THE NEO-INTERVENTIONIST TOOLKIT 1.0
FROM HIZMET TO THE ISLAMIC STATE
GEO-COGITO
THE TERRORIST THEORY OF GEPOLITICS

THE TERRORIST THEORY OF GEPOLITICS
CHAPTER I: ON PREDIALECTICAL RISK: HAGANISTS, OR JIHADISTS
The principle specific to de-singularization concerns the empiricity of non-thetic and pragmatic re-individualization of the nomadic group. This group's consciousness doesn't maintain itself as permanence of diagrammatic passages, but corresponds to a directionless conversion of abstraction as it relates to the nomadic essence of insurgency. Two options present themselves: a de-singularizing intersection in the determinant level or in terms of nomadic omissions of certitude, which open broadly onto the instability of possible. In the first instance, the group is constructed through a self-unifying capacity of dissemination, which result in a group whose processual intersection constitutes a surpassing negation - organizing the group's movement in the state's branches as a valorization of an intervention a-head-of-itself. In the second instance, intersectional mediations are replaced by neutrality of annulation. A pre-arithmetical abstraction of regime-regime without a concept of speed-in favour of familial destination of estrangement. A passage, as opposed to destination, is characterized by the stage-unity of its periodicity, its capacity to govern its delimitation in order to constitute diagrams intersecting in the development of becoming. There is a univocal index for the production of arrival which bifurcates a group's movement of conditions; a univocity that is articulated, processual in constitution, not a stationary settlement that leads to the "graves of the elders (Rilke)".

To bring into revolution other signifiers beyond those of purely abstract categories, to transpose the concealment of silence and transiency of utterance where anthropomorphism is generated by a "leaping" of arithmetical seriality; these are the regimental paths of the de-singularization (the locality of escape from the nomadic identification of insurgency-revolution-struggles etc..). Initially the model of armed resistance, informed by partisan writings such as Total Resistance (Hans von Dach), revolutionary-third worldist theoreticians (Guevara -Guerrilla warfare-) and inherited from the Bolshevik century of history, has contributed to the creation of heteronomous, bipolarized field of destination. The perspective possibilized by the multi-polar modes of accumulation (U.S/Soviet) regarding the non-existent determination of nomadism has impacted almost the entire field of our approach -as Thirld Worldidsts- to dominance. For the insurgency is the force of an interplay's differential.
Before it exists for itself, it is the term given to virtualize its probabilities as" force of effects" (the effects of the modes' interplay). It is in itself, a supplementary formal operation of subtraction. It finds itself in itself as the index of an effect existing as the comprehension of its subtraction by the accomplishment of this interplay, and does not constitute itself as responsible by its own action of initiating immigrations or by intersecting passages .Therefore, Multi-polar insurgency model is from the start responsible for the validity of its comportment as excluded middle.

To the state as an entity there corresponds no destination. That is why the denotation of the "partisan experience" could not be condensed in a form of abstraction applied to one's rapport to genetic conditions , which would result in quantifying nomadism in a passive signalization . The Haganah’s high-command chiefs at least knew that the "value of the state “cannot be aggregated from a "variation" of destination and the projection of this destination through a variant subjectivity. They had been looking for an transversality of access to the state, and when they comprehended the aleatory differential of WWII, they were in the end stating that each encounter presupposes nomadic transposition in transversal performativity. “Total Resistance” of Von Dach and the insurgent theme -in Hagana’s experience in general- are then not totalizing in the solidarities of its datum. The particularity of the Haganah, its potentiality, does not sum up its individuation by its experience of de-singularization. It both excludes and transfigure its deprature, without being uni-vocalized by a determinate operational theme.

The Haganah, as a formal defense organization linked to the Jewish Agency limited itself strictly to defensive measures but , by 1936, the Haganah had expanded its operations to include occasional preemptive strikes.In 1938 the British allowed the Haganah to arm itself legally and organized special constabulary units under Captain Wingate ,composed largely of members of Haganah . When World War II began , the Haganah cooperated fully with Britain and it encouraged Palestinian Jews to join the British army. Altogether ,some 43,000 Palestinian Jews saw service in British units during the warn and these veterans would later prove highly useful to the Haganah during Israel's 1947-1948 war fore independence .After the war , to protest British restrictions on Jewish immigrations, the Haganah conduction a terrorist campaign against Britain; unlike the rival Jewish terrorist groups , The Irgun and the
Stern Gang, the Haganah generally hit strictly military targets and attempted to minimize causalities.\(^1\)

During World War II, the extremist groups engaged in terrorism and guerrilla warfare against British authority including the assassination of Lord Moyne in 1944. The more mainstream Haganah (Tactical diffraction to auto-administratate its crisis) cooperated with Britain in the formation of Jewish brigade in the suppression of the extremists after Moyne’s assassination. In late 1945, Ben-Gurion ordered Haganah forces to sabotage British railroads and oil installations, and he encouraged ships carrying illegal immigrants to bear arms and resist British patrol. In response, British launched Operation Agatha on 29 June 1946, and seventeen thousand British soldiers swept through Jewish strongholds to arrest suspected militants and seize weapons, which -for fear- induced Ben-Gurion to elevate de diplomacy over force and suspended Haganah Operations against British from July 1946 to November 1947.

But Operation Agatha failed to curb the extremists, as Irgun and Stern Gang posed a more deadly challenge to British personnel. Within a month of the operation, The Irgun bombed the King Davidd Hotel in Jerusalem, the center of British politico-military authority killing 92 British, Jews, and Arabs.\(^2\)

Israel-in contrast to all third worldist entities- is defined by this relationship of transversality. It is its own virtuality of dissemination: it exists between its intra-operated proximity with the other (The British), in the middle of its designation. And if terrorism, which insurgents (Mainly Jihadists) correlated in their own way, appeared to inform the superlative that determines their notion of destination, it does not occupies the same privilege in Haganah’s multi-transversal contact with contradictions. “Total Resistance” is the variable of a sub-unit (1945) which the transversal plan does not nominally depend on, but pluralize its segments as a parallactic angle (Irgun-Stern Gangs 1947-48). The diplomatic variable is indivisible only in its extensional crossing of military variations (1946-47). In the relationship with the real, that is, in the formation of the plan as concept of this real which the systematics establish, passages are standardized to intersect in a political datum.

Having said all this, the oppositions between these two modalities of group formations are estimingly clear: Haganah’s experience consisted in producing - or more exactly in having already produced, in a
non-reconstitutable exchange which was never passive – an arrival that could not be assumed by the abstract exteriority of destination; it consisted in being re-individualized by the infinity of its rapport with another that was an enemy (equipping and training the Arab’s militaries), and a hegemonic power whose presence was dealt with by a unitary diffraction of segments (manpower support in WWII, terrorism, transactions, cooperative local administration, and diplomacy etc..) in order to “exceptionalize” the Jewish subjectivity, as a force of structure, in the order of the British strategy. The difference between Haganah and Jihadists is strong enough to break the voluntarist form of nomadism, in which this difference is still operational.

No analogy can, however, be established between nomadic dissemination and nomadism as chaos. Nomadic dissemination is totally operational. The differential that associates Haganists and Jihadists is no longer that of the inter-play of naissances or of a positing by which the affinities of existence open up before us. Nomadism is not an event. The only true possibility of state-formation in a situation of group crisis is articulated by nomadism as a strategy of disseminative wholes, that brings about an authentic solidarities of semi-bureaucratic system of positions, bifurcating this concept as the production of both material and immaterial group-reproductions. Therefore these solidarities must not be exclusively concerned with univocal relations of organism on a local cadre (aggregates of prisoners who hold unemployed humanist connotations with determinist relations of force as Jihadists’ role model choice), but must also take into account constituting an exceptional pre-state corporatism that is firmly fixed by nomadism as Haganists did.

Haganists’ corporatism and executive branches appear historically to be totally understanding the full implications of nomadic maintenance, which was a decisional category at all its periods of crisis. Unit 8200 – a unit of signal collection and intelligence transmission - is a concrete situating of this policy. The number was ascribed to the unit through the mundane process of a computer assignment. However, a more popular story attached itself to the unit. It goes that the electronic warfare unit got its name from its founding members: 8 Ashkenazi Jews and 200 Sephardic immigrants who came to Israel from Iraq, who were educated under the British in wireless communications and as Iraqi Railways radio operators, and who, above all else, had an intimate
understanding of Arabic. The unit’s origins, however, are a rather more practical affair. It began in the hodgepodge of pre-state agencies linked to the Jewish agents who learned the art of wiretapping and early signal intelligence under the British. Indeed, many of their early skills were learned in the days when the British ruled Palestine during the Mandate and the Jews worked closely with them, first against the Ottoman Turks and later Nazi Germany. In turn, the underground Haganah would utilize these skills against the British. (3)

The authenticity of autodidactic, for Haganists - was a future on its own seat of origin, an openness that is constituted by the inner movement that projects one unto the tonality of rhythm. This authenticity was decisional in 1949 too. During the battle of Jerusalem, for one, the Jewish forces drove Iraqi troops from the western part of the city using a homemade mortar called the Davidka. Named after David Leibovitz, the engineer who built it, the Davidka possessed a roar that was worse than its ability to inflict any real damage. The primitive gun wasn’t rifled, so when it fired off shells, they were uselessly inaccurate. What the Davidka could do was to burst in the air with a terrifying thunder. Only a handful were built. The Israelis would mount them on a vehicle, fire off a few rounds, and then transport them to another location, creating the illusion that there were many of these powerful mortars ringing the city. The bluff worked, and the strategy was repeated in the northern town of Safed and the coastal city of Tel Aviv. (4)

