similarities between the cases, I was not saying that they were identical in every way. I mean, one is simply saying about the particular tradecraft here that it was used in other cases.
- C Q. I am pointing out to you, putting to you the equipment which the KGB gave their persons. A. Yes, and this is a way in which I think tradecraft has moved on. The KGB realised that these -- this kind of equipment was very incriminating.
- D Q. So let us look at the next thing then. Let us look at the case of Houghton, Lonsdale, Crowder. A. Which is even older, probably one of the most famous cases ever, 1961.
- Q. In that case microdots. A. Yes.
- Q. Equipment for making microdots. A. Yes, radio transmissions and a Russian illegal who posed as an American -- I mean, you have everything in that case, but it is now 30 odd years old.
- E Q. Yes, but I am going to come to the more up-to-date ones with you. There was a Ronson lighter with a concealed space? A. Hmm.
- Q. One time pads -- what is a one time pad? A. For radio transmissions; its a code, enabling the person to decode radio transmissions.
- F Q. There was nothing like that found with Mr. Smith? A. No.
- Q. Under the lino in the kitchen of one of the men was a trap-door, was there not? A. Yes.
- G Q. Underneath that there was a wireless transmitter? A. Hmm.
- Q. There were torches with false bottoms; is that right? A. Yes, a range of concealment devices.
- H Q. Money hidden in the loft, under the glass insulation fibre in the loft? A. Yes, money is often hidden in cases.

- A Q. Often hidden; in this case it was in the drawer.
A. Yes, but it was certainly there. I mean, it was ---
- Q. Not hidden, was it? A. No.
- Q. False passport? A. Yes.
- B Q. There was no false passport in Mr. Smith's case?
A. But of course -- I think it was Lonsdale and the Crowders who had the false passports, who were of course not British. I mean they were not the agents; they were the controllers.
- Q. Likewise they had a Minox camera as well. A. Yes.
- C Q. Then finally the case of Hambleton which was 1982.
A. Yes.
- Q. He had a radio transmitter. A. Yes, he did.
- Q. He had specially treated paper on which you can write a message. A. Yes.
- D Q. There was no such paper was found in Mr. Smith's possession, was there? A. No.
- Q. Hambleton had the one time pad. A. Which went with the radio transmitter. If you have got the radio transmitter, the chances are you will a one time pad as well.
- E Q. He had a Minox camera. A. Yes.
- Q. He was trained in the art of secret writing? A. Yes.
- Q. Is there any evidence of secret writing here? A. Not as far as I'm aware.
- F Q. So therefore, when we consider what has been the paraphernalia of the person working for the KGB, if you look at secret place, secret hiding place in the house, it is not here. A. Usually that is for a radio, which is not featured in this case.
- Q. Well, you can do that to hide anything you want to, can you not? A. Yes.
- G Q. No Minox camera? A. No.
- Q. No items with false containers found at all in Mr. Smith's possession? A. Hmm.
- Q. No microdots found?
- H MR. JUSTICE BLOFELD: Can I discourage you from -- once you have said it two or three times, we have all got the

A point. You are now repeating questions you have asked already.

MR. TANSEY: Yes.

B THE WITNESS: I would just say that all -- what you say is perfectly true but tradecraft has moved on. Although some things are the same, they do -- it does change in changing circumstances; and those things are very incriminating and have been proved to be incriminating, and therefore one would not be surprised if they were not used, if they were not really necessary.

Q. Just help us then, please, with how has it changed.

C A. Well, it has changed because these things are now seen to be incriminating. If an agent is caught and he has all these things, this spying equipment if you can call it that, it is going to be very incriminating. The less they have -- I mean, it's almost the same thing as not writing notes: the less you have the less likely you are to be incriminated by it.

D Q. So what does a person have in tradecraft? A. As little as possible. I think indeed if people can even avoid writing notes, can remember things and perhaps write them down and pass them on and destroy them, it's -- I think it's just simply the less you have that can incriminate you has got to be better.

