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Viewing cable 10SANAA4, GENERAL PETRAEUS' MEETING WITH SALEH ON SECURITY

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Reference ID Date Classification Origin
10SANAA4 2010-01-04 13:01 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Sanaa
INFO  LOG-00   EEB-00   AF-00    AID-00   ACQ-00   INL-00   DOTE-00  
      PERC-00  PDI-00   DS-00    EAP-00   EUR-00   OIGO-00  FAAE-00  
      FBIE-00  VCI-00   H-00     TEDE-00  INR-00   IO-00    LAB-01   
      MOFM-00  MOF-00   M-00     VCIE-00  DCP-00   NSAE-00  ISN-00   
      NIMA-00  MCC-00   PM-00    GIWI-00  SCT-00   ISNE-00  FMPC-00  
      SP-00    IRM-00   SSO-00   SS-00    NCTC-00  CBP-00   SCRS-00  
      PMB-00   DSCC-00  PRM-00   DRL-00   SAS-00   FA-00    SWCI-00  
      SANA-00    /001W
 
O 041333Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY SANAA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3474
INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI IMMEDIATE 
AMEMBASSY ASMARA IMMEDIATE 
AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI IMMEDIATE 
AMEMBASSY DOHA IMMEDIATE 
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 
AMEMBASSY RIYADH IMMEDIATE 
CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE
CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE
DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
FBI WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
NCTC WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
S E C R E T SANAA 000004 
 
 
NOFORN 
 
DEPT FOR NEA/FO AND NEA/ARP 
NSC FOR DPNSA BRENNAN 
HQ USCENTCOM/CCCC-CIG FOR JSEATON 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/04/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR PINS MOPS MASS MCAP SA
AE, UK, ER, DJ, QA, YM 
SUBJECT: GENERAL PETRAEUS' MEETING WITH SALEH ON SECURITY 
ASSISTANCE, AQAP STRIKES 
 
REF: 2009 SANAA 1430 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Stephen A. Seche for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). 
 
 
1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: Commander of the U.S. Central Command 
General David Petraeus congratulated President Saleh on 
recent successful operations against AQAP, and informed him 
that U.S. security assistance to the ROYG would increase to 
USD 150 million in 2010, including USD 45 million to equip 
and train a CT-focused aviation regiment under the Yemeni 
Special Operations Forces.  Saleh requested that the U.S. 
provide 12 armed helicopters and train and equip three new 
Republican Guard brigades.  Saleh rejected the General's 
proposal to have USG personnel armed with direct-feed 
intelligence present inside the area of CT operations, but 
agreed to a have U.S. fixed-wing bombers circle outside 
Yemeni territory ready to engage AQAP targets should 
actionable intelligence become available.  END SUMMARY. 
 
SALEH: HELICOPTERS, HELICOPTERS, HELICOPTERS 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
2. (S/NF) CENTCOM Commander General David Petraeus, 
accompanied by the Ambassador, CENTCOM aides, the Embassy 
DATT, and EconOff note taker, congratulated President Saleh 
on successful operations against AQAP during a January 2 
meeting.  The General told Saleh that he had requested USD 
150 million in security assistance for 2010, a substantial 
increase over the 2009 amount of USD 67 million.  Also 
present were Minister of Defense MG Muhammed Nasser Ahmad Ali 
and Deputy Prime Minister for Defense and Security Affairs 
Rashad al-Alimi.  Raising a topic that he would manage to 
insert into almost every item of discussion during the hour 
and half-long meeting, Saleh requested that the U.S. provide 
the ROYG with 12 armed helicopters.  Possessing such 
helicopters would allow the ROYG to take the lead in future 
CT operations, "ease" the use of fighter jets and cruise 
missiles against terrorist targets, and allow Yemeni Special 
Operations Forces to capture terrorist suspects and identify 
victims following strikes, according to Saleh.  The U.S. 
could convince Saudi Arabia and the UAE to supply six 
helicopters each if the American "bureaucracy" prevented 
quick approval, Saleh suggested.  The General responded that 
he had already considered the ROYG's request for helicopters 
and was in discussions with Saudi Arabia on the matter.  "We 
won't use the helicopters in Sa'ada, I promise.  Only against 
al-Qaeda," Saleh told General Petraeus. 
 
3. (S/NF) Saleh agreed to General Patraeus' proposal to 
dedicate USD 45 million of 2010 security assistance funds to 
help establish and train a YSOF aviation regiment, allowing 
YSOF to focus on al-Qaeda targets and leaving Sa'ada air 
operations to the Yemeni Air Force.  Without giving much 
detail, Saleh also requested that the U.S. equip and train 
three new Republican Guard brigades, totaling 9,000 soldiers. 
 "Equipping these brigades would reflect upon our true 
partnership," Saleh said.  The General urged Saleh to focus 
first on the YSOF aviation regiment. 
 