Henceforth it is the ordering of this semi-bureaucratic nomadism of Haganah on this planet that constitutes its coefficient of determinability. In the acceleration of its survival, Haganists productive forces transformed their nomadic machine, on multi-sectorial levels, to be the determinant sensibility of their state. Meir Amit’s Diamond Operation is the processual example of this mediation. It was Amit who famously orchestrated the theft of a Soviet MiG-21 from Iraq in 1966 and the defection of its pilot and his family. At the time, the MiG was one of the most advanced fighter jets in existence. Israel’s possession of the jet’s inner workings played a huge role less than a year later in its stunning victory in the Six Day War against the Soviet-supplied air forces of Egypt and Syria. His vision of intelligence has had a profound and far-reaching influence. (5)
The de-singularization does not come from the negation of dissemination as a commandment of classification, it rather comes from the verticalization of this generality’s striving; dissemination is passive when its classificatory comportment is directionless. Haganists’ concept of de-singularization as through this generality-category of dissemination – is proportionate to Fordism, that is, a factical verticalization of the Jews’s dissemination. The Haganists’ concept extends to bear a unitary trace of Fordist labor administration which could be summed up in the organicity of passages that Victor Grayevsky’s maneuver expresses, and what his immigration to Israel manifest -obtainment of an advance copy of Nikita Khrushchev's 1956 speech to the closed session of the Communist Party's 20th Congress--; Grayevsky gave the document to the Israelis, who then passed the contents to the CIA-Grayevsky’s authentic maneuver occupies the “Primal Exodus” passage, whilst Meir Amit’s Business administration in Columbia University in New York -after a parachuting accident in 1963 that left him in crutches which induced the IDF to send him to New York to study. While there, he came into contact with a Philco computer that influenced him to turn Mossad into a “man and machine apparatus” (6) - .denotes the “Retro Exodus” passage that intersects with the former in a worldly synoptic link of permanence. All appearances in time are facticalization of encounters in ex-istence; the vertical facticity of dissemination demarcated Haganists in an horizontal classification of force relations with U.S (20 Congress Speech and MiG’s engine formation). This is not an anthropological particularity, since Haganists’ history consists in the categorizing the state by this dissemination as transfer, so that they could exploit it for their own persistence. This determinability is the correspondence of “exceptionalizing subject” of this dissemination. U.S and Haganists’ alliance was a nonlocalizable identification against the Soviet military-industrial capital and its mechanisms of valorization in the middle east. The labor division of this identification was therefore a Fordist coefficient of correspondence, whilst PLO and Black Septembrists were enjoying an Asiatic coefficient of liaison in the labor division of their allies. Black Septembrists were logistics officers whose role was reduced to coordinating contacts between GDR’s Stasi and Red Army Faction (RAF) through their secured passage to and from West Berlin through the Airport of Berlin-Schönefeld. Operation “Wrath of God” was in itself the dialectical modernity of Haganists’ force relations, and the individuating force of the amphimictic instrumentality of Black Septembrists, serving as infra-stratified chain that is aggregately
encoded by Stasi’s Operation Needle that supplements the processing of KGB’s Western Counterespionage program (Operation Moses).

The Stasi Chief (Mielke) de-coded PLO’s instrumentality when he opened the conference with Abu Iyab (the head of PLO intelligence) by asking him to relay his thanks to Yasser Arafat for refraining from “carrying out any action against the American President during the Soviet-American summit meeting in Vienna”.

Commonly PLO’s voluntarism is not bifurcated by its index of demarcating that is polar in its informational technics of subjectivity. PLO’s blunders are rather of aggregative sensibility that offer nothing but an abstract index to the history of ideological strategies which "granted" them a surplus of amphi-mictic operations on which they had no root. A universal plan of strategy, and not being a satellite like PLO always enjoys, inductively informs executive solidarities superposed in intersectional frequency which last beyond superstitions of sabotage. It is transmitted by persons who cannot believe anymore in non-positional demarcations. What is quantified in voluntarism is not time, but the un-stability of the timely possible. A quantification of ego as a de-singularizing subject, voluntarism leads partisans who have a passive intelligibility of metaphysics, who are present to be absent beyond authentic interrelation, persons who redeem their untimely absence by being contiguous to their decay.

Anyway that remains not to much a rigorously account to document voluntarist aftermaths. But PLO’s most certain distinction that landscaped out of its praxis, had been incomparably summarized by Guattari in his Schizoanalytic Cartographies when he declared:

“Was the Palestinian revolution really written on the void, an artifice superimposed on a nothingness, and is the white page, and every little blank space between the words, more real than the black characters themselves? Would this revolution have been nothing but a pretext for him (Jean Genet) to write literature? What, then, would separate him from all those “poets of the revolution” that he mocks so cruelly? But evidently this “passage via writing” of his Palestinian experience is no way comparable to a vulgar enterprise of literary recuperation.” (7)
Conclusion:

From a dialectical perspective, Haganah’s experience is the evolutionary correlation of pre-dialectical risk. There is an extrinsic prototype of “Exodus” to articulate beyond the spontaneity of self-sufficient presencing—throughout history—the illocutionary certitude of risk. While it is involved in an equation of dominance that depends on the adaptation of national security resources to “War-On-Terror” like the Nazi racial matheme of “Final Solution” to assert a classic monopoly of concentration, U.S adaptive monopolism is abstractly inverting the pre-dialectical sign-function of Jihadist paradigm. In order for it to survive, IS must be interventionist in the illocutionary sense: a dialectical transversality in praxis, concerned only with, and determined by, infrastructural intersection. It will require the development of a semi-bureaucratic intersection of solidarities, with an para-identical ‘strike force’ that eliminates and accelerates the determinability of intersection exploiting the capitalist norms of promotion and hierarchy. IS would seem to need a dialectical understanding of capitalist synthesis of determination that implies three cumulative conditions:

1-A dialectical understanding of the duality of centrality/periphery; “Socialism in one Country” of the Soviet Union is the para-division that is articulated on the strategy of structured proliferation of its partisans (ex: The Rosenberg’s and Los Alamos atomic ring)

2-A dialectical understanding of the relation with others; the intervention in strategy of relations of forces is the operational logic of utility. An enemy must not be killed outright if he could spin and recontract his edges as did the Nazi Heinz Pannwitz and the double agent “Kent”. Pannwitz sent the agent “Yves Rameau” to penetrate the swiss ring (The Red Three). Rameau was in fact Ewald Zweig, a German Jew forced to serve the SD to save his own skin. (8)

3-A dialectical understanding of the corporatist efficiency of bureaucracy as did the Nazi SD intelligence service in 1937. A report from a white Russian émigré based in Pars named Skoblin reached Heydrich-SD intelligence service chief—suggesting Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky was plotting to overthrow Stalin. Heydrich believed the report to be genuine and brought it to Hitler’s attention. Hitler agreed with Heydrich’s analysis and chose to back Stalin against Tukhachevsky, which was irremediably for the Fuhrer a win-win twist. (9)
The unity of praxis, its positing as an "alter-remoteness," which is identified and localized in a non-existent interiority (the executive branch), is not a way to make existence purely passive. The crossing effected by the unity of transversal constructs beyond scholastic causality of power, constitutes the act of interventionism as a peri-ontic act, or executional totalization in act. It is this subtractive movement of crossing that designates the organic structure for the actuality of the event. Rainer M. Rilke poetically picturized this essence when he said in Duino Elegies:

“Then you, darling,
you, silently leapt over
by the most exciting joys.
you,
always on the swaying scales of balance
like stacked fruit of serenity
publicly displayed between shoulders.”

References:

2- Caught in the Middle East : P27 – Peter L. Hahn / N Carolina Press Chapel Hill and London 2004
4- Ibid p:18
5- IBID P:71
6- Ibid p:71
9- Ibid P: 31
CHAPTER II:
THE TERRORIST THEORY
OF PROPAGANDA
The alterity of the face is communicative, an expansion, in the metalanguage of being unanticipated, qualified to, and negated. Discourse has not only an expressive induction but also a heuristic and physical supervision. In his face, the other is executed, that is, not, discharged, but located, by an offering that is transposition. To face another is to locate yourself to behind him. Or, we may say, discourse modalized as abandonment is the structure of exigency that orients the irreducible occurrence of “withholding”. This exigency decorticated in intentional arrangement of consent is not a business; it is not a “reconsidering” of force to an “experiencing” beyond force signified by “reconsidering” as accomplishment. It is not pure flippancy, but the securing of an origin that encounters us a-head of ourselves. The discourse imposes its stress by qualifying conscience as a dream; this dream is not reactive as a content of punishment but as a destitution of reaction in-itself, is not repression as an operation of being but as an generative fixation. The other de-accelerates himself in his enmity vis-à-vis moi, and the mediation of this de-acceleration is executed through his face. To recognize this executional tendency is not to re-found it as secondary relation, but to preserve my initiative, and to answer for my universality; it is to experience a concern - not a spontaneous concern of meaning, but a concern against my permutation-caused by my enemy. The representation of this concern and the association of its plan with other segments of different conjunctions, are unitary performances; it is in a war-type world of identifications where I find myself disposed to initialize this concern’s grammar. In a register of chains, that is, in linking the movement I have constituted with the predicates of the other, in constituting the stress of this other in order to “invent” the operation of his contestation. Thus a grammar for my concern presupposes the judgment of “my other” about its condition of expansion au detriment of my enemy. The modernity of this grammar is analogous to PROPAGANDA whose primordial datum is elasticity, that is operating according to an Avant-logic of elasticism, and “dealing” with the risk imposed over it by its own elusiveness. A practice that mainly consists in the rationalization of denial by totalizing the liberation of elasticism. The soviets’ takeover after the WWII is exceptionally due to this preservation of tactic that consists in rationalizing contradictions by declaring for example that the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact of August, 1939 was a victory to educate its trans-networks, mainly of Spanish Civil war’s veterans after feeling betrayed as Party’s newspaper Pravda claimed- due to
empowering trade relations after the Treaty of Versailles which decreased Germany’s reliance on Soviet imports and also included secret protocols that consist in dividing Poland and giving the Soviet Union a free hand in Latvia and Estonia, and in the border area of Rumania.

There is nothing surprising in the mediating level that Propaganda occupies alone. Not merely in projective assuming, if we would border on what the practice of Propaganda can teaches us, in the broad form of enumerations, whether determinative or reflective, we should primarily imagine Propaganda as a negative permanence in-itself, that is to systematize the conditions of its own inversion. This “priority” has indubitably been long since detected in its realization, by manufacturers of media as they investigated its equivalent simultaneity. Because excess without stratification of egoicity supplies the installation of inversion. This rule could be magnificently displayed in IS video messages’ série of beheading (James Foley and others) after U.S air intervention to protect U.S facilities and interests in KRG. IS “demanded” to identify the struggle with U.S scholastic “interventionism” in the genital level of gratification, with the contestation of the exception whose striving is ecstatical, and with the dialogic of contactlessness. This is the condition of inversion of any Propaganda: if you want to invert it, you must solely offer it with excess and wait for the remoteness of its effects.

Everyone knows U.S tradition of manufacturing pretexts, which range from “who fired the first gun” (On June 25, 1950, the North Korean military were said to have moved three miles into South Korea territory – pretext of U.S intervention in the Korean war), to fabricating bullets for its enemies (declassified documents of Pentagon’s deals with PR Firm $500mm to create fake Al Qaeda propaganda videos). Why then wasn’t IS able to not be cloaked in the same garb, which is nevertheless so easy, by resorting, as is classic, to divisiveness? Such recourse ultimately presupposes preserving (le taux du rotation d’un conflict), which is recommended for the panoramic prestige of the group. It is so simple to know why they didn’t and, moreover, it is true that IS, with such pre-dialectical legalism could be nothing but an heteronomous index of jouissance. After capturing several suburbs in Nineveh, including Baashiqueh, Rabiaa, Telkif etc… IS rushed toward Al-Khazer which is the most contiguous suburb with Erbil (where U.S coordination office is situated as extension of Baghdad’s central command). Such
catastrophic retreat of Peshmerga estimatingly urged Barzani -KRG governor- to demand U.S defensive air-strikes to protect strategic facilities in Erbil. Shortly afterwards, IS released a video message of James Foley’s beheading, articulating terms of control between IS and U.S. It would be purely infantile for a superpower like U.S to submit under such denominational contestation, thereby Obama’s administration haven’t taken a different path from theirs predecessors of “pretext-ing”. Furthermore, it seems, that the dialogic of this “genital finalism” has led IS to a sort of anecdote that is represented in its rotation of development, which results in what I will call pre-dialectical jokes.