Q. You have just said it has moved on. A. Hmm.

E Q. I am just asking you what has replaced the Minox camera? A. Perhaps just somebody's memory. I'm -- certainly not the Minox camera. I mean, we will perhaps get -- people will have computers and pass it on, be able to -- that is a possibility. But certainly I'm not aware of a Minox camera being used for some years.

F Q. The secret hiding place in the house, what replaces that? A. I have no idea. Perhaps -- I mean, you can still have a secret hiding place, but again if -- it's things; what's in the secret hiding places is the important thing, is it not? You can have a secret hiding place but if it's empty, it does not matter, does it?

G Q. What has replaced the briefcase with the secret compartment? A. But what I'm trying to explain is, if people don't actually have anything, any incriminating evidence, what one -- what should really be the situation -- then you don't need all these containers and briefcases and secret hiding places; and so what I'm trying to say is that it's replaced with perhaps a growing realisation that you shouldn't give

H

A people these things which will encourage them to keep things they ought not to be keeping.

Q. What has replaced microdots? A. Well, again microdots is only a method of communication.

Q. Yes; what has replaced it? A. I'm not certain that it needs to be replaced. I mean, if you are communicating information to somebody and then leaving no trace of it, you don't need microdots.

Q. What has replaced specially treated paper on which you can write an invisible message? A. I'm not certain anything has. Maybe that could still be used. If you were writing a letter, you could write on the paper, and it could go and you wouldn't have any trace of it left with you.

Q. These or some of these items are what one might expect to have found, are they not? A. Not necessarily.

Q. Not all of them? A. No.

Q. Some of them? A. You might have done, but it's not surprising that one hasn't. Not every case has all of those things.

Q. But certainly, for a person who is acting as a spy in this way, one could well expect to find some of these items? A. One's found the notes and money and things. Some of the things have been found. The fact that they weren't secreted in false bottomed briefcases or containers is not necessarily relevant.

Q. You said that the security services keep a good surveillance on the KGB. A. On?

Q. Watch them carefully. A. On known intelligence officers.

Q. Is it correct that there are no sightings of this defendant ever with Viktor Oschenko? A. First of all, I can't answer that and, secondly, I'm not certain that I should, in that it relates to the time that he was in the United Kingdom, and to our operations at that time, and so I really cannot answer that.

Q. Do you have any photographs of his meetings with Viktor Oschenko? A. I don't, no.

Q. Not you personally, your service.

MR. JUSTICE BLOFELD: Mr. Tansey, I Am not ruling against you but, if you are going to go into what happened between 1972 and 1979, and you want to know what happened to Mr. Oschenko, at the moment Mrs. C is

A saying she cannot answer this. I am not certain if she meant she could but does not feel she ought to for security reasons, but I mean then you are opening up a particular -----

MR. TANSEY: All I want to say is: are there any photographs?

B MR. JUSTICE BLOFELD: You cannot open up part of a chapter without risking the whole of the a chapter coming out. I just warn you, if you want to open up a chapter, you do so, but you cannot pick out the plums. It may be there is nothing against you but you cannot just pick out plums and say you cannot have the rest, if there is a rest. So you must make a choice. Maybe you would like to think about it. Move to something else and come back to it, if you want, after the adjournment.

C MR. TANSEY: My Lord, yes. (To the witness) In 1990, is it correct that the Russian economy was near to collapse?
A. The Russian economy has been near to collapse for a long time, and I think in 1990 it was no different to any other time.

D Q. It was in a very ----- A. Yes, very parlous state, yes.

Q. Its industry, including its military industry, was in a very very run-down condition, was it not? A. I don't know specifically. Certainly industry generally was run- down. There was a great shortage of money.

E Q. Is it within your knowledge that in fact there was no demand for information in 1990, 1991, 1992 because they had no use for it, because they had no money and no industry to use it? A. I am not aware there was no demand for it. I'm aware that they had very little money though certainly, as far as I'm concerned, the demand was continuing. Whether they had the money to actually exploit information is another matter.