AQAP STRIKES: CONCERN FOR CIVILIAN CASUALTIES 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
4. (S/NF) Saleh praised the December 17 and 24 strikes 
against AQAP but said that "mistakes were made" in the 
killing of civilians in Abyan.  The General responded that 
the only civilians killed were the wife and two children of 
an AQAP operative at the site, prompting Saleh to plunge into 
a lengthy and confusing aside with Deputy Prime Minister 
Alimi and Minister of Defense Ali regarding the number of 
terrorists versus civilians killed in the strike.  (Comment: 
Saleh's conversation on the civilian casualties suggests he 
has not been well briefed by his advisors on the strike in 
Abyan, a site that the ROYG has been unable to access to 
determine with any certainty the level of collateral damage. 
End Comment.)  AQAP leader Nassr al-Wahishi and extremist 
cleric Anwar al-Awlaki may still be alive, Saleh said, but 
the December strikes had already caused al-Qaeda operatives 
to turn themselves in to authorities and residents in 
affected areas to deny refuge to al-Qaeda.  Saleh raised the 
issue of the Saudi Government and Jawf governorate tribal 
sheikh Amin al-Okimi, a subject that is being reported 
through other channels. 
 
SHIFTING AIRSTRIKE STRATEGIES 
----------------------------- 
 
5. (S/NF) President Obama has approved providing U.S. 
intelligence in support of ROYG ground operations against 
AQAP targets, General Petraeus informed Saleh.  Saleh reacted 
coolly, however, to the General's proposal to place USG 
personnel inside the area of operations armed with real-time, 
direct feed intelligence from U.S. ISR platforms overhead. 
"You cannot enter the operations area and you must stay in 
the joint operations center," Saleh responded.  Any U.S. 
casualties in strikes against AQAP would harm future efforts, 
Saleh asserted.  Saleh did not have any objection, however, 
to General Petraeus' proposal to move away from the use of 
cruise missiles and instead have U.S. fixed-wing bombers 
circle outside Yemeni territory, "out of sight," and engage 
AQAP targets when actionable intelligence became available. 
Saleh lamented the use of cruise missiles that are "not very 
accurate" and welcomed the use of aircraft-deployed 
precision-guided bombs instead.  "We'll continue saying the 
bombs are ours, not yours," Saleh said, prompting Deputy 
Prime Minister Alimi to joke that he had just "lied" by 
telling Parliament that the bombs in Arhab, Abyan, and Shebwa 
were American-made but deployed by the ROYG. 
 
ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT IN MIL-MIL RELATIONS 
----------------------------------------- 
 
6. (S/NF) General Petraeus praised cooperation between the 
Embassy and the NSB, YSOF, Yemeni Coast Guard (YCG), and 
Counterterrorism Unit (CTU), but singled out relations with 
the Yemeni Air Force as problematic.  Only four out of 50 
planned U.S. Special Operations Forces Command training 
missions with the Yemeni Air Force had actually been executed 
in the past year, he said.  Saleh said he would personally 
instruct Minister of Defense to improve the situation.  The 
General also urged Saleh to stop Yemeni Customs' habit of 
holding up Embassy cargo at the airport, including shipments 
destined for the ROYG itself, such as equipment for the CTU. 
Saleh laughed and made a vague pledge to have the customs 
issue "taken care of."  Saleh complained that the ROYG had 
not yet received the necessary training to operate 17 Iraqi 
Light Armored Vehicle (ILAVs) provided by the USG in 2008, 
saying that YSOF needed the training in order to use the 
ILAVs for CT operations.  The General said he would look into 
having U.S. Special Operations Forces personnel conduct the 
training. 
 
7. (S/NF) Pointing to the ROYG's problems in combating 
rampant drug and arms smuggling, Saleh told General Petraeus 
that U.S. maritime security assistance was insufficient to 
cover Yemen's nearly 2,000 km of coastline.  "Why not have 
Italy, Germany, Holland, Japan, Saudi, and the UAE each 
provide two patrol boats?" Saleh suggested.  The General told 
Saleh that two fully-equipped 87-foot patrol boats destined 
for the Yemeni Coast Guard were under construction and would 
arrive in Yemen within a year.  Saleh singled out smuggling 
from Djibouti as particularly troublesome, claiming that the 
ROYG had recently intercepted four containers of 
Djibouti-origin TNT.  "Tell (Djiboutian President) Ismail 
Guelleh that I don't care if he smuggles whiskey into Yemen 
-- provided it's good whiskey ) but not drugs or weapons," 
Saleh joked.  Saleh said that smugglers of all stripes are 
bribing both Saudi and Yemeni border officials. 
 
SALEH WELCOMES LONDON CONFERENCE 
-------------------------------- 
 
8. (S/NF) Saleh told the General that he welcomed PM Gordon 
Brown's announcement of the London conference and said that 
the cooperation on Yemen between the U.S., EU, Saudi Arabia, 
and the UAE would be benefitial.  Qatar should not be 
involved, however, because "they work with Iran."  In this 
regard, Saleh also identified Qatar as one of those nations 
working "against Yemen," along with Iran, Libya, and Eritrea. 
 
9. (U) General Petraeus did not have an opportunity to clear 
on this cable. 
 
 
SECHE