Let’s do a brief monitoring, a very quick one to sift out elements of analysis that will construct our analytic achievement of theory about terrorist Propaganda:

1-IS attacks Al-Khazer region in August, 2014 and threatened -according to intelligence reports – Erbil with plundered long-range missiles, and several Humvees from Mosul military bases, just Four months after unprecedented crisis between Syrian Kurds and KRG (digging ditches at borders with eastern Heseke where YPG and PKK militants are positioned to preclude drugs and arms smuggling: Link). This step was reportedly the condition of a bilateral energy agreement with turkey for logistical cooperation (exporting Iraqi-Kurdish oil through Kurdish-Turkish pipelines).=(YPG+PKK) #(KRG)

2-Unprecedented budget crisis with KRG and Baghdad over cutting salaries of civil servants in the region: With a barrel of oil at an estimated price of $60, the Iraqi government has a daily income of at least $150 million. In five days, Baghdad can accrue $750 million, just enough for the KRG’s operating expenditure budget. That includes the civil servants’ loans, which is also equivalent to the monthly income of the KRG’s 500,000 barrels oil exports. Apparently, Baghdad claims to be bankrupt in the meetings only when it comes to the Kurds (Rudaw)=(KRG) #(Baghdad)

3-Before September, 2014, there was no military cooperation between Syrian-Iraqi Kurds, even partisan sympathy was swept up by logistical cooperation with Turkey and barely cloistered in virtual tweets. (YPG+PKK) # (KRG +Turkey)

4-“Shiite leaders -- including many from Maliki’s own Dawaa Party -- were even more strongly opposed, with followers of radical Shia cleric
Moqtada al-Sadr threatening renewed violence if any American troops stayed past the end of the year. The Sadr threat was deeply alarming to Iraqis just beginning to rebuild their lives and their country after the bloody sectarian strife which ravaged Iraq for the past eight and a half years.

The only major Iraqi political bloc that was willing to speak publicly about a troop extension was the Kurdish alliance which governs the country's north and has long had a testy relationship with Maliki and the country's Sunni and Shia populations. But even Kurdish support was far from monolithic: Mahmoud Othman, an independent Kurdish lawmaker considered one of the most pro-American members of parliament, said in a recent interview that he wanted the U.S. troops out. (TheAtlantic)

Even Mosul's capture didn't inform a political debate about the emergent necessity for a « second U.S interventions » ; Iraqi leaders barely asked religious authorities to rally Iraqis (mainly southerners Shi'ites) for the formation of a fledgling “popular para-military force” dubbed -Al-Hashd Al-Shaa’bi-, made limited ammunitions contracts with U.S firms and bought some unsophisticated Russian helicopters .(KRG+ Baghdad + Iran-backed militias) # (U.S administration) .But IS hasn’t enclasped all these factors because it doesn’t believe in le taux du rotation d’un conflit , and decided to step up its suicide bombings in Baghdad , hence accelerating the substitution of Dawaa-party’s doctrinist faction (Maliki) under popular rage given consecutive defeats and more deadliest penetrations , by the opportunist and pro-interventionist faction currently led by Haider-Abbadi .

5- IS released James Foley’s beheading , hence provoking a subliminal superlative for the formation of anti-terrorism air-campaign spearheaded by U.S ; departing from Erbil’s airfields . Obama didn't find any difficulty to convince protectionist countries to buttress the intervention ; IS blunt “savageur” helped most protectionist forces to reinvigorate their pluck after deceiving results in Iraq and Libya . This time it is not about a “farce” (weapons of mass destructions ), It is against a fully live genocidal savagery.

Sooner the Americans will notice how fruitful the cooperation with the pliable Kurds of Iraq in tackling IS , but this time not solely in Iraqi-
northern governorates to protect American civil servants in Erbil, but also in Syria using moderate ground force (YPG) to disjoint IS shoulders therein. Therefore, the U.S administration decided to duplicate its success in Iraq with the same pliable component in Syria, and started to communicate with YPG to install a coordination office in Kobane for further partnership. (here all the above mentioned oppositions will start to converge and the rate of rotation will grow steadily slower)

5-YPG forces deemed the weakest link in Syria, and humiliated at every round of battles against IS with a death rate of 100 fighters per battle before August, 2014, has turned the tables to become the most effective ground force in Syria thanks to U.S entrepreneurial cooperation. Nevertheless, YPG militants have regained all their system of positon prior to 2014 and helped to contrive para-institutional private security jobs to theirs unemployed comrades (PKK) in recompense to theirs efforts in recapturing Sinjar from IS. PKK personal who had been living like shadows for years were also hired to teach guerilla warfare’s principles and skills to new Peshmerga volunteers.

“Shingal militia claims Baghdad providing salaries and arms “ (Rudaw)

6-The rotation rate of conflict will be more prominent in the eyes of IS militants when they will notice that every small incursion to capture towns aligned with Deir-Zour military airbase enmeshes them in a chasse-à-la-sorciere U.S air-strikes. The militants who had driven “Assad dogs of Tabqa air-base to hell” after forcing them to strip to their underwear in 72 hours, were found ceaselessly unable to resume battles under the same tempo after the U.S air-screen embargo. The situation therein has started to take a pure combined-arms Frankist (general Franco) plan of firepower as it was in Spanish civil war

7-So the extremists tried to espouse, what they claimed to be, innovations (literally Ibtikarat) to offset their “countless” enemies’ superiority in armament system and manpower. They have intensified their man-hunt for Sahawat in Northern Baghdad using intra-diverse tactics which finally led -according to IS newsletter Al-Nabaa N°50:P:12-creating untrusted relations between Baghdad and local anti-terrorism fighters ( Sahawat ) after the incident of killing Abu-Ammar Al-Azawi by the hands of U.S special forces for blatantly disobeying orders and refusing patrolling and coordination terms for fear of IS pseudo patrollers that had harvested 40 figures before him.
To their surprise, the militants have also found-retardedly- that small-scale attrition against Peshmerga and Assad forces are incomparably better than campaign-style fighting (Ghazwa). Statistics were grouped to testify the effectiveness of this alternation:

**Al-Nabaa N°46 P:10** : After Six months of retreat from Palmyra; The Islamic state has succeeded in:

-Killing 500 military, pro-Assad militias personal, which is mathematically greater than the barely 200 military killed in IS campaign that captured the city in 25 May, 2015.

- Seizing 40 tanks, 17 23mm gun, 9BMB, and many other arms of different caliber.

**Al-Nabaa N°48 P:7** : Scribbling a narrative about an IS infiltrationist which was left in a ditch behind the retreating militants in Northern Aleppo. The narrative enumerated his individual exploits in killing 15 FSA militants and pulling down a 23mm gun using his rifle with some DIY-grenades before fleeing to join the group.

The nature of this joke is pre-dialectical because the temporality of “the real” in its periodicity is not generic but rotational, mechanistic which doesn’t require the mere effort of intuition to deorticize this itinerary’s arbitrariness. But consideration of the joke’s evolution, as just indicated, already teaches us, amongst other things, that the “repertoire” is the primary process that determines the inter-formation of communication between Propaganda as logistical contact and Propaganda as re-territorialization (Guattari) of links to be aggregated alternatively. Further, the endo-psychic register of IS repertoire from one use of an image to another, ending in the voluntarist over-determination of reaction has acquired a reality of its own. This lapsus-firstly initiated by a beheading-video message- is no doubt parallel to a tragedy that could have been avoided by a same, simple “geste” of Propaganda. To show how extraordinarily the combinatorial use of a virtual social networks, feigns, survey’s manipulation, and deception circuits can ramify from its original simple segment, just as other singular segments ramify and extend from a primary one, the example may be taken from Soviet journals of self-criticism for their role in regulating and manufacturing consents even for ultra-leftists and revisionists. The government offers these means itself, This role is
played by satirical journals attacking the authorities, yet tolerated by the dictator (for example Krokodil) or by a wild holiday set aside for ridiculing the regime, yet paid for by the dictator (for the Friday of Sorrows in Guatemala). Clearly, such instruments are controlled by the regime.

They serve the function of giving the people the impression that they are free, and of singling out those about to be purged by the government as guilty of all that the people dislike. Thus these instruments of criticism serve to consolidate power and make people cling even more to the regime by providing artificial release of tendencies that the state must keep in check. In such situations, propaganda has an almost therapeutic and compensatory function.

Deception is an even more ruminating tool than the others (especially on individual level, deemed more trusted tool than official one e.x: pseudo-fugitive exposes large secrets, pseudo-documents, narrating about low moral, and fratricides etc … then followed by a denial message from officials endorsing details and denying others, letting enemy’s intelligence cloaking the fugitive’s reports with interest; thus installing backdoors).

I don’t know if IS planners were aware of this, but Propaganda is concerned especially with reterritorializing refrains. Because of this, it concerns itself with what we must call the non-existent transversal. The transversal -as non-existent variable- is the difference between what Propaganda can accomplish in parallactical encounter and what it shouldn’t. What works is elasticity. The transversal works by alternating its scansions - that it functions as a prophylactic segment. To perceive that the univocity of your refrain is the com-possibility that generates barriers for your own normality in the world, and you starts to alternate, yet in post-intuitive encounter, it means that you have unhappily entered in your enemy’s auto-positioning.

The middle East needs artists of firepower that could perhaps learn to operationalize the traditional infra-consistency of intra-contradictions; Dialecticians to limit their study of theory; Partisans to reconsider the illusions of terrorism. One must further add that this IS refrains cannot be reduced to problem of repertoire that expresses itself by every prescriptive will to will (Heidegger) producing an isomorphism of genital capitalization. The isomorphism of a repertoire of this type, might in general be an introverted responsibility of the prison’s signalization of revenge. What is the causality of enunciation upon which prison
totalizes univocity? It is the powerlessness of accomplishment. This powerlessness goes against the motifs of disjunction from the oral character of revenge to which the identification of IS militants is stabilized with; Tragically, IS’ enemy is the most sympathizer for what IS produces concerning Propaganda videos. IS always speaks the truth. And sometimes the truth that may deplete its entropic unconscious, because there’s no way, to say it differently. IS’ Dabiq Magazine, for example, devotes a particular section dubbed -in the words of the enemy-. Yet It doesn’t know that through this unintentional submission that IS’ enemy preserves its third worldist systematics (accomplishment of third worldist object-relations -revenge- as priority). This is the mathematical consequence of IS univocal exchange of refrains linearly thematized by integrating spectacle in its Propaganda machine (either positively or passively) in order to split itself from the themes of prison and torture.