F The demand, as far as our information goes, for scientific and technical information particularly with a military application has never gone away and indeed, as I have said, they are still saying that this is what they need. Whether they had the money and the resources to exploit it is quite another question, and that is not within my knowledge to be able to comment on it.

G Q. Is it correct that in 1990 the information that they received was such that in fact it was all piling up; there was nobody using it? Did you know that?
A. No, it's not within my -- I mean, I know -- as I say, one knows the demand for it was still there. What happened to it when it arrived is another matter.

H

A Q. The government departments there and the industry was in chaos. A. That I believe is true. It's one of points I made earlier, that there were severe financial constraints on all Russian government departments. This did not happen to the security intelligence services until late in 1991/92. They survived that with their resources intact, and even now they have not had the same constraints put on them that other government departments have. It's a measure of the importance that their leaders place on them.

Q. Is that because of their internal needs as well?
A. No, it applies to both the internal and the external service. There have been some cuts made. They have had some constraints put on them, but not to the same extent that other government departments have.

C Q. Did you ever read John Le Carre's The Honourable Schoolboy? A. Not The Honourable Schoolboy, no. I read some of his early books but I found, after the first one or two, that they were largely repetitive and becoming more and more convoluted and difficult to follow. So I have not read The Honourable Schoolboy.

D MR. JUSTICE BLOFELD: Instead of reading out chunks -----

MR. TANSEY: I was trying to avoid that.

MR. JUSTICE BLOFELD: If you are saying -- I imagine you are going back to putting at any rate the instances of tradecraft -- there are a whole variety of spy novels.

E MR. TANSEY: Oh, yes, I think that is been accepted. There is one particular matter.

MR. JUSTICE BLOFELD: I was going to say that, if you want to emphasise that by selective passages, if you think there is a point to be gained, may I advise some I hope relative brief document which can be agreed and placed before the jury. What I am a little anxious to do -- it may be that the jury and I are going to have a read a children's book but we do not want to have to read a lot of spy novels.

F MR. TANSEY: I had them available, but the point seems to be conceded so it therefore is not a particular issue. It is one particular matter which Mrs. C referred to about the surveillance.

G MR. JUSTICE BLOFELD: You ask about it.

MR. TANSEY: Yes.

H THE WITNESS: Which I'm quite prepared to believe is in a number of novels. it's just that I haven't personally read one.

A MR. TANSEY: So to save me reading anything then, to make life simpler for everybody, would you accept then that all the tradecraft without exception is in novels?
A. I'm sure it is. I don't see it really is particularly relevant because -- but if you wish to make the point, fine.

B MR. TANSEY: Yes, my Lord, now it is conceded it saves having to read this passage.

MR. JUSTICE BLOFELD: This witness says she has not seen it; she is simply accepting what you are putting to her, but I expect it is.

MR. TANSEY: I could read out a short passage.

C MR. JUSTICE BLOFELD: I am sure you can deal with it with the Crown. If in fact there are short passages, I expect it can be done a different way. I am rather discouraging endless passages being read out to this witness. If that is the only way of doing it, maybe Mrs. C can be brought back, when you have the passages and you have got them on a sheet of paper, and she can come and go through them and say yes. I expect a police officer could say yes.

D MR. TANSEY: That certainly is an attractive way of dealing with it, may I say. Subject to two matters, my Lord, that will be the end of my cross-examination.

E MR. JUSTICE BLOFELD: Would you like me to rise for five minutes so that you can think about them, because I would like to get on, and I expect the Crown would rather re-examine after you have completed the whole of your cross-examination.

MR. TANSEY: There is one matter on which I am not yet fully able to cross-examine.

F MR. JUSTICE BLOFELD: Members of the jury, would you like to go and have five minutes to stretch your legs, even though it is near lunch. Once you have gone I expect Mrs. C can be taken to a room. That way I do not think there is any harm -- because we are in camera -- in your walking across the mouth of the court. Once the usher has dealt with the jury, she can come and tell you where to go.