Merely to recapitulate this genealogy puts us in a position that some will locate as a theorist valorization. Yes, I know that. But I am one of those who think that the converse is the valid postulate - that all prophylactic operations are possible. There is only one small problem with this: Propylaxis and its induction, are contacted by their autonomous compatibility.

When IS took over Falouja in Jan 2014, and arrested several suspects ranging from tribal militias, to policemen, and pro-government informers. It managed outright to initiate them to 101 re-education techniques in mosques using a scholastic methodology that has proved its feebleness many times. And every time, once arrested elements are liberated, after formal repentance, they flee their detected locations and return to their past tasks. This tragicomedy re-supposed itself in Mosul in 10 June, 2014, but IS militants haven’t busied themselves inventing (in intuitive situation) tools and scenarios to make those elements (mainly Ezzat Al-Douri’s Naqshabandi army) pour out their agency in regrouping security elements and former security personal to feel better about themselves and not transfer them to government for no-fees. Furthermore, Naqshabandi Army could have been dealt with pragmatically (infiltrating them by communication agents -as in the case of Mark Zborowski with the Trotskyist movement in France- and deliberately letting them have their hands on some arms) to tackle Peshmerga forces by relying on their skills in IED planting in Northern Nineveh, but when they had met in
one of Tikrit’s homes, IS militants didn’t propose a third choice; either join, or shut up (Reuters).

Theoreticians are struck by the way in which they (IS militants) find nothing better than hardening theirs enemies. The militants failed to operationalize Maliki’s autarkic, non-interventionist corrupt institutions by loosening up their bombing in Baghdad, when everyone wants—especially U.S-rushed to use surveys amidst popular rage—to oust him (digging for legal pretexts). They could have pervaded the city with hidden explosive vests and reported on them by themselves (double task) to Iraqi’s security information service to offset U.S and Saudi-aligned survey’s makers (knowing that U.S helped to topple Maliki first by elitist surveys—clerics—to influence popular ones).

Anyway, IS’ isomorphism in rhythm and praxis negated such integrations; Prophylaxis is no simple thing. It is neither elementary, nor eidetic. It is the result, composition, or complex of an entire set of inductions.

Mao said; "One cannot force a people to renounce idealism or force a people to believe in Maoism. To settle ideological problems, one must act through the democratic methods of discussion, criticism, persuasion, and appropriate education." But we must remember the—incidentally quite remarkable—method of the "Hundred Flowers" as in Nazi Germany in 1943—there was a period of apparent liberalism when expressions of all sorts of criticism, deviationism, idealistic and religious inclinations and so on, were tolerated, authorized, even encouraged. Then, after all opponents had spoken, the wage of repression hit them: arrests, jail sentences, and above all, political-reeducation took place. The purpose of the "Hundred Flowers Campaign" was to make opponents come out so they could be arrested, and eliminated. The subsequent rectification campaign could not, in Mao's words, be "gentile" as a breeze or a summer rain for the enemies of the people. (2)

To take an expressive affirmation concerning the depth of IS anteriority of dimension, We must re-analyze Al-Kassassbah video message to decipher the inqualifiable inwardness of IS ideology of contestation. Everything is prior to plan, or everything is planned in priority. Is it certain
that in this teleology to exposedness that temporalizing the understandable is inverted? Indeed, burning in slow scansions (Foreignness to the sensible), primitive cage (Animalism), and Guantanamo’s orange detention clothes (revenge) can be understood in several senses. Tough, they can mean, principally, that IS thematic analogy (filming on the ruins of home destroyed by the pilot’s F-16) is devalorized in the hetero-structurality of levels (insurgency Versus state) by the condensation of refrains on the pre-modern animalism, laid out in burning an “innocent pilot who did nothing but mere air-reconnaissance tasks”.

Conclusion:

Systematics subordinate the relation with the enemy to the origin of externalization of qualities, systematics thus transform the becoming of proximity, whose inter-identicalness the enemy alone cannot possibilize. If the externalization of qualities is expressly and fully experienced as the ground of the fractality, and if autonomy is conceived and qualified as a valuation of nihility, then the dialectical cycle, as systematic rotation of wholes, is co-determined by fractality.

This is undoubtedly one of the most hyper-complex “solidarities” of analycity. What is essential is the truth that the IS pre-dialectical object non-linearly leads to negating its negating matheme (lacan) of communication (Insurgent entities x international legal system/arms industry corporations’s differential). It means that IS is dialectical through its pre-dialectical enunciation (PROPAGANDA) in negating the correlations of its diastasis, because it grasped the anachronistic inversion to autonomize its object by fractal non-correspondence. We cannot fail to emphasize here the genealogy of splitting as condition and assemblage of fractality for insurgent groups. I'm not surprised to recall the differential effects that have informed Jihadist experience since Al-Qaeda has externalized its organizational concept outside Afghanistan (2003), to be nearly negated by its first segment after Al-Qaeda-in-Iraq rejected Al-Qaeda type of organization and transformed itself to a pseudo-local Islamic state (2006). Jabhat-AlNusra (2012) which, for a diffracted segment from the Iraqi segment, opposed itself the exteriority that occurs in the Iraqi insurgency as an absence of Communal partisanship. There is nothing mysterious in Al-Qaeda identity
of experience throughout its history of externalization: it is essentially the same, the same superseding externalization, without the origin ever determining it. A dialectical diffraction that lives under the locality of freedom.

A terrorist Propaganda machine is then not without a datum, but it has a performativity of striving, that is, without facticity; it has a purely generic mode whose center it schematizes. This machine is not concerned with situating terrorist entities in proximity to their de-singularization. It is rather a discursive externality without consciousness to which the nudity of the understandable corresponds.

References:

2- Ibid, P :308
CHAPTER III:
TERRORISM AND PROPHYLAXIS:
EXERCISES
In the unicity as reflection, peace becomes a factual disclosure of dominance, for in the unicity as reflection is articulated the anachronistic responsibility of willing interior to every authentic precedence of presencing. The recuperation of peace and war does not exhaust the beingness of space in the abandonment of the “there” in which gravitates history, nor in the pressing of being towards the determinability of duration, but rather in the decline of intolerance as a modal commandment by which the primal striving to dominance is “manipulated”.

Peace can be “produced” only outside the discontinuity of its management whereby peace as process is proposed to enact the determinants of values in actualizing what is no longer involved by any categorial modalization of peace. That means, peace is sought to invert the quality of the principal contradiction which is “deterrence”, by reproducing it as index of capacity to perform the a fortiori temporalization of violence, not what is admitted to be -in conformist jargon- an alternative to war, given that peace is not the symmetric alternation of war because it is predisposed to “individuate” the asymmetry of this alternation through preserving the positing of its revocation. Peace is, nevertheless, the infra-sensuous middle, whose accomplishment by the source (war) of its original positing is the genuine continuity of war due to what has deliberately been encompassed by means of battles. It’s not a period when we must find the enemies which suits us (Cioran), for war has never been the emergence of a compelled act to preserve interests and the sovereignty that establish their character of rapports. War is an act reflected upon its “otherwise support of recurrence” without going countercurrent to dim its phenomenon down as existing whole because it can never be eliminated but barely “superseded”. In this context, peace appears as the periodicity of post-aleatory aggregations by means of “what-is-no-longer-futural” by the motive of war.

To perdure subduction as the ruptural “toward-oneself-without-distance” in signification of existence, as the tracing back beyond the condition to
the suprasensuous advocate that founds it, is to separate oneself from a stochastic tradition that sought the foundation of the ontological determinacy of contact, outside the heteronomy of becoming. We think that permanence for itself is not the ultimate meaning of perduring, but rather the putting back into question of the self, the turning back to what is prior to oneself, in the detour of the Other. The presence of the Other, a privileged heteronomy, does not impair freedom but invests in its modular accomplishment. Subduction is articulated through its return. The essence of reason consists not in securing for man a foundation and powers, but in assisting its being in inviting him to preeminence.

Contact therefore does not consist in bending over the presencing of the ‘I’ to seek in the transiency of comporting the transposition in the being of power. It is not in the transposition whose appropriative determination corresponds to what is articulated in the disposedness where that contact is posited. To be sure, the individualism of the I marks the break with the participation and opens the possibility of seeking an encounter for oneself, that is, not a dependence upon an exteriority without this dependence absorbing the irreducible diachrony of identifying accompaniments. This practice, consequently, at the same time maintains independence as a principle of economy; such is the face to face relation? In the quest for truth, a work eminently individual, comes back to the negating givenness of the individual. The determination of creation lies in creating a dissemination in dominance. And this implies precisely bodying forth the limits of our exteriority, but at the same time, beyond exteriority, the differential positivity of the freedom that constitutes it.

The non-concept is a terrorist concept, that faculty of not coinciding with what is concrete through internalization, was not provided for in the disposedness of will. The jihadist knows it, but he has neither the courage to assume its ensemble nor to invert its essence by assimilation. Indifferent to his occupation, along amid himself, detached from his force of finding one’s register: how could he, why he is only vulgar? a being without intelligibility. There is Consciousness, a provisional filter of datum if he surely has one, he would manage to aggravate to its point of accumulation and to fall into fragments along with it by relating himself to its purposelessness, he will raise himself to his essence, and he will fulfill his mission to become his own enemy.
The lie is not an utterance opposed to the veridical word: it is the justification of violence in the flight of invariant perseverance in truth. The repetitive lie is beyond every lie, in the ordinary lie the speaker dissimulates himself, to be sure, but in the repetition, it is necessary to change the lie's referral to the sensuous in time in order to struggle for the survival of that which shall not be revived. The "I" is like a comprehension that seeks to cross through the fundamental contradiction of the other's encounter where reflection interlocks in non-participation without ever resting on a mode of conditions, without ever commencing.

The creation is offered in the political perspective of the event, it is borne by propositions. The event is the principle of the phenomena. The phenomena is not deduced from it, one does not rediscover it by tracing back from the representing of sign as determination of norm, in a movement analogous to that mode of possibility that applies to objects already given. The enemy cannot be revoked, for the relationship between him and me is governed by untotalizable exigency of risk. It is presupposed by every limitation, and not only because it is necessary to agree on that limitation, establish its conventions which cannot be laid down arbitrarily.

Community is no longer maintained as a fraction designating an ideological "matrice" of organization with regard to the power formation assumed by the mode of production, but rather as an intersection of para-professional relations of practical-universalistic model: it is the very society of agents, the utterance of subterranean segments modalized as an organic community, that now generates determinate communitarian forms as a differential index to its movement of arising. Even from this perspective, what reemerges is the logic of internalizing a concept of governance from within, what reemerges is a distancing of unicity in antagonist existence: community advances or withdraws, expands or contracts itself, on the basis of the space which has not yet been, mobilized by systematizing logic into a complex whole of inter-positions. When scholastic theory opposes an interventionist one to a static rationality, it remains within the same mechanistic paradigm, with an additional, defensive impasse. The diachronic buildup of communication constitutes, at the same time, the point of resistance and allows reserves to be "temporalized" toward whom the techniques of annulment would be "directed". The fact that community is understood as a paternalistic a priori rather than a atomistic index, or that community, considered as a
punctuality if not possibility, is pre-dialectical risk that eclipses the primordial and authentic meaning of community in the modern world.