G (Discussion in the absence of the jury and witness)

H MR. TANSEY: Mrs. C, there is just one more matter to put to you regarding what was put to you this morning. Is it right that there were no sightings of Victor Oschenko with this defendant? A. That's right, during the

A time -- in his time in London, Oschenko's time in London?

Q. That is right, yes. A. Yes, that's right.

MR. TANSEY: My Lord, subject to one other matter which, if I may reserve cross-examination at this stage

B MR. JUSTICE BLOFELD: Yes.

MR. TANSEY: Those are all the questions I have to put to Mrs. C.

(The witness withdrew)

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Witness Statement

Statement of Mrs "C"

Age if under 21 Over 21 (if over 21 insert 'over 21').

This statement (consisting of...6.....pages each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.

Dated the 9th date of November 1992

Signature..... Mrs "C"

I have been employed by the Security Service for 23 years. I have made a study of the techniques used operationally, by the Intelligence Services of the former Soviet Union and of Russia whose intelligence services have inherited most of the Soviet intelligence services resources and assets, following the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991. This study includes information gained from the debriefing of defectors from the Soviet and Russian intelligence services and from the Security Service's observations of Soviet and Russian intelligence officers in the UK. I am thoroughly familiar with these techniques. The objective of these intelligence services is to gather intelligence with the aim of gaining political, economic and military advantage for their parent state. Included in this aim is the intention to cause short or long term damage not only to the Western State in which their intelligence is gathered, but also to other Western States. There are a number of methods used by Soviet/Russian Intelligence Services to facilitate such intelligence gathering activities; one is to seek to suborn and recruit citizens of a Western state who have access to classified information and persuade them to hand it over usually in return for money. It is in the interest of the intelligence officer and his agent that such activities do not come to the notice of the authorities in the Western State. To this end, Soviet/Russian

Signature..... Mrs "C" Signature witnessed by..... Martin Morrissey.....

Continuation of Statement of Mrs "C"

intelligence services have developed over the years particular 'tradecraft' practices designed to ensure the security of their operations, their officers and their agents. Meetings and other forms of communication between the officer and his agent are considered to be particularly vulnerable to the attentions of the security services in the host nation and there are many well established tradecraft practices designed to minimise this risk. Examples of these practices are:-

How often revised / updated

(a) Instructing an agent to follow a particular route to a meeting. A number of defectors have told us that this is normal practice designed to enable the officer to observe the agent and ensure he is not under surveillance. Douglas Britten, convicted under the OSA in 1968 was instructed to travel to meetings with his Soviet controller following a pre-arranged route. (b) The use of marks made with chalk, drawing pens, sticking plaster etc. on walls, posts or similar or placing at a specific place a particular object, often an item of rubbish e.g. empty cigarette packet, orange peel etc to convey messages. Both marks and objects are placed so as to be readily visible to the passer-by without stopping. Different marks and objects indicate different messages to the agent and his controller and reduce the need for personal meetings or other communication which carry inherent risks. Dieter GEHARDT the South African naval officer convicted of espionage in 1983 and Geoffrey PRIME, the GCHQ officer convicted of espionage in 1982 both received messages from their Soviet controllers by means of chalk marks on telegraph poles and trees. An empty coca-cola can left in a specific place was also used by PRIME to convey messages. (c) Selecting meeting places in open areas away from city centres, which are well used by the public and where a meeting would not attract undue attention but surveillance would be difficult and easily detected. I know from a number of defectors and from my service's observations of Soviet/Russian intelligence officers that parks, quiet suburban areas, particularly suburban tube or

where is the end of such direct?

cf notes found.

Signature.....

Mrs "C"

Signature witnessed by.....