The poverty of the categories – and thus of the intellect, is that of representing a factual given without the absolute intuition in schematism. Intuition is not ostensive but only heuristic for individuating the finitude of perspective. Heidegger said once “The realm of the possible and the real exists only in what is finite, and its distinguishability of possibility and reality belongs to the essence of Being, the being in general is finite in essence”(1). In the field of praxis in the ordinary sense, occurrence assumes the character of inter-performance. Every action of the self in this context is influenced by all things and in turn influences all things. Communitarian development becomes the multiplicity of the self, and the self becomes the character of this structuration. At such a fundamental level the world moves as “functor” of subduction for the society of agents. This idea is close to the Soviet-Yugoslav conception of Industrial espionage units that were deployed in Western Europe or the Cambridge Five organism, although in our situation, the destiny of self (as a discursive departure of the agent) in community is a fundamentally creative one. The “subduction” itself becomes function insofar as the drive is the occurrence in the becoming of power. This means that the drive of becoming itself reveals its profound transformation as an outside beingess of attainment; and at the same time, the self “intentionally” manipulates -within this world- the rapport with its inherent adversary.

Symbiotic subduction may be called the originary experience of intuition beyond the “prefigured” engagement of this world of becoming. The search for surpassing in a worldly category that transcends the coming to presence is, of course, negated by the pursuit of “exhausted” theme of termination with praxis that such our inner world hides from view. The collapse of IS, of its impermanence, comes to be seen as the activity of its own conditions, an activity without any transcendent de-singularization; it becomes the play of fatigue in the prescription of creative facticity which is absolute affirmation. That all experiences are ceaselessly cycled and passing away in despair is a positive source of self-overcoming; Moreover, this self-overcoming and its source can, just as they are, be a grounding possibility which inverts the dynamic quality of contradiction, a discipline leading to action
rather than actions (finalistic in essence) unsurprisingly leading to discipline.

The stochastic relation to the enemy which stems from the exteriority of withdrawal into willingness (primarily held by IS leadership) can be replaced by an interventionist order where the relations between individuated wills (agents) are reduced to the common subduction of wills in an aggregated whole, which is not exterior to wills. This is the State. It is the uncoverdness of temporalized internalization.

Now, if this is the knot, while in the past armed approach (traditional Jihad) was attempted as a field of contact with the enemy, I think the moment has come to cut it. This requires a new configuration of the infrastructure of the state power, which assumes a very strategic character. The determinate critique of infrastructure that I am advancing here is centered on the functional regime between superstructure and infrastructure. Each of these two regions seeks to ground itself from start to finish in a relation of force. This is related to the primacy of legal constitution, in that full engagement of society of agents in professional positions requires a denial of having already been "demarcated" within the political contradiction established by the enemy, as well as a denial of having been persisted in advance with an orientation to the Other's environing concern (formal institutionalism). Both regions stress that There is in the state a power of subjugation (assujettissment) contradiective to the articulation of any worldhood difference whatever as well as to any order of difference. Both the infrastructure and superstructure are unique and univocal, rather than dual entities. State power, as is widely known, pre-supposes an intersection of passages between sovereignty and its paradox, and can be inverted only inasmuch as subduction assumes a directionless comportment of convergences: dismissal by non-contradiction = coup d'Etat, so goes the doctrine. During a long phase of history, this identity of sovereignty and its paradox has been answered by a kind of subduction stemming from a society of agents. Obviously, this was an obscure indication of the determinacy of decisionism—in the form of Coups—as the unique causality of political transition. Or rather, it puts the very structure underlying armed insurgency along with traditional Jihad into crisis.
The morbid, or rather exhausting age of insurgency’s type of maneuvers has really made impossible the definitive victory of Jihadist factions. IS, in my view, bears the historical guilt of letting America win precisely through those solutions that served to reinvigorate the solution provided by American third way.

Democracy has freedom of objects. If it is true that real universal change occurs according to forms – those of governments – though in the permanence of the endless cycle of revolutions, it thus represents the synthesis of the immutable orders of things and the continual motion, but at the price of adding considerations to these forms: governments

Government configured as synthetic a priori, is precisely this conjunction, binding together order and its object, that must be critically exploited. It is a matter of detaching and juxtaposing the two terms—order versus object—because order is factual commitment to the same extent that object is transcending in essence. The problem of government must then be confronted on two sides: a negation of democracy must be accompanied by a paradigm, what I would call an analogical paradigm of passivity that would roll back to the negation of democracy insofar as negation is understood not as a process in accordance to its conditions, but an annulment in process to the principle of permanence that is aleatory in inherence. As we elaborate the figure of the agent, we should keep in mind that the agent needs to retrace the form of arising. Because it is precisely “awakening in time” that is the operational element in negating the regions of an immutable system; an awakening in the immutable.

Arising begins at the very point that consciousness determines the conditions of reality in experience, that is, conceives of the commitment “in the world” which lies beyond its nature qua being and encloses it; when it becomes self-conscious at the same time that it becomes conscious of the commitment that lies beyond its periodicity - when it becomes patience. Arising establishes a relationship with an commitment which is not assumed. Qua arising subject is the one for whom the exterior world exists in excess. From that moment on, his so-called subterranean “refuge”, his strictly signature, is illuminated with inclusion. The object of need, which is henceforth a provisional object, recuperates utility. Althusser’s thesis, advanced in “On the Materialistic dialectics – on the unevenness of origins”: (The speculative illusion is to
invert the order of things and puts the process of auto-genesis of the concept – the abstract- in the place of the process of auto genesis of the concrete), exhibits the modality of the real in the recognition of principles which self-consciousness brings to existence, which is invariant. This central modality, welcoming every commitment in function of its own worldhood, but capable of conceiving an arising as something factual to the inward system, and of representing to itself a commitment that is not yet assumed, makes the state a securing of the irreducible in the possible. Arising does not spring forth from withdrawal into willingness as IS maintains; it is not the autonomy of will; Arising rests on the worldliness of negation. The positing of agent, immersed and subterranean, in state is brought about as negation ahead-of-itself.

“Aucune classe ne peut durablement détenir le pouvoir d’État sans exercer en même temps son hégémonie sur et dans les appareils d’État” (3). We should realize that politics is not something exterior to hegemony as Althusser advances: Hegemony is not the primal striving of politics, it is an illocutionary occurrence “in” politics, and is inferred from its center, so that there have been and can be apparatuses without hegemony, where there is a “renounced” presence for power, and where the best that an apparatus can realize is shunted to the side. We are moving in this passage, through an opening in convergence (from different levels) reduced to the surpassing of appearance “in and upon state’s apparatuses” : faced with this drift, limiting oneself to the detention of state power is a mistake which is making more than a few people of good will waste their life.

The hegemony that believes it can withdraw from the will to “difference”, which is to say from the relation of the I to its alter-freedom, the hegemony of concealment, is an hegemony that can open its essence only through the disappearing In the enemy’s advent to my encounter. This recovering in effect exempts one from the mediation of becoming. But it has its price, because the exemption from the mediation of becoming is the premise of the dissolution of the enemy.

Now, we should generate a concept for a facticity of accomplishment that entails “subtracting” the political technique of violence as well as its differential variables; one should say that reality temporalizes its model of possibilities. Or even, more realistically, one should say that the unthinkable is the “actual against the possible”, hence the task of
subtracting a model of occurrence—that is, the uniqueness of any absolute, any ultimate “reigning”—is far from having become outdated. Striving continually bears witness to this claim as in the case of IS that it is made up of only entropic experiences without dialectical bearing. The "US style” commonly treats insurgency with military violence; it attributes the existence of terrorist insurgencies to the action of extremists, which can be repaired by isomorphic measures. The typology of dissolution of an insurgency is that which slips away from U.S—once again, with a profound fixation of strategy ‘once we scrutinize the merest memory, we are already to burst with rage'(4). Does this mean that ‘striving in the equiprobability of our inner dissolution will invert the quality of our undertaking of the unthinkable? Of course, it means that ‘striving is directionless in the valorization of its directness’; striving is thus first of all the ‘deliverance’ with no linear foundations before which our arising should be commanded. The enduring of IS in its dissolution by “US counter-insurgency style” is non-aggregative in the primacy of its self-exploitation, this enduring, staunchly provoked by “US military intervention”, will be inscribed in different forms and instruments in international politics after the death of traditional insurgency (traditional Jihad), in opposition to any drift towards an insurgent bloc, that is, towards the desperation of those who continue to struggle within a “self-contained contradiction”.

Normally the standpoint of "traditional insurgency" is said to be "non-operational," but in the case of IS, insurgency becomes the entity’s origin of future. This is the new direction that “US combat style” has opened up in coordinating small-scale paramilitary units (YPG, FSA etc) using a divisional air asset. In this overdetermination, the modelisation of coup d’Etat is the equivalent to the end of ideological understanding of ability “chez l’Etat Islamique”.

But US hardly estimates this. It lets it slip in overlooking that the institutional modelisation is "the irony of IS dissolution." IS does not recognize its ability, and yet, what an intuition! Gulmurod Khalimov, Abu-Ayman al-Iraqi and many other troublemakers, were truly situated in strategic positions of play, in the sense that assembled pieces of individuals always leave a space to accommodate their organization within the "play". The irony of the dissolution will certainly happen after exhausting IS’ semi-irregular mode of warfare. On the other hand, IS, to possibilize its structurality of strategy, should resort to an internal, institutional, and para-professional intersection of rapports in order to
modelise a coup d'Etat. We are now compelled to mould a sociology of coups that will enable us to ponder which political order can be exploited, and therefore targeted.

The only way out of this impasse is thus interventionism, at a certain point, of a prophylactic form: IS' new generation had to constitute itself by presupposing itself in its return, in an inter-sectorial convergence. In other words, it would not be operational for the new IS to posit itself as 'its own work', it had to presuppose itself as already-delivered from its presence. Or, to put it directly, the return to strategic positions (for example where Khalimov was situated) had to coincide with the another mode of return, to self-overcoming, a return to the future, which is determined in the last instance by violence. Coup d'Etat, the potentiality of violence as hierarchy, is determined by two grounds:

1-The Bonapartist formation of strategy of force relations.

2-The artistic performativity of execution at intersectional level.

Druze officers, in the post-colonial period, designated, par excellence, the pre-modern form of coup whose conditions of reproduction have been estimingly surpassed through transforming the relations of military structure and its correlation with the principal military contradiction (the necessity of a plural allocation of officer corps to preclude autonomous dominance of a sect over another)

Husni al-Za'im overthrown by a group of officers, of whom many are Druze; A coup that followed the attempt to intimidate the Druze Jabal area. The crucial armored unit commanders were Druze whose cooperation has been enlisted by the planners of the coup. The new regime starts its attempt to unite Syria with Iraq, and a new coup is planned to overthrow it and stop the union. Druze officers of the armored unit carry out the coup, which leads to Shishakli’s military dictatorship. Shishakli’s regime overthrown, Thus was preceded by his military occupation of the Jabal Druze area and his arrest of a Druze delegation, which led to disturbances and reprisals. The group which carried out the coup was composed of three factions, of which the druze was perhaps the most important. (5)

Druze secto-opportunistic control has forced Syrian authorities to change the entire discipline of allocation concerning military personnel's divisional allegiance. The primary actors were Druze armored officers in all the post-colonial coups, who had been perceiving themselves as
threatened to be exploited by the Syrian alliance of landowners and merchants and thereby to steal Druze land and culture. This type of secto-opportunistic coup cannot be reproduced in later stages of capitalist development of military norms because post-colonial armament structure was dominated by armored divisions with a stark lack of departmental mobile, sub-units of police and Gendarmerie; which means that armor was unrivaled at that time.

Pure auto-didactic is impossible in the temporal apprehension of modelling. Hizmet’s experience of “executive solidarity” can only succeed in reinvigorating the artistic norms of Bonapartist reterritoriality in the executive field of modelling. July's failed Coup is the determination of auto-erotic fixation reigning in the Turkish Armed Forces after 2007-2012 series of purges (Ergenekon). The executive solidarity can only be empirically stratified by the regulation of a deception-concept of antagonism between the fractional compositions of a determinate executive state apparatus that entails a peri-Bonapartist auto-administration -through the practice of leadership-of executive rapports in case of a purge. Gulenist Prosecuters, security officials, and affiliated Media neutrality between 2007-2012 was strategic due to promotions of Gulenist lower-rank officer corps and their intersection in different arms. But 2013-2016 series of purges, in short, was passive and exempt from a concept of diffraction (multiplicity of sub-fractions of a unitary fraction) for the executive transference of Bonapartism through the same scholastic norm, as was the case in the Bougrine (1971)-Oufkir(1972) duel coup in Morocco!

Executive solidarity presupposes a Bonapartism of concepts and a theatrical alternation of symbolism. It demands that we face up to transitive genitalization infra-stratification wherever it emerges - collateral encounters - in order to differentiate the positional intersections of apparatuses according to a non-positional norms of contact than those of encounters. An essential diagrammatic periodicity for a military coup against a paternalistic regime will be the structuration of military apparatus’s dominant fraction as an ensemble of sub-fractions that set a tautological plan they can auto-administrate in all stages, including the crisis stage, as did the Cambridge Five at the head of MI5 in screening logistical communication between soviet agents in Britain. Class warfare and linear periodicity of strategy have woefully led Hizmet and neo-Kemalist likewise to a endo-diagrammatic auto-erotism of neo-executive formations as a whole.
Beyond recognizing a static classicism of plan, the question becomes one of how to articulate the organization of military echelons and its synchronization with political strategy, and how to direct them towards a Bonapartist reterritoriality. Morocco's duel coup of 1971-72 interiorizes the systematicity of Bonapartist reterritoriality individually determined by the concept of intersectional convergence. Mohamed Oufkir was the valorization of this convergence. A WWII French colonialist army veteran of Gaullist veins who feverishly sympathizes with the conformistic progressivism of Nasserist Journalist Heikal. The same figure ruthlessly represses trade-unionist riots in Casablanca in 1965 and with the same vehemence crushes away protestations in Rif because he seemed to be a shrewd unbeliever of any means that revolutionary movement of Armed forces (Egypt 56, Libya 70). A progressive Nasserist, like all his executed friends in the Skhirat 71 ring, that nevertheless, welcomes Levi Eshkol's assistance of representatives in France as a determinant arms supplier in the assassination of his political rival Mehdi Ben Barka. Oufkir had a Gaullist sense that grasped very early the threat of his tricontinentalist saboteur, and deemed him a loudmouthed, untrustworthy hole of filters given his very stupid trajectory of political mobilization in bringing back a para-feodal collaborationist Monarch (Mohamed V) to his palace of whom he had woefully been expecting a “democratic allocation of power”. After the Skhirat ring had cracked down, Oufkir managed to rescue “patriotic remnants”; Amekrane, the commander of the Kenitra Air Base, was one between fewest rescued by the veteran during military coup investigations to take place in his own scheme. The Skhirat Trio comprising Medbouh, Ababou, and his French Army comrade Bougrine, in which Oufkir didn’t take a pro-active role, was undoubtedly a catastrophe that exposed him to restrictive, but very centralized operations that were nonetheless ramping up his leverage as a Defense and Interior Minister. The Trio’s Cracking was akin to a chess sacrificial exchange for a strategic concentration in central squares. According to Gilles Perrault, Oufkir was slogging through a regular practice of rotating officer corps through echeloned divisions to avoid the establishment of regional or administrative affiliations, and grew increasingly busy at the same time thinking of a professional scheme subordinated to the French tactical principles he learnt; brief, surprising, and a control-concept instrument for the coup scheme that was incomparably intuitive in conception of the 1972 plot, yet woefully
unable to govern its performance by the axiomatic modality of every coup which is a code communication for the operative Northrop F-5 pilots’ ring; this schematic vulnerability was exploited by Hassan II to save his own skin from rotting in the air with all his filthy mess—Gilles Perrault’s Notre Ami le Roi is a reliable documenting of this dual tragedy’s aftermath.

Oufkir’s intersectional convergence was not vigilantly stitched, and he suffered numerous avoidable blunders. For all his audacity and tactical agencement of the power relations he governed, Oufkir’s artistic performance was vulnerable, but his major superiority lies in his positive belief in the determinability of the executive branch of the state apparatuses in the power bloc formation. He came out, in the last instance, lopsided from the test embodied in Napoleon’s sifting criterion: “the greatest general is the one who makes the fewest mistakes”.

Conclusion:

The state is enacted between the alter-remoteness of passages, between localities of temporalization which do not enter into their capability, but in the differentializing proof of this remoteness. The illocutionary contact with the power bloc by way of condensation in the executive branch is the universality of access that cannot be “ex-communicated” from its singularity.
References:


CHAPTER IV: VOLUNTARIISM AS ENTROPY: EXERCISES
Voluntarism presents egoicity in terms of its resistance. It is clear why: if resistance, as such, is totalizing, there is no possibility that we can derive from it any dialectical finitude. Voluntarism can only be the teleology of alienation, of becoming the subject of its determination. There is a movement of determinations on which the modality of relation between voluntarism and the alienation depends. Let us assume for a moment that we are in the field of voluntarist becoming in the ontic sense: in that case voluntarism would be superseded by a specific content, by an extension in enactment. Thus we would conclude that resistance is egoicity-for-the-condition of extension; voluntarist performance would be passive and extension would be only one of its internal recuperation. So, let us modify the assumption: let us suppose that by “becoming” we do not understand an arrival in the transformation of the factical subject that just anticipates its elaboration by specific forms, but, rather, a passage to an “agencement” vis-a-vis the forms of determination that supersede it.

In that case the relation between voluntarism and alienation, between inscription and its teleological index, will be dramatically different: there will not be an aggregation, but an auto-structure of consequence.

The alienation will only acquire a content by exteriorizing itself in a mode of repression through which it can “communicates” its extension of egoicty. But the subject of alienation cannot be reduced to its specific content either, as it only functions as a drive for identification. Indeed, given that the latter is not an object-relating formation, this developing content will represent the organization of voluntarism identical to its passivity. That is, it will represent the principle of passivity as such.

All this Althusser has said and very well=(C’est la matérialité des éléments qui supporte la continuité, mais c’est le concept de la reproduction qui exprime sa forme spécifique parcequ’il envoie les déterminations différentielles de la matière.) But the relation which he neglects to derive from it is that in order for the concept to express its specific form, it is necessary that its object be first given in the unicity of its constitution. A voluntarist actor who had already constituted his imminence via his intuited postponement of judgment would in no way be able to distinguish his reproduction from the spontaneity of an “action en retour” which has not been worked on. Even if he were to utilize it according to the concept foreseen by idea, he would be inverting the concept and would thus, neutralizing his freedom in
enumerating non-hypothetical demarcations to which dialectics had access before him.

The relation of voluntarism to intuition is of a semiotic nature. The intuition of a model is not the passive transition to withdrawal into acceleration, in which voluntarism comes out as its transference; intuiting is rather the quality of being outside the executional sense itself; that is, an exterior act that remains ahead of its aggregates in the mode of indifference to what is immediate. But political voluntarism—or the politics of voluntarism—makes known to itself what it is “dialectical” by means of postponement, by an expressive economy rather than an economy of scansions. This peculiarity has been captured, among terrorist groupings, in the images of a ‘Al-Qaeda hijacking-pilots’ and Iraqi insurgency-later transformed into what stands for 2014 Caliphate-. The first, designed by Bin-Laden in his Afghan voluntary exile to impinge a large scale civil-war which indicates to what extent the jihadi conceptualization of power is no more than a pleasure; enjoyment of object-relating memory-traces into systemic energies; Voluntarism borders on energy determined by a monolithic unemployment of rhythm in the regulative sense. The 9/11 attacks—without reeling back to archival details—as a product of the politics of exile with rapport to the interval of Gulf war—were according to its artisan, formative for the condensation of jihadist interpellation, an interpellation toward faticizing the Hegelian suppressed-conserved conscious and thus transcending it as ruptural to the U.S hegemony. Voluntarism, isn’t it? why? Because he who endeavors to violates dialectics realizes in the last instance that he is condemned to live in his own “retard” and thoroughly within recoining what is “imitated” as rhythm (essentially determined by the “retard’). In other words, voluntarism is a logistical concept that becomes an communitarian extension of the self’s language of values. It is, In Cioran’s terms, “every form of impotence, of failure involves a positive character in the metaphysical order”. (1) The great problems of history are categorized in objects-modules that thematizes the localization of drives within the self.

Let’s simplify more and more; during 1990s, U.S administration continued old funding patterns that favored electronic surveillance-ideal for counting soviet warheads over human intelligence efforts better suited for penetrating terrorist groups. Although details about U.S intelligence spending are classified, conservatives estimates based on the declassified 1997 intelligence budget put annual human intelligence...
spending at $1,6 billion, a little more than the cost of building and launching a single spy satellite. The amount of money spent directly to support human intelligence operations in the field was even less. (2) This simply means Al-Qaeda-senior leadership had had an advantage in exploiting infrastructural determinants of adaptation within security institutions to establish multitude and intersections of para-professional convergences before the rotational transition of U.S administrations to a new national security model after the soviet state’s collapse.

But behind this “culture terroriste” we can also see the economic architype generated by Bin Laden’s interpellation, and subsequent manifestations represented by the 9/11 attacks, the very period of Bin Laden’s Parisian exile and of the enunciation of world-scale civil war’s “thématique”. In this regard, it is worth reflecting on the signifying chain of voluntarism, economism, and dialectics.