Martin Morrissey D/I

Continuation of Statement of Mrs "C"

railway stations within the 25 mile limit are favoured. (d) Arranging in advance regular times, meeting places and arrangements if contact is lost or broken. As with marks and signals this is a well established method by which intelligence officers reduce the need for personal contact with their agents and so lessen the risk of discovery. Hugh Hambleton convicted of espionage in 1982 and Harry Houghton convicted of espionage in 1961 and Britten all had regular pre-arranged meeting times, places and "fall-back" arrangements if contact was broken or lost. I have familiarized myself with the Michael Smith case and in particular have examined exhibits JS41-44 inclusive and read the relevant parts of his interviews. I am able to state that the notes contained in those exhibits are typical examples of the tradecraft referred to above, designed to ensure the security of clandestine meetings with an agent. I formed that opinion on the basis of the following: JS 41 describes marks to indicate "danger" a vertical line and "come next day" - a horizontal line. It notes what appears to be a meeting at Horsenden Hill on 25 September with arrangements for further meetings if that meeting is not kept or contact is broken. I have visited Horsenden Hill, a popular open wooded area with a large car park some 3 miles from Smith's workplace at GEC, East Lane Wembley. It is typical of sites selected by intelligence officers for intelligence meetings. The other notes on JS 41 have no intelligence significance. JS 42 contains a note which appears to relate to a meeting at "Roxeth REC" on a date in April. I have visited Roxteth Recreation ground which is situated in a quiet suburban housing estate close to South Harrow railway station. This is shown in exhibit PA4. It is an open park area with restricted access and typical of sites selected by intelligence officers for clandestine meetings, this exhibit also notes arrangements for meetings at Perivale or Sudbury town tube stations if the contact is lost. The other notes on JS 42 have no intelligence significance.

Signature.....

Mrs "C"

Signature witnessed by..... Martin Morrissey DI

Continuation of Statement of Mrs "C"

JS 43 contains notes which appear to relate to regular contacts, possibly with a previously unknown person - "REC & GUARDIAN" probably refers to using the Guardian Newspaper as a recognition signal - carrying a particular newspaper is a common recognition signal. It also notes what could be signals for changed meeting arrangements, "green for next day" and "red for next Sat.pm". The other notes have no intelligence significance JS 44 contains what appear to be arrangements for a clandestine meeting or meetings; details of signals - a vertical line for "danger" and a horizontal line for "come next day to agreed place" - a symbol, possibly a fire hydrant or notice board, for the location of the signal; details of another signal and location - "Abbotsbury Rd/Melbury coke can at bollard". I have visited this location and it is shown in Exhibit PA3; details of a particular route dated 6 August, I have visited Harrow and can say that the route described in JS 44 "from bottom of hill walk up and (round Church Hill) into Church" corresponds to the route up Peterborough Road from the junction with Kenton Road turning right into Church Hill which leads into St Mary's Church, this route is shown in Exhibit PA1; details of meetings at Horsenden Hill; a list "get old project notes, biosensors, micromachining, micron-valve- give details about cut-backs, HTSC" which appears to be a list of requirements on which information is required. The other notes in JS 44 have no intelligence significance.

Signature Mrs "C"

Signature witnessed by Martin Morrissey

Witness Statement

Statement of Mrs 'C'

Age if under 21 Over 21 (if over 21 insert 'over 21').

This statement (consisting of pages each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.

Dated the 9th date of December 19 92

Signature Mrs 'C'

Further to my statement dated the 9th day of November 1992. I have examined JS 45, a street map of Oporto, Portugal with four crosses marked thereon, two of the crosses with adjacent arrows, and read the relevant part of the Defendants statement. I visited Oporto in September 1992 and identified the four places marked. Three of the crosses are very specific, that is at a particular point on a particular side of the road. At each of these sites there are bus stops and telephone boxes but nothing of obvious tourist interest. The fourth cross marks a square, Largo de San Joao Novo, where there is a church, a museum, a restaurant and a pub. These locations were photographed and are shown in Exhibit PA2. Having visited these sites it is my opinion that the marked map is typical of the sort of instructions given by Soviet/Russian Intelligence officers to their agents to follow a specific route; in this case passing either telephone boxes where further instructions could be received or bus stops where anti-surveillance measures could be used and ending in a busy tourist place where a meeting or contact could take place which would be difficult for any surveillance to monitor. Instructing agents to follow a particular route is an established tradecraft practice of Soviet/Russian Intelligence officers as stated in my previous statement. It is also established tradecraft practice for Soviet/Russian intelligence officers to arrange meeting with agents in particularly sensitive or important cases, in third countries. For cover reasons this is often combined with a holiday or other reason for travel. Both PRIME and GERHARDT had meetings with their case officers in third countries. Also third countries are sometimes used for training agents in communication or anti-surveillance techniques. I have examined

Signature Mrs 'C' Signature witnessed by Martin Morrissey DI.....