Al-Qaeda’s critique of the functional regimes in the interval of Gulf War in 1990s and its discourse about ‘U.S functional administration of its chains’ that precludes any possible autonomous unity of Islamic world turned, in 1998 (where Al-Qaeda operatives carried out the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar-Salam, Tanzania, killing more than 200 people and injuring more than 5,000 others), into an externalized symbolism by the mean of terrorism as rupture for the construction of a ‘new equilibrium’, founded on universality and crisis—a ‘refrain of coefficients” for the management of sovereignty by an authentic power bloc (i.e. through Jihadist rule of Sharia). It is to this shift that we shall turn first. The possibility of the dialectic is the impossibility of the periodization that is constituted dialogically. A periodicity of wholes that posits itself and maintains itself in terms of its démultiplication (of variabilities and dimensions): Dialectics is a movement of contradictions that grounds totality in the sublation of processual infinity of rotation. The constitution of state in the history of dialectics is, therefore, inferred from encounters of démultiplication, in which all chains, all contradictions are transformed back into a negative becoming which advances as autonomous beginnings (diffractions) in continuity with the motion of the systematic whole. Everything becomes demultiplied at every encounter by the “aperiodicity” of the negative—as in the form of -Aperiodic set of prototiles.
The question of administration is then of how to exteriorize the individuated ego in economic form of production, at the level of political strategy and organization. In other words, how to effect a "transition élargie" to being responsible for the reproduction of an economic type of practice that negates economism par excellence. It is in this sense that we should compare Al-Qaeda’s conception of power to the Italian’s leftist “Operaismo” of the 70s. The primal thesis that Operaists and Jihadists posit as crucial to the operational organization of society is: “the autonomy of the revolutionary agent qualitatively determines the conditions of productive processes (living in the community by one’s own rules)”. Evidently, the principal association here is that every variation that posits autonomy passively in a dialogical intelligibility drowns in the last instance in a face-à-face pre-dialectical plan of access. We have deemed earlier this dialogism voluntarist simply because it is a generalized “dissociation hors rythme”. Unfortunately, Negri, who is in any case always in this world, animated this principle by the class which suppresses itself, justified not in the category of self-overcoming, but in principle for the occurrence of revenge. He says:

“It is brutality that is open to the temptation to be arrogant: it is arrogance that is open to the temptation to be terror; it is terror that is open to the possibility of being comical. A paradox arises here: the negative power of the negative does not manage to be credible. Repression is not credible. Its spectacular form is paradoxical and ridiculous. Indeed, why not "swap Brezhnev for Pinochet"?” To laugh at repression is not to detend oneself but to define it, facing it as it presents itself.” (3)

Insofar as voluntarism is associative of “resistive” demonstration of energy, Our guiding theme must be then dialectics and, above all, what "the organic rhythm of dialectics " means. We could quickly say with a certain right that what has been noted about autonomism cannot be transformed to what "the rhythm of dialectical cycle" stands for because it is not a secondary relation or attunement in the way that voluntarism is. To say that terror is a regional determinability of access seems senseless. The “impasse” which have been lived in Syria inevitably remind us of the illocutionary materiality of diachronism as the energy of plan; we must view it from an operational perspective, either because our own impasse present us with the pre-dialectical plan of access in a clearer manner or, on the contrary, because our own practice has been
more accurately articulated on exceptional modes of contradictions (the partisan type of nationalistic revolutions -especially the Bolshevik one). We don't see as much utility to judge the past as the present. The dialectical cycle comes forward to transcend the resistance of the understandable we pass upon it. It supports totality and presupposes the wholeness of its negation by itself; having been overdetermined by monopolist rapports of production, it (our century) has generalized the determinability of aleatory differential (the excluded sector of oppositional movements) in history. This cycle and its differential indifferent to its movements, are nonetheless part of it, and we cannot describe it without either confirming or annulling it. Our task now is to know that the inseparability of dialectical cycle and the indifferent temporality of dis-accelerations which is situated in systemic conjunction with it qualitatively determine the standards of aleatory contact.

A revolutionary machine can always be “profiled” according to this praxis where the two polar aggregates are never exchanged but superseded by diffraction. This becoming is of inferred development, since it follows the generative fixations of dialectical cycle: it inverts its object down into qualities where a formal allocation of oppositional-rhythmic operations within a single cycle can be assisted. In fact, it contents itself with materializing the potentiality “toward” the given.

Let’s simply:

1) “inversion as destiny of finitude,” for instance to invert is to appropriate the order of things in a secondary standing-within-time. The decisional act of dialectic is not to let the opposites come forth, in order to see them but rather to actualize the sublation of their co-acceptance of rhythm.

2) the transformation of productive forces determines the rotation of dialectical cycle. Rotation in dialectics thus means: the transposition of opposites in terms of mobility (not complexity).

3) Sublation as category of dialectics means, preserving. This preservation is the modal accomplishment of dialectics (processual infinity with no index). This category remains important for the infra-individuation of complexity in the dialectical cycle.

It should be clear that the determinative categories dealt with here are not considered, to be the only or generally important ones in character and performative formation, except that they are primary nuclear ones in
determining the datable logistics of dialectical cycle. Even in questions of situational differences, dialectical patterns are eidetically negating or neutralizing theirs differential determinations, but in so far as the wholeness of the process is the indexal regime of its own temporalization. It seems justified now to regroup this analysis of relations and categories in the analogism of quasi-totality of past/present in order to situate the actuality of dialectical chains. And It is difficult, on the other hand, to separate from history a general needlessness of presencing, in the sense of factualizing historical acts in a present thématization. Was it ever truly convincing? Why all that, what if it is merely a conciliatory spontaneism? Understanding might be always much more easier than ideology. What gives this agencement legitimacy in presencing history via the thématique of the other is the axiomatic interpellation of this disposition as an "syntactic stratum", given that all genetic operators are transformed after every operation. Freedom of presencing should not conceive the conjuncture as a standing-open (Heidegger) that tends toward a predisposed comportment. Conjuncture is, at first, systematized by what is articulated and mobilized by the operation of its autonomy, as a friendship between two passengers in a sub-Saharan desert that we would notice in our everydayness; it presents itself constrictive yet undetermined: it is a quality which regulates our "understandable" with the indivisible materiality of "conjuncture" and which makes this life our charge.

The Spanish Civil War (SCW) in this respect, seems to be concernfully in context to serve as a ‘natural history’ of such diagrams given its historical pre-war role on the informational division of semi-regular organizations, interventionist policies, and the absence of dialectical judgment in politico-military action. This sequential demonstration of SCW’s phases of administration -especially its deep analogy with the Syrian conflict- is to a set of concluding remarks on the role of dialectics and the strategy of interventionism in the practice of the ‘neo-executive movement.

On 18 July 1936 military insurgents in Spain declared a State of War without the consent of the Government, with the aim of overthrowing the Popular Front Government of the Spanish Republic. The uprising was successfully resisted in many parts of Spain, and thus developed into the Civil War of 1936–9, ending with the victory of General Franco on 1 April 1939. The Republic constructed what was in effect a new army, which it
called the Popular Army of the Republic (Ejército Popular de la República). In the Republican press the Popular Army (the Spanish adjective popular means ‘of the people’ but to call it ‘People’s Army’ would suggest a similarity to forces which did not exist at the time, as well as begging the question of communist influence) was also often called the Spanish Army, to underline the fact that Franco’s forces were foreign, as indeed they were to a greater extent than those of the Republic. Its opponents generally called it the ‘Red’ Army or Ejército Rojo. Here it is called the Republican Army. (4) With this term, which is a synonym for voluntarist model, I mean that what presents itself to us in the Spanish experience is never something that is intuitively self-aleatory, nor autonomous; neutralization mobilizes its necessity through the category of tempo, but tempo does not experience neutralization, so that praxis is called to the work of temporalizing positions in order that what there is does not dissipate. In 1932, while from 20,576 officers the lists were reduced to 12,373. It would be difficult to analyze whether the friction and bitterness caused by this block to the careers of so many officers inclined them towards insurrection in 1936 against a Republic of which Manuel Azaña, author of the retirements decree, became President in May 1936.

Before that, the divisions in the Army over the promotion system were most evident in the hostility between the artillery and the engineer corps on one side, and the infantry on the other. The former swore, when they received their commissions, to accept promotion only by strict seniority, and thought that battlefield promotions were often unfair and due to pure luck. The crisis came to a head during the dictatorship of General Primo de Rivera. He insisted on making abundant battlefield promotions during the Riff war, contravening the 1918 Ley de Bases, which allowed such promotions on a very restrictive basis. Consequently, the artillery officers declared a strike. As a result, some 2,000 of them were suspended without pay. (5)

It is also worth stressing that left-wing opinion was convinced that too many officers with progressive views had accepted the retirement offer, among them several of those involved in the failed Republican uprising in Jaca in 1930. Franco himself believed that most monarchist officers had remained in the Army. 10 The main criticism of some authors is that the Republic did lose officers indiscriminately, given that Azaña refused to purge the Army politically. He thought that all those officers who were unhappy about serving the Republic had
been granted retirement under favourable conditions. Indeed, many of the men who would hold high commands in the Republican Army during the war, for instance Antonio Cordón, Adolfo Prada and Francisco Galán, had taken advantage of Azaña’s decree to take early retirement.  

If we wish to summarize in a few words the condition of militar-executive formation, we would say what I myself see in the Syrian civil war; catastrophic development of class-autonomy of military system under the dominance of a monopolist military faction. The Africanists faction had all the ingredients: they were superior in the logistical plan of economy of force, unrivaled in the system of positions, and “blessed” by the aleatory 1932 promotion system that bluntly favored the autonomy of the Africanists faction as well as sifted out the republican cadres from divisional command.

The Nationalists had advantage in coordinating all the operational variables because their Italian and German allies provided a large amount of equipment and munitions on a steady basis. Early in the war the Nationalists also established lines of credit and, with the sea lanes mostly under Nationalist control, were able to import motor vehicles and fuel from the United States with little hindrance. Supply was more difficult for the Republic. Although the Republic had ample credit to buy munitions, in the form of Spain’s gold reserve of $500 million, importation of weapons was made difficult by the international embargo on weapons to Spain. The easiest way for the Republic to import military supplies was by rail through France, but France kept her borders closed to arms shipments for Spain for most of the war. This situation meant that the only reliable source or military supplies for the republic was the Soviet Union, and the Soviets had to send weapons and supplies via a long sea route into Spanish ports while avoiding Nationalist and Italian naval attacks. Even when the supplies got through to Republican-controlled harbors, the port facilities were still subject to regular air attacks.

The Africanist had also a prophylactic faculty in autonomizing their masse of power from the army before the coup. Documents suggest that Contacts between the military conspirators and Germany dated at least back to the 1920s, well before Hitler obtained the chancellorship. The Spanish generals’ main contacts centered on important military contractors and some members of the German armed forces. As the conspiracy began picking up steam following the Popular Front elections of 1936, the leaders of the plot began efforts to generate international support. The original leader of the coup, General Jose Sanjurjo, traveled to Berlin in
the spring of 1936 with the intention of obtaining weapons. Despite his efforts, however, there is no evidence that he met with any official representative of the German government. As a result, these negotiations came to naught, and no weapons, or promises of weapons, resulted from Sanjurjo's journey. The role of the German intelligence agency (Abwehr) has often been cited as proof of Germany's involvement in the plot. While the agency did have representatives in Spain prior to the civil war, all available evidence supports the conclusion that the nation was a low priority for the German government. The contacts that did exist revolved around the exchange of intelligence on the operations of leftist groups. In addition, only one of the Abwehr agents in Spain had any knowledge of the uprising, and that operative's information only days before the event occurred. (8)

In retrospect, dialectical modernity and anarchism don't go hand in hand, and the over-determination of a whole stage regionally and temporally opened up by a exceptional phase of transition (fascism) which leaves the possibility of radical maneuvers (initiated or at best anticipated by the battle-hardened Africanists) without function. This perspective involves a break with the anarchical exteriority of “retiring” from the executive branch of state apparatuses, and recalls interventionist “agencement” in tempo and position within the executive branch.

The accumulation of retirement, antimilitarism, and workerist tendencies as strategy for working-class organisations, (antimilitarism for example) was an essential element in the fundamental concepts of Spanish anarchism, and this would lead to many problems in the Republican Army during the 1936–9 Spanish Civil War. Socialists were opposed less to the Army in principle than in practice, because the burden of military service fell heavily on the working class. For the Left in general, Morocco was a hotbed of corruption, favouritism and self-interested cliques. (9)

Conservative scholars, among them Stephane Courtois, Jean-Louis Panne, and Ronald Radosh, have argued that Stalin wanted to establish Spain as a client state, much in the manner of Eastern Europe a few years later. If so, why did he not provide enough help to win the war? The alternative reading is that he was using Spain to establish an antifascist alliance with the Western democracies. When that strategy failed—and it failed decisively when the democracies ceded
Czechoslovakia to Adolf Hitler at Munich in September 1938—Stalin lost interest in Spain. Stalin was thus no idealist, a conclusion one should not ignore.\(^{(10)}\)

The revolutionary crisis climaxed in early May 1937, when tensions between pro- and antirevolutionary movements in Catalonia exploded into a series of bloody street engagements known as the May Days. The conclusion of this war within a war on 5 May marked the definitive end of CNT involvement in national government, the end of the revolutionary drive started ten months before, and the beginning of strong communist influence in the Republican camp. Ultimately, the anarcho-syndicalists were outmaneuvered by their Republican and communist opponents, who exploited the collective responsibility of the antifascist war effort to erode the CNT's sources of popular power gained in July 1936.\(^{(28)}\)

from the front in every sense of the word. The central government fled to Valencia from Madrid (opposed by the CNT representatives in the cabinet who stayed in a show of unity). This event ensured that much of the membership in Barcelona did not fully understand the need for a unified and comprehensive military effort. Asturias was the area with anarchist strength before the war and where unity between the different factions occurred at a much more profound level, but its geographic isolation from the Republican heartland and its conflicts with the governments in Santander and the Basque region prevented this collaboration from success in military terms. Any hopes of replication in other areas were destroyed when the Nationalists conquered the region. Moreover, anarchism, by and large, resisted the elimination of the militias formed at the outbreak of the civil war and the incorporation of these forces into a centralized and hierarchical military structure. While some anarchists such as Mera successfully rose to positions in the unified Republican Army, others felt that that was a prequel to domination by other Popular Front forces. Many units made up of anarchists unsuccessfully resisted, most notably the (in)famous Iron Column in Valencia, which became the 83rd Brigade. The Iron Column, composed primarily of freed convicts, further contributed to the perception that libertarian units were undisciplined, violent, and to be feared.\(^{(11)}\)

There is no external criterion by which one can determine the freedom of conflict, but there is a powerlessness of motifs by which one recognizes it. Syria nowadays is at the point to renounce its assumption by the indifference of surpassing itself in diffraction, since jihadist insurgents reason under the category of pure “legalism” and since
The facticity of accomplishment is negated by a series of decisions taken under their freedom of powerlessness; The Syrian civil war is structurally determined by the interplay of legalistic potentialities, since what is advanced indiscriminately into situation each time is the paralleled and pre-dialectical legalism of Islamic “legal circuits” subtracted from determinist extrapolations (mainly the history of early Islamic wars, whose principles are unsurprisingly superseded).

The rotation of dialectical cycle is determined by the principality of oppositional masses and their communication. Accordingly, the Syrian conflict is being qualified as post-dialectical, whose future has no positive freedom: that is to say, the jihadist factions have withdrawn from the possibilization of their becoming. The Jihadist’s itinerary of war since 2014 (after a thrilling 2013 year) has been a legalistic withdrawal into willingness largely due to the Jihadist opposition to “endure” the intra-contradictions of factionalism and the administration of reserves according to the dialectical system of positions.

Let’s delve into a brief monitoring of this itinerary in order to “décortiquer” (decorticate) the meaning of events:

1- In April 2013, Baghdadi announced ISI operations in Syria and changed the group’s name to the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). He also claimed that ISI had created al-Nusra in Syria, and that the two groups were now merged into one.

2- The locations in which IS is exerting control share other commonalities besides proximity. A number of them, such as al-Raqqa, were previously liberated by Jabhat al-Nusra, often in concert with FSA units. Some of these towns have been free of regime control since early in the war and have struggled to provide rule of law and services. Despite the public dispute between JN and ISI(S) surrounding ISI(S)’s creation, in practice the groups have continued to work together, and ISI(S) seems to have stepped in to exert influence in a number of areas where JN was known to operate. Since there have been no known JN/ISI(S) clashes over these areas it appears that this transition has been fluid and at least tacitly approved by JN. (UnderstandingWar.org)

3- Fluid series of jihadist captures of towns by different commonalities to the extent of a quasi-complete cooperation between ISIS and JFS factions in Ladhequia’s northern suburbs after and before the
assassination of JFS prominent figure in Ladhequia Abu- Bassir Al-Ladiquani.

4- In Oct 2013, snarling between factions relatively vanished from sight, and rebels commonly celebrate Eid el-Adha in shivering fraternal atmosphere, commemorated by comradeship pictures (JN,Ahrar, and ISIS).

5- November, December 2013: Syrian factions indirectly adopted a task-division system that coordinated the rebel’s military efforts. Ex: ISIS partly successful offensive that followed Jaysh al-Islam failed offensive on Aleppo’s Southern town Al-Sfira.

6- December 2013: Rebel military effort takes the shape of an intra-complex spectrum-type of concentrations in almost every town.

7- January, 2014 crisis that led to the current carnage between factions and since then no change has limped into scene but continuous fight.
This structure of this reflection has transformed the Syrian rebel's partisan rapports from a differential support by endurance, to agents who regroup their energy via a legalistic thématique, thus desystematizing the regime of contradictions by positing it as an idea-ground as the anarchists did, who likewise express it in terms of individualism. Therefore, the dialectical contact of consciousness, aside from the fact that it fixes the proximity rapport with the indivisible whole, is heuristically assigned to reduce the powerlessness of motifs. Yet if we accept the objective existence of dialectical contact of praxis, we are obliged to conceive a mode of possibilization different from the principle of actuality in-itself, a unity which articulates contradiction by diffraction, not in the Leninist legalism of destruction and destruction and destruction. The duality of dialectical contact of reflecting and reflecting upon the rapports of my reflection (superseding the egoicity of reflection) that we are referred to is the principal determinant of prophylaxis, and this term in turn determines the unitary immanence of hierarchy. But if on the contrary we wish to take our point of departure from legalism as such and to posit conjuncture and autonomy of concentration as auto-aggregative, then we would encounter the pre-reflective agencement of the non-existent generality we wish to neutralize (The every time monopolist expansionism of U.S). This is unfortunately what has not been achieved in Syrian Civil War. Let's get again to terrain to situate the theory therein:

1- Violating the principle of sublation by: fighting ISIS, that finally led to an entitarian autonomy of governance on towns between factions which ostensibly influenced combat power ratio and the logistical plan of battles. It is worth noting that during the climax of crisis in Jan 2014 between factions, the rebels lost control - essentially due to extreme lack of men power (few elements of JN while the others were turning the rifle against ISIS) - on Industrial city of Sheikh-Najjar which is contiguous to Al-Sfira’s defense factory. A lost battle that will later change the whole theatre of operation in Northern Syria.

2- Violating the principle of rotation: The autonomism of plans and movements has led in its turn to loosening stress on Assad troops which was not without price, especially if we remember that combat performance between factions qualitatively differs in concept and tempo (FSA strength in medium-range ammunition and ISIS strength in tactical penetration), that is, the unitary
quality of stress has vanished. Therefore the tempo of operation against regime forces has taken the shape of a French style limited and passive offensives, spawning an advance rate of less than 1km/day and a paralytic dependence on foreign assistance that developed later to a satellite-controlling by Saudi-Arabia, Qatar, U.S etc. ... 

3- Violating the principle of inversion: the entitarian development of factions gave heed to survivalistic battles between ISIS and JN supported by moderate rebels that ended by rooting out the alliance of JN and FSA factions from southern swathes of Heseke (Murgada for example) and full-control of Deir-Ezzour Eastern governorate. This concentration on almost the half of Syrian borders with Iraq precipitated in turn the attack on Mosul in June 2014, thus leading to a transition of superposed insurgency. This superposition is the voluntarist coexistence of legalistic praxis and plan since every insurgency has to invert the politico-military rapport of production and de-singularizes its transition in the state as a differential norm of political object in order to autonomize the substantiality of inverting from the non-existence of differential rapport. Afterwards it can pursue protracted meddling in foreign affairs without loosing and beginning from nothing.

Conclusion:

We can manipulate modern conflict by dialectics, precisely because the world is nothing but what can be aggregated from its invariables, beyond the actual, which posits and monopolize monadically without disposedness. The act of prophylactic positing is accomplished in discovering the indexal entities of a giveness by interoperable intuition that is, intuiting the intelligibility of future and reflecting on that intuiting as action en retour; otherwise it would be looked at in an instantaneous in-itself commitment, that it passes to reality through the identification of its region.

The unitary series of dialectical cycle has an ontological priority over actuality, for actuality is simply the regional relation of a monad in the wholeness of series. Jihadist political programme rests precisely on such a de-ontologized, even stochastic, grasp of actuality (Wirklichkeit). How else is the decisionistic instance of the state to be understood if not as the transition of the subduction of rationalities, as the spectrum of ISIS,
JN, and others—de-centering themselves from the administration of the state, and assembling theirs forms of selfsameness via the nomadic archetype … the inefficiency of the political apparatus? Political decisionism or, more precisely, voluntarist formalism situates itself in the place of the negative.

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