Continuation of Statement of Mrs 'C'

US 66, a street map of Honfleur, France, marked with three crosses, two joined by a line. I visited Honfleur in November 1992 and identified the places marked. Two are hotels and the third a restaurant. The two marking hotels are joined by a line. I was assisted by a member of the Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (DST) who took photographs. Whilst it is possible that these markings indicate a specific route and meeting places, I do not consider I have sufficient information to draw a firm conclusion that they have an intelligence significance. Mrs 'C'

Signature..... Mrs 'C' Signature witnessed by Martin Morrissey DI

Witness Statement

Statement of Mrs "C"

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Dated the 10th date of May 19 93

Signature Mrs "C"

I refer to my previous statements dated 9 November and 9 December 1992. I have been asked to expand on my expertise. I joined the Security Service in October 1969 and for the following five years was a member of the section studying the operational methods and techniques of intelligence services of countries hostile to the U.K. My work involved the study of information gained from defectors and from Security Service investigations and observations of such intelligence officers in the U.K. and worldwide. During this period I took part personally in the debriefing of a number of Soviet defectors. Between 1976 and 1987 I was involved in the research and preparation of a number of Official Secrets Acts prosecutions. From 1987-1990 I was head of Security Service training department and as such involved in the training of Security Service officers in methods to counter the operational techniques of hostile intelligence services. From 1990-1993 I was head of the section of which I was a member when I first joined the Security Service. During this period I was involved in the study and assessment of the effects of the changes in the Soviet Union and the break-up of the Warsaw Pact on the intelligence services of those countries. I have also been asked to expand on the assertion in my statement of 9 November 1992 that the intelligence services of the Russian Federation (RFIS) have inherited most of the resources and assets of the Soviet intelligence services following the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991. Despite the lessening of tension between Russia and the West the RFIS have continued to be active against Western, including British, interests. RFIS officers en poste in the UK and worldwide continue to gather information by clandestine means.

Signature Mrs "C" Signature witnessed by M. Gray DCI 180

Continuation of Statement of..... Mrs "C".....

Intelligence gathering is like completing a jigsaw, every piece, while not necessarily of high value in itself, can be of great value in building up the whole picture. This is particularly true in the Science and Technology (S&T) field, where classification of individual pieces of information is not necessarily a true reflection of their worth to an enemy. Sometimes a small, seemingly innocuous piece of information, can be of value in adding to information already received or ongoing research. RFIS remain active also in Europe and North America and information gained in these countries as well as the UK, could be valuable in adding to knowledge of joint UK/US/European research. In these circumstances information of a low classification or even unclassified could prove extremely valuable to those receiving it. I have been asked about the circumstances in which Viktor OSCHENKO arrived in the UK last summer. On 20 July 1992 Viktor OSCHENKO, a Colonel in the SVR (formerly KGB), sought asylum at the British Embassy in Paris. He was given leave to enter the UK, which he did on 25 July 1992, when he was granted indefinite leave to remain. Previously OSCHENKO had served in the UK as Third then Second Secretary at the Soviet Embassy from 29 August 1972 to 22 September 1979. During this period Security Service investigations identified OSCHENKO as a member of the KGB. Mrs "C"

Signature..... Mrs "C".....

Signature witnessed by..... M Gray DCI.....

Witness Statement

Statement of Mrs "C"

Age if under 21 Over 21 (if over 21 insert 'over 21').

This statement (consisting of 1 pages each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.

Dated the 18 date of June 19 93

Signature Mrs "C"

I refer to my previous statements. I have been asked about events in the former Soviet Union leading up to and following the August 1991 coup, in particular their impact on the organisation and responsibilities of the intelligence and security services. I produce as Exhibit C/1 a chronology of events in the former Soviet Union
Ex No 81 from 1985 to 1992 and an organogram of the evolution of Russia's current civilian intelligence services from the old KGB, prepared by the section in the Security Service responsible for the study of intelligence services hostile to the U.K. This exhibit has been prepared entirely from a variety of unclassified sources. Mrs "C"

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Signature Mrs "C" Signature witnessed by Martin Morrissey DI

Witness Statement

Statement of Mrs "C"

Age if under 21 over 21 (if over 21 insert 'over 21').

This statement (consisting of 1 pages each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.

Dated the 17th date of September 19 93

Signature Mrs. "C"

I refer to my previous statement dated 9 December 1992. I have read the statement made by Detective Inspector Morrissey dated 17 June 1993 and the statement made by Antonio Cardoso Moreira dated 14 September 1993 and examined the exhibits attached to D.I. Morrissey's statement. I am now aware that in 1977 there were no telephone boxes situated on two of the sites marked with a cross on Exhibit JS45 and on which there were telephone boxes situated when I visited Oporto in 1992. I am also aware from D.I. Morrissey's and Mr. Moreira's statements that bus stops were situated on three of the sites marked with a cross in 1977. Nothing I have read in D.I. Morrissey's or Mr. Moreira's statements causes me to change my opinion expressed in my statement of 9 December 1992.

Signature Mrs "C"

Signature witnessed by . Martin Morrissey D.I. 340

Witness Statement

Statement of Mrs CAge if under 21 over 21 years (if over 21 insert 'over 21').

This statement (consisting of 2 pages each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.

Dated the 8 date of November 19 93Signature Mrs C

I refer to my previous statements. I have been asked if it is normal KGB/RIS practice to provide their agents with escape plans in the event of a problem. In my experience it is not normal practice with agents although they would have emergency contact arrangements for use in the event of a problem and it may be possible that at such an emergency meeting an escape plan would be discussed depending on the nature and size of the problem. This would not follow any fixed plan but be ad hoc to meet the particular circumstances. If an agent for his own reasons and by his own means escapes to Russia, as in the case of Burgess, MacClean, Philby and Blake, one would expect the Russians to offer some assistance; how much would depend on the value of the agent // In my experience only illegals, who are Russian Intelligence Officers, have prepared firm escape arrangements. // I have been asked whether the RIS/KGB would have warned SMITH once they were aware of OSCHENKO's disappearance and defection. OSCHENKO arrived in the UK on Saturday 25 July 1992. His disappearance was not noticed by the Russians until Wednesday 29 July when they asked the French authorities if they had any knowledge of his whereabouts. On 31 July the Russians asked the British authorities, who confirmed that OSCHENKO was in the UK. In my opinion the SVR's first priority on learning of OSCHENKO's disappearance would have been his current French activities and agents. No doubt they would in time have got round to looking at his

*X Even Royal Le J defector
to Britain*

Signature Mrs CSignature witnessed by R Gilbertson DSMrs CR Gilbertson DS

Continuation of Statement of Mrs C

activities and agents in the UK in the 1970s but the sheer practicalities of doing a damage assessment on such a long career would have been overwhelming. Once the Russians knew OSCHENKO was in the UK it would have been considered too dangerous to contact SMITH; he might well be under surveillance or had been a double agent throughout. In my experience the normal reaction would have been for everyone to lie low and hope it would blow over.

Signature Mrs C

M.P.92

Mrs C

Signature witnessed by R Gilbertson DS

R Gilbertson DS 378

Handwritten to [unclear]

I would not expect a KGB case officer, or any of his colleagues, to write a letter of this nature because they would be aware that the Security Service would have examples of their handwriting and possibly their fingerprints. If such a letter was the only way of re-contacting or contacting an agent they would get a clerk [&] or support-worker to write it.

Ms C.

8.11.